FORUM: IL RUOLO DEI CARISMI NELLA VITA ECONOMICA E CIVILE

I carismi hanno un impatto anche nella vita civile, politica ed economica dei popoli? Oppure la loro azione si situa a un livello pre-economico/politico/civile, livello che potremmo chiamare personale o spirituale?
Il forum cerca di rispondere a queste e altre domande, e raccoglie, dopo il saluto del Preside dello IUS Piero Coda e un'introduzione di Luigino Bruni e Barbara Sena, alcuni dei papers presentati e discussi durante il convegno internazionale "The charismatic principle in the economic and civil life", svoltosi a Loppiano (presso il Polo Lionello Bonfanti) il 28 e 29 maggio 2010.
Ciò che ha ispirato il forum è la convinzione che il "principio carismatico", essendo un principio costitutivo della dinamica storica, si ritrovi alla base anche di molte esperienze economiche e civili, sebbene a tale principio non venga ancora riconosciuto il suo giusto posto. Il convegno, promosso dall'Associazione "Heirs" e dall'I.U Sophia, ha visto la partecipazione di oltre cinquanta relatori provenienti da molti Paesi e da molte discipline, tra cui Sociologia, Economia, Teologia, Storia.

An opening greeting

di PIERO CODA

1. It is a joy, for me and for the entire academic community of our University Institute, to extend a warm welcome to all the participants of this international Seminar.
Among others, I would like to particularly mention with gratitude the organizers of the event: professors Barbara Sena and Luigino Bruni; the HEIRs Association (Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations), with its president professor Pier Luigi Porta of the "Bicocca" University of Milan; the Faculty of Social Sciences of the St. Thomas Aquinas Pontifical University "Angelicum" of Rome, with its Dean, professor Helen Alford, o.p.; and the entire scientific committee of the Seminar.

2. The sincere joy, which I feel to express on behalf of all, is surely motivated by your numerous and qualified presence. But also by the suggestive, innovative and challenging topic that brings us together in these days.
In fact, it seems to be an important and positive sign that we can share our thought and life experiences about "The Charismatic Principle in Economic and Civil Life".
Today more than ever - as Benedict XVI (the sixteenth) has underlined - there is need for a "new trajectory", a new "impulse" of spirit and thinking to indicate the routes the human family is called to sail upon the open sea of a future that involves everyone.
Already a century ago, the philosopher Henri Bergson, looking ahead, wrote that «the grown body of humanity awaits a supplement of soul», just as social and economic, scientific and technological development «needs a new mysticism».
And this has occurred throughout the course of history. So much so, that it is surprising why the strategic contribution of the "charismatic principle" to the progress of civilization has been so little emphasized.
It is precisely for this reason that the specific value of the present seminar is so significant. It implies crossing a *historical approach*, which looks at how the charismatic principle has in fact been operating in the course of the centuries, with a *prospective approach* capable of perceiving the symptoms of its presence today, in order to support and promote its cultural efficiency in an intelligent way.
Obviously, both approaches refer to a *broader horizon* that can help to complete and illuminate them. This horizon directs us to the endless and philanthropic source of the charismatic principle and to the track of light that it gradually unfolds, in synergy with our free and mutual assuming responsibility.

3. But there is a third reason for our joy today: the fact that this Seminar is also hosted by our small and still young University Institute.
Because it was precisely a charismatic impulse that brought the Sophia University Institute into existence, namely, Chiara Lubich's charism of unity.
This charism stems from Jesus' prayer to the Father: «*that all may be one, just as You and I are one*» (John 17:11), a charism born in the heart of the tradition of the Catholic Church, but also recognized and embraced by other Churches and other religious and cultural traditions.

According to the intuition of Chiara Lubich, Sophia has a task: to teach that Wisdom which makes us (to quote Chiara) «sharers in God's plans for humanity, to embroider patterns of light on the crowd», participating in its trials and sufferings and fermenting philosophy, theology, science, economics, politics, ... (etcetera) with the yeast of love. Sophia, therefore, intends to be a laboratory of dialogue between peoples, cultures and fields of knowledge for the formation of new generations, a place in which life and study are intertwined, in the research and transmission of anthropological and ethical foundations of a culture animated by unity.
In this biennial of specialization, students learn how to put their own field of study in dialogue with the others.
At the basis of Sophia's academic life is the relation between persons, which sets the tone for the relation between the fields of knowledge (our students come from twenty-four different disciplinary backgrounds) and between the cultures (twenty-seven different countries are represented): thus allowing for the knowledge acquired, enriched by this variegated communication, to contribute to the integral and overall development of the person and society. The students called it - in the inauguration hymn - «a house for everyone».
For this reason we are especially happy to be here today with you!

4. I'd like to conclude this brief greeting with the words of one of our students describing his experience here:

> *«For me it is like that of a child who wants to look over a wall, to see the beautiful things on the other side. In the "average" experience, we sometimes get to see over the top; like jumping from time to time, but the jump doesn't leave us in position long enough to contemplate what we see: it's fleeting. Here at Loppiano, it is as if someone puts us on their shoulders so we may constantly see the other side. We can always make the choice to look down to the ground or behind us, or even to climb down - but the means are there to see what is most beautiful».*

This is my wish to all of us for this Seminar! Thank you!

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Introduzione[1]

di LUIGINO BRUNI e BARBARA SENA

È lecito affermare che carismi hanno un impatto anche nella vita civile, politica ed economica dei popoli? Oppure la loro azione si situa ad un livello pre-economico/politico/civile, quello che potremmo chiamare personale o spirituale? L'intuizione che ha originato il convegno, nel quale i papers che riportiamo in questo forum sono stati presentati e discussi, è nata dalla convinzione che il "principio carismatico", essendo un principio co-essenziale della dinamica storica, si ritrovi alla base anche di molte esperienze economiche e civili, sebbene a tale principio non venga ancora riconosciuto il suo giusto posto.

Chi guarda con attenzione la storia, infatti, vede che non solo le "istituzioni" hanno cambiato e cambiano la vita economica e civile, ma anche persone che agiscono mosse da un carisma hanno avuto e continuano ad avere un impatto fondamentale nella dinamica civile. La storia dell'Occidente è certamente frutto dell'azione di Venezia e Bruge, di Marco Polo e Cristoforo Colombo, degli Stati nazionali e delle Banche centrali; ma è difficile negare che essa sia anche il risultato dell'azione di San Benedetto e San Francesco, di Don Bosco e Gandhi, di Dorothy Day e Martin L. King (persone che, non a caso, sono stati oggetto di diversi studi presentati al convegno). E oggi la vita economica è determinata certamente dalle grandi imprese e dall'azione dei governi, ma anche da tanti fondatori di cooperative e di Ong, di associazioni di volontariato o di imprese di Economia di comunione. Il Teologo Von Balthasar e il sociologo e filosofo Max Weber hanno scritto importanti e influenti pagine sul rapporto tra *carisma* e *istituzione*, tra principio "carismatico" e principio "istituzionale" (Bruni e Smerilli 2009). Molto nota è anche la teoria dell'economista J.A. Schumpeter sul rapporto tra innovazione e imitazione, una teoria che però è rimasta confinata prevalentemente all'ambito economico, mentre siamo convinti che le sue implicazioni siano di portata più generale, e certamente utili per comprendere la dinamica storica tra carisma e istituzione. La visione di Schumpeter è particolarmente adatta, forse di più delle teorie weberiana o balthasariana, a cogliere la dialettica tra carisma e istituzione nella vita civile. Schumpeter nel suo libro *Teoria dello sviluppo economico* (2002[1911]), un testo classico della teoria economica del XX secolo, descrive la dinamica dell'economia di mercato come una "rincorsa" tra *innovatori* ed imitatori. Egli utilizza un modello nel quale il punto di partenza è lo "stato stazionario" nel quale le imprese pongono in essere soltanto attività routinarie, dove cioè il sistema economico replica perfettamente se stesso periodo dopo periodo, e dove quindi il valore aggiunto generato dalle imprese è sufficiente soltanto per coprire i costi di produzione e gli ammortamenti, senza che ci sia creazione di nuova ricchezza. Nella teoria di Schumpeter, lo sviluppo economico inizia allora quando un im-

1) Ringraziamo il Comitato scientifico del Convegno, il Presidente dell'associazione HEIRS, prof. Pier Luigi Porta, il prof. Piero Coda, Preside dello I.U. Sophia, la Dott.ssa Eva Gullo Presidente del Polo Lionello Bonfanti, e la Sig.ra Silvana Bardi, la segretaria organizzativa del convegno.

prenditore spezza lo stato stazionario introducendo un'*innovazione*, che consiste in qualsiasi invenzione tecnica, nuova formula organizzativa, creazione di nuovi prodotti o di nuovi mercati, che riduce i costi medi facendo sì che l'impresa possa creare nuova ricchezza[2]. L'imprenditore innovatore è il protagonista dello sviluppo economico, poiché crea vero valore aggiunto, e rende il sistema sociale dinamico. L'innovatore è poi seguito da uno "sciame" di *imitatori* attratti dal profitto come le api dal nettare, che entrando nei settori nei quali si sono verificate le innovazioni e creati profitti fanno sì che presto il prezzo di mercato di quel prodotto diminuisca fino ad assorbire interamente il profitto generato dall'innovazione, riportando così l'economia e la società nello stato stazionario, finché una nuova innovazione non ri-inizia il ciclo dello sviluppo economico[3]. L'imitazione non ha allora una valenza negativa: essa svolge un compito importante, poiché fa sì che i vantaggi dell'innovazione non restino concentrati solo nell'impresa che ha innovato ma che si estendano all'intera società (ad esempio attraverso la riduzione dei prezzi di mercato, che aumenta il benessere collettivo). Ma il messaggio di Schumpeter è ancora più forte: quando l'imprenditore smette di innovare l'imprenditore muore in quanto innovatore e blocca la rincorsa o la staffetta innovazione-imitazione che è la vera dinamica virtuosa che spinge avanti la società. Inoltre, l'innovazione è un fatto sociale, non una faccenda privata dell'imprenditore o dell'impresa (non è sufficiente l'invenzione o la nuova idea perché si abbia l'innovazione, poiché se mancano le condizioni "sociali" e culturali adatte a coglierne la validità, quelle invenzioni e quelle idee non sono traducibili in innovazione, e quindi non producono sviluppo economico). Un ulteriore elemento della teoria economica di Schumpeter, che ha anche una sua valenza per il nostro discorso sui carismi, è quella che lui definisce "distruzione creatrice": la dinamica dell'innovazione e della creatività, ma anche la stessa natura della concorrenza di mercato, spinge avanti l'economia e la società operando una sorta di "distruzione" degli equilibri e dello status quo.

La teoria di Schumpeter che è stata brevemente sintetizzato ci offre lo spunto per dire qualche cosa di più generale sul modo di procedere della storia, anche quella economica e civile. La rincorsa innovatore-imitatore non è troppo lontana dalla dinamica carisma-istituzione, sia nella versione originaria di Max Weber sia nella sua versione ecclesiologica di Von Balthasar, che interpreta la vita della Chiesa come un dialogo o tensione vitale tra diversi "profili", in particolare tra il profilo o principio carismatico e quello istituzionale. La griglia teorica schumpeteriana si presta infatti molto bene anche per comprendere e raccontare la storia economica e civile delle società come una rincorsa tra innovatori, *i carismi*, e gli imitatori, le *istituzioni* e la gente comune, che svolgono la funzione fondamentale di far sì che l'innovazione culturale e civ-

2) Per Schumpeter, quindi, il profitto, compreso l'interesse bancario, può essere maggiore di zero solo in presenza di innovazioni, solo in un contesto dinamico (da qui nasce anche una spiegazione teorica interessante del perché in società statiche, come erano normalmente quelle pre-moderne, il tasso di interesse sia zero, e quindi l'usura condannabile per ragioni non solo etiche ma anche economiche).

3) Il profitto ha dunque, per Schumpeter una natura transitoria, poiché sussiste fin quando c'è innovazione, nel lasso di tempo che passa tra l'innovazione e l'imitazione.

ile dei carismi produca bene comune. Quando nella storia irrompe un carisma, grande o piccolo che sia (ma come si misura la grandezza di un carisma?), inizia un processo di autentica innovazione, che investe tutti i campi dell'umano, economia compresa. Fino all'epoca premoderna, quando l'economia non era ancora un ambito separato e distinto dal resto della vita in comune, era semplice vedere gli effetti economici di un carisma: chiunque fosse vissuto al tempo di Benedetto, o di Francesco, non avrebbe potuto non vedere gli enormi effetti civili ed economici operati dalla rivoluzione che il carisma scatenava; anzi, erano soprattutto quelli civili gli aspetti che più venivano in evidenza, in un mondo dove il religioso impregnava tutto di sé, e il fattore critico e scarso era lo sviluppo economico e civile. Le grandi innovazioni spirituali erano immediatamente innovazioni civili. Va infatti ricordato che i grandi carismi nella storia (anche se ci limitiamo alla sola storia della Chiesa) sono stati eventi di liberazione morale e civile, soprattutto dei più poveri e degli esclusi, e lo sono ancora; sono stati, e sono, molto di più e di diverso di quanto la cultura contemporanea chiama, riduttivamente, "religioso" o "spirituale". I carismi di Vincenzo de Paoli o di Don Bosco, furono anche, e, forse primariamente, strade di vita buona a 360° per il loro tempo, per donne, uomini e bambini che vissero meglio grazie alle innovazioni che quei carismi produssero ben oltre i confini religiosi, geografici e storici nei quali si svilupparono. Oggi possiamo trovare - se li sappiamo e vogliamo vedere - tante persone portatrici di carismi che fondano cooperative sociali, ONG, scuole, ospedali, banche, sindacati, lottano per i diritti negati degli altri, degli animali, dell'ambiente, dei carcerati, dei malati mentali, perché vedono "di più e di diverso" da tutti gli altri. Nella società attuale, che da una parte mostra segni di grande individualismo ed edonismo, si assiste anche ad una fioritura di questi nuovi carismi, per le mille battaglie di civiltà e di libertà, grazie a persone portatori di carismi, capaci per questo di vedere prima degli altri un bisogno insoddisfatto, lasciarsene attrarre, amarlo, e trasformare quel problema in bene comune.

Per questa ragione se guardiamo alle vicende umane con attenzione, ci accorgiamo che la storia dell'umanità, storia economica compresa, è anche il frutto di innovazioni prodotte da questi carismi, dalla *charis*. Poi (quando la vita civile e politica funziona), le innovazioni dei carismi vengono "imitate" dalla gente comune e universalizzate nelle istituzioni: Gandhi inizia nel marzo del 1930 la sua "marcia del sale", e quindici anni dopo l'India è indipendente, e la Costituzione supera la divisione castale. Persone con il dono di occhi diversi ("carismatici") danno la vita per rivendicare diritti negati di minoranze, donne, bambini, spesso anche contro individui e istituzioni che dopo qualche tempo "imitano" l'innovazione carismatica, la universalizzano e la fanno diventare bene comune. Senza i carismi di fondatori di ordini e congregazioni sociali tra Seicento e Novecento, solo per un esempio, la storia del welfare-state europeo sarebbe stata ben diversa: gli ospedali e l'assistenza sanitaria, la scuola e l'istruzione, la "cura del disagio", sono stati il frutto di questa dinamica innovazione (i carismi, che hanno fatto da apripista, da innovatori in questi terreni di frontiera dell'umano) e universalizzazione (le istituzioni pubbliche e private)[4]. Senza imprenditori che hanno iniziato, liberamente, bilanci sociali, attività di responsabilità sociale, buone pratiche non avremmo avuto poi legislazioni che hanno esteso a tutte le imprese standard etici e sociali. Il carisma "innova";

l'istituzione civile universalizza facendo sì che i frutti di quella innovazione arrivino a tutti. A volte l'innovatore carismatico può anche avere l'impressione che a causa dell'imitazione di altri la sua esperienza abbia nel tempo perso originalità e carica profetica, ma in realtà quell'imitazione ha "alzato la temperatura del mondo", ha prodotto bene comune. La storia (quando produce autentico sviluppo umano) è anche una staffetta tra innovatori e imitatori, tra carisma e istituzioni.

Pensiamo anche al grande tema dei diritti umani. In ogni generazione sorgono nuovi diritti umani grazie alla rivendicazione da parte di persone o movimenti carismatici, senza che esista all'inizio un obbligo perfetto in capo alle istituzioni che dovrebbero farli rispettare, ma una pretesa di tipo etico e ideale. Col passare del tempo, però, quegli obblighi imperfetti associati ai nuovi diritti umani (pensiamo oggi ai nuovi diritti di seconda generazione, come quelli economici e sociali: Sen 2010) diventano perfetti grazie alle istituzioni che fanno sì che a fronte di quel diritto ci sia un obbligo legalmente riconosciuto e garantito. La dinamica storica è dunque un passaggio continuo da obblighi imperfetti a obblighi perfetti, grazie anche qui alla dinamica carisma-itituzione.

Va infine notato, seppur per inciso, che i carismi, almeno i grandi, hanno innovato anche sul terreno della scienza e della cultura economica. Ciò è vero senz'altro per il medioevo, quando da Benedetto, da Domenico e da Francesco nacquero non solo realtà economiche (dalle innovazioni nelle abbazie alle banche dei francescani), ma anche nuove categorie culturali e teoriche (per il tempo), quali idee sul valore, sull'interesse, sullo scambio, sulla moneta, sul mercato, che hanno rappresentato la prima "teoria" economica prima della rivoluzione moderna (e in un certo senso anche dopo).

Innovatori e imitatori, "pionieri" e "generalizzatori": forse è questa una delle dinamiche più profonde della storia. Anche della storia civile ed economica: è stata questa l'idea ispiratrice e la scommessa del convegno, e dall'interesse incontrato e dalla qualità e quantità degli studi presentati, si può affermare che ci sono buone ragioni per pensare che sta iniziando una stagione dove ai carismi verrà - finalmente! - riconosciuto il loro ruolo nella storia e nell'oggi dell'umanità. Noi ci proponiamo di continuare su questa strada, poiché una civiltà si sviluppa quando riconosce il ruolo dei carismi e li valorizza, anche se siamo coscienti che il lavoro che ci attende è ancora grande, e per questo appassionante.

I papers che qui presentiamo sono rappresentativi, anche se non esaustivi, di vari aspetti che trattano il tema dei carismi nella vita economica e civile e che sono stati affrontati nel corso del convegno dai vari studiosi che vi hanno partecipato.

Il primo lavoro che proponiamo, quello di Adrian Pabst, dal titolo *Economy of life*, può essere considerato una sintesi teori-

4) Con questa distinzione (necessariamente ideal-tipica) tra carisma e istituzione non vogliamo dire che nelle istituzioni non ci possano essere persone "carismatiche": ma sono queste persone che riproducono, anche all'interno delle istituzioni, la stessa dinamica di innovazione-imitazione di cui abbiamo parlato. Inoltre, il carisma poi spesso si istituzionalizza, e l'istituzione carismatica resta tale quando e se aperta all'azione profetica di persone che al suo interno rendono vivo e incarnato nell'oggi della storia il carisma originale. Il principio carismatico ha molto in comune con il principio profetico della Chiesa e di Israele, e forse si identifica con esso (ma per dipanare questo rapporto occorrerebbe più lavoro, e altre competenze).

ca sul tema dei carismi, in quanto tratta il significato che il termine ha assunto nell'ambito delle discipline sociali, umane e nella Chiesa, fino ad arrivare agli assunti più recenti dell'economia civile.
Il secondo paper, che parla del legame tra la tradizione benedettina e il buon governo, è stato presentato dall'economista Bruno Frey durante la prima sessione plenaria del convegno, e approfondisce il carisma benedettino come forma di governance che ha ancora molto da insegnare all'attuale sistema economico.
Il terzo paper, scritto da James Murphy, approfondisce e amplia il carisma benedettino cercando delle connessioni con il movimento dell'Opus Dei di Josemaria Escrivà. In particolare, lo studioso analizza il principio dell'"ora et labora", sottolineandone gli aspetti carismatici, ma allo stesso tempo differenti presenti nei due movimenti cristiani.
Il quarto paper che qui viene presentato è quello di Jeanne Buckeye e John Gallagher sul rapporto tra carisma e istituzione nell'economia di comunione. Gli autori sottolineano le difficoltà a tradurre nell'ambito delle teorie organizzative esistenti la struttura delle imprese che afferiscono al progetto dell'economia di comunione e notano, invece, come il carisma che le muove spinge ad analizzare nuove forme di organizzazioni che potrebbero arricchire il dibattito teorico sulle imprese e l'efficienza delle strutture organizzative.
Il quinto paper è quello di David O'Brien, ed espone un confronto tra alcuni dei principali leaders carismatici del contesto democratico americano: Eugene Debs, Martin Luter King, Dorothy Day. L'analisi è condotta in modo non banale e tenta di mettere in rilievo gli effetti sulla società e, in particolare, sul contesto politico e democratico, dei carismi incarnati da queste figure così significative della storia americana.
Infine, il sesto paper dello studioso Ian Weinstein esamina la figura di Martin Luther King, figura notoriamente carismatica dell'america democratica, che l'autore confronta tuttavia con la teoria weberiana del leader carismatico. Il confronto, non si limita soltanto alla prospettiva teorica, ma anche al differente contesto storico, politico e sociale in cui Weber e Martin Luther King hanno espresso le loro idee, tracciandone spunti di riflessione e di analisi originali e significative.

In conclusione, crediamo che il principale valore di questo forum sia indicare una nuova pista di ricerca per le scienze sociali, le quali, con la grande eccezione di Max Weber, hanno guardato con troppa poca attenzione al ruolo dei carismi e alla loro capacità di innovare e così cambiare il mondo, anche quello economico.

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BENEDICTINE TRADITION AND GOOD GOVERNANCE

di
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BRUNO S. FREY
KATJA ROST
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Governance is the set of processes, customs, policies, laws, and institutions affecting the way an organization is directed and controlled. In the past few years, with the world economic crisis, and the huge scandals related to excessive manager compensation and fraudulent bookkeeping, the discussion over the need for good governance has become a hot topic. Many political and economic leaders recommend an accentuation and extension of external control mechanisms, such as a tightening of the law or new monitoring measures.

This original and unconventional paper shows that alternative solutions can be found in an unexpected place, namely in the ancient governance structures of religious orders like the Benedictines. With their governance, tested in practice over more than 1000 years, the Benedictine monasteries are a call to give weight to internal governance as well. It is interesting to note, among other aspects, that in order to reduce misbehavior, monastic governance involves broad participation rights of the members or an emphasis on implementing values and norms.

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> "*Essential for election and nomination [of the abbot] shall be the merit of his life and the wisdom of his doctrine*"
> (Regula Benedicti)

Monastic governance of a Benedictine kind starts with Benedict of Nursia (San Benedetto) (480-547), honored by the Roman Catholic Church as the patron saint of Europe. Benedict's main achievement is his *Rule (Regula Benedicti)*[1],which contains precepts for organizing a monastic life. Therein, his charismatic personality, knowledge of human nature and great foresight becomes visible[2]. Benedict was not the sole composer of the *Rule*, but adapted the scripts of his predecessors in an exceptional way. He knew the strengths, and particularly, the weaknesses of his peers; a unique spirit of balance, moderation and fairness does justice to the particular monk[3]. On an organizational level, the ability to adapt, inherent in this basic constitution, is one of the essential secrets of success of the Benedictine organizations[4]. As the history of religious orders shows, on the one hand, this flexible system created strongly diverging organizations with local, situational and temporal adaptations; on the other hand, it continued to rely on similar basic principles, which after more than 1000 years, are still alive. As a consequence, the *Rule of Benedict* became one of the most influential religious constitutions in Western Christendom.
In the *Rule of Benedict*, many pillars of Benedictine governance already make their appearance, as one can notice in the exemplary initial quotation. However, for this article, we are not interested in the saint or his *Rule* itself, but in the effective history it has initiated. This paper brings together our research on Benedictine governance[5], and extends the results to include a motivational perspective. We analyze how Benedictine institutions organize their governance. Their approved governance structures may offer new ideas and approaches for good governance beyond the monastic field. The paper proceeds as follows: First, we take a closer look into the Benedictine institutions, and particularly into the chronicles of one

1) *Regula Benedicti, Die Regel des heiligen Benedikt* (Beuron: Beuroner Kunstverlag, 2006).
2) The paper originated in the keynote speech of Bruno S. Frey at the International Seminar 'The Charismatic Principle in Economic and Civil Life: History, Theory and Good Practice', Sophia University, Loppiano (Florence), 28-29 May 2010. The authors are most grateful for the helpful support of Luigino Bruni (University of East Anglia) and the Benedictine Abbeys of Engelberg, Einsiedeln, Muri-Gries and Plankstetten.
3) A. Grabner-Haider, *Dei grossen Ordensgründer* (Wiesbaden: Marix Verlag, 2007).
4) B. Jaspert, 'Benedikts Botschaft am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts, Regulae Bendicti Studia', *Annuarum Internationale* (1989), 16:205-232 and J. C. Eckert, *Dienen statt Herrschen. Unternehmenskultur und Ordensspiritualität* (Stuttgart: Schäffer-Poeschel, 2000).
5) E. Inauen and B. S. Frey, 'Benediktinerabteien aus ökonomischer Sicht. Über die ausserordentliche Stabilität einer besonderen Institution' (2008), *Erbe und Auftrag*, forthcoming; E. Inauen, K. Rost, M. Osterloh, B. S. Frey, 'Back to the future: A monastic perspective on corporate governance', *Management Revue* (2010), 21(1), 38-59; and K. Rost and M. Osterloh, 'Opening the Black Box of Upper Echelons: Expertise and Gender as Drivers of Poor Information Processing During the Financial Crisis', *Corporate Governance: An International Review* (2010), 18(3), 212-233.

exemplary abbey, the 900 year old monastery of Engelberg in central Switzerland[6]. With quantitative data and qualitative descriptions, we illustrate how Benedictine governance works. Second, three pillars of the monastic governance system, which we consider relevant today, are explained. Third, we compare Benedictine governance with current concepts of Corporate Governance, in order to gain new insights into improvements.

1. Benedictine Governance

Benedictine monasteries were pioneers in organizational design, with a major impact on the development of law and economy in the Occident[7]. As far back as around 1000 AD, an innovative structuring of their organizations, e.g., the division of labor or the development of work morale, brought enormous wealth to many Benedictine monasteries. However, wealth and fortune tend to go hand in hand with temptations. History reveals that the shortcomings and failures of abbots and their convents had serious consequences, sometimes threatening the existence of a monastery[8]. Nevertheless, mismanagement and fraudulence remain a rarity in the Benedictine abbeys. There is good reason for that. To prevent misconduct, a special governance system was developed which, in our view, was decisive for the impressive performance record and sustainability of these organizations[9].
In contrast to most other organizations, the Benedictines rely primarily on internal management and control mechanisms, characterized by three pillars. First, an embedding of the members in a common value system is of crucial relevance. Second, the monasteries developed democratic structures and give broad participation rights to their members. Third, while not entirely abandoning external control, they organize it in a different way. In the following paragraphs, we examine Benedictine governance, illustrated by an exemplary case, the Benedictine monastery of Engelberg[10].

6) Data for the analyses were obtained mainly from the following historical chronicles: Germania Benedictina (1970, 1975, 1999); Helvetia Sacra (1986); G. Heer, Aus der Vergangenheit von Kloster und Tal Engelberg 1120-1970 (Engelberg: Kloster Engelberg, 1975). Further, one of the authors lived in the monastery of Engelberg for three months.
7) A. Kieser, 'From Asceticism to Administration of Wealth. Medieval Monasteries and the Pitfalls of Rationalization', Organization Studies (1987), 8(2), 103-23, and L. Moulin, 'Policy-making in the religious orders', Government and Opposition (1965) 1(1), 25-54.
8) Germania Benedictina, 'Die Benediktinerklöster in Bayern' (St. Ottilien: EOS-Verlag, 1970); Germania Benedictina, 'Die Benediktinerklöster in Baden-Württemberg' (St. Ottilien: EOS-Verlag, 1975); Germania Benedictina, Die Reformverbände und Kongregationen der Benediktiner im deutschen Sprachraum' (St. Ottilien: EOS-Verlag, 1999); G. Heer, Aus der Vergangenheit von Kloster und Tal Engelberg 1120-1970 (Engelberg: Kloster Engelberg, 1975). This was the case in the monastery of Engelberg as well. The monastery did not remain unscathed by dishonest or incapable abbots. One example is the life of abbot Johann Strin (1442-1450), who wasted the fortune of his monastery, and spent more time in Lucerne freely associating with women than in the monastery. Strin is described as 'vermin' and as unqualified as a steward of his community.
9) E. Inauen and B. S. Frey, 'Benediktinerabteien aus ökonomischer Sicht. Über die ausserordentliche Stabilität einer besonderen Institution' (2008), *Erbe und Auftrag*, forthcoming.
10) E. Inauen, et al., 'Back to the future'.

To investigate whether the governance structures are successful, we refer to the leaders of this monastery and distinguish between competent and incompetent abbots. Table 1 shows the results of the analysis and confirms the practicability of some of these mechanisms.

Table 1. Determinants of good and poor abbots[11]

Characteristics of the abbot	Good abbot	Poor abbot	Total	N	F-Value	Sig.
Tenure (yrs)	19.44	7.54	16.29	49	17.70	.000
Not self-determined election	10.71%	63.64%	25.64%	39	15.67	.000
Abbot origin from an outside Benedictine monastery	18.18%	40.00%	23.26%	43	7.87	.008
Bad Pre-election performance of abbot	6.45%	70.00%	21.95%	41	29.99	.000

Note: All abbots from the monastery Engelberg during the time period 1120-2010.

The Benedictine governance system consists of the three main pillars, which are explained in the following subsections.

Embeddedness in Common Value Systems

Values and norms are of tremendous relevance in the monasteries. While many other organizations establish control and supervisory institutions in order to monitor decision making, in monasteries, a common value system is the basis of conflict resolution and standards of correct behavior. The Benedictine value system is based on three cornerstones: the Bible, the *Rule* of St Benedict and the tradition of a particular monastery. In order to implement these values, the Benedictines developed various selection and socialization practices.

First, candidates for a monastic life go through a stringent selection process, in order to ascertain their suitability[12]. During a first probation period, the candidate has the opportunity to carefully consider his motives. In the next years, the novice learns the background of the value system, the Holy Scripture and church law. Education is of great relevance, involving a monastic apprenticeship or the beginning of studies. Only after several years and passing through the different steps the final oath (including broad participation rights) can be celebrated.

Second, in order to ensure living and working together successfully, careful socialization and the composition of an organizational identity are considered essential parts in the governance of these collectives. As such, for the padres and brothers, an equality of treatment in daily life is important in order to integrate new members and establish common values. The transfer of values takes place through the members of the community, and manifests in institutional structures

11) Ibid.
12) *Schweizer Benediktinerkongregation*, 'Satzungen und spirituelle Richtlinien der Schweizer Benediktinerkongregation' (Engelberg: Kloster Engelberg, 1986).

like daily routine, prayers, common meals and meetings, a sensible allocation of tasks or trainings, and education in different areas. Along with socialization goes the forming of an identity. The religious order and the local organization provide the meaningful frame of reference.
The utility of these practices can be illustrated with an evaluation of the abbots in the monastery of Engelberg. We find strong differences among abbots coming from an external Benedictine abbey and abbots coming from within the monastery of Engelberg. The results in Table 1 demonstrate that only 18% of the good abbots were outsiders. In contrast, 40% of the poor abbots were outsiders. Further, pre-election performance of an abbot, i.e., the shadow of the past, is a good indicator of his post-election performance. We searched the historical chronicles for the activities and responsibilities of an abbot practiced before his election, i.e., when serving as a common monk. The results support our proposition by showing that only 6% of the competent abbots had a poor or inconspicuous track record, while 79% of the poorly performing abbots had a poor or inconspicuous track record. A more qualitative look exemplifies the results: Internal selection and socialization principles work quite well in the monastery of Engelberg.

Democratic Structures

Surprisingly, the Benedictine Order (contrary to the strict hierarchy of the Catholic Church) is organized in a very democratic way and reveals a culture of co-determination. The padres and brothers possess substantial participation rights and monitor the abbot and his officials[13]. Each of the monks with a solemn profession has equal rights and may vote in elections. The convent, i.e., the religious community of a monastery, has different major tasks. First, it is responsible for decision making in important business affairs, e.g., the acceptance of a novice as a full member, or an expansion of the monastery through acquisition. Second, the convent democratically elects the abbot and employee representatives for the 'advisory board', i.e., the *Consilium*. Third, the convent evaluates whether a proposed prior (the vice 'CEO') is eligible. Monasteries complement participation processes with internal control processes. Similar to some stock corporations, monasteries have a two-tier board structure. In addition to the 'management board', with the abbot and his officials, there exists a separate advisory board, with partly elected members of the convent. Finally Benedictine organizations are characterized by transparent structures and processes, comprehensible to all members.
Our analysis shows that, in monasteries, a democratic election leads to an increased number of good abbots. In contrast, external intervention, such as the manipulation of the election of an abbot, undermines internal governance. Monasteries operating under such conditions should see an increased number of poor abbots. Table 1 shows that this suggestion is validated by the data. The results first show that, among the good abbots, only 11% were not democratically elected,

13) *Consuetudines*, (Engelberg: Consuetudines Abbey of Engelberg, 1991); 'Satzungen und spirituelle Richtlinien der Schweizer Benediktinerkongregation' in *Schweizer Benediktinerkongregation*, (Engelberg: Kloster Engelberg, 1986); 'Eigenrecht der Bendiktinerkongregation St. Ottilien' in *St. Ottilien Benediktinerkongregation*, (St. Ottilien, 2004).

i.e., their election was externally manipulated. In contrast, 67% from the abbots associated with governance problems were not democratically elected. External interventions disregard the preferences of the monks, and thus ignore the fact that organizational members themselves have the most comprehensive information about the skills, past behavior, and talent of a contender.

Integration in the Hierarchy of the Catholic Church

Finally, the external control of the Benedictine Order is hierarchically organized, and involves jurisdiction and periodical external evaluation. Benedictine monasteries belong to the Catholic Church and are governed by its laws. The jurisdiction of the Congregation[14] is the first judicial authority outside the monastery where disputes are settled. The Congregation supervises the election of abbots and organizes the 'visitations' of monasteries. In the Benedictine Order, the subsidiary principle is applied. As the legal rules of the umbrella organizations are quite general with respect to economic issues, the so-called 'visitation', a periodical external evaluation, is the most important tool for disciplining the convents. Every four to five years, delegates of the Congregation visit a community to evaluate the condition of the monastery. The visitation not only examines the economic situation of a monastery and its fields of activity, but also the spirit and the discipline of the community and their members, and the possible abuse of authority[15]. In the last several decades, the main function of 'visitations' is to induce reflection, rather than an exercise control and discipline.

In the monastery of Engelberg, the system for dismissal of abbots is efficient. Therefore, the tenure of poorly performing abbots is shorter than that of competent abbots. While good abbots have an average tenure of 19.44 years, poor abbots show an average tenure of only 7.54 years. Thus, poor monastic leaders are unable to permanently install themselves at the top of the organization, even though they are essentially elected for life. The monastic structures facilitate the dismissal of poor abbots by employing two mechanisms. One of the most obvious instruments is external visitation, i.e., the regular evaluation of the monastery by the umbrella organization to detect irregularities and to support monasteries in trouble. Additionally, in many cases, internal pressure can lead to the resignation of an abbot. This pressure is effective within monasteries, since an abbot depends a great deal on the goodwill of his convent.

Benedictine monasteries in Germany and Switzerland substantiate the findings of the Engelberg case study. To broaden the basis of our analysis, we additionally present quantitative evidence on the efficiency of Benedictine governance[16].

14) Congregations are the umbrella organizations comprising about five to twenty Benedictine monasteries.

15) 'Satzungen und spirituelle Richtlinien'.

16) E. Inauen and B. S. Frey, 'Benediktinerabteien aus ökonomischer Sicht', forthcoming; K. Rost, E. Inauen, M. Osterloh, B. S. Frey, 'The Corporate Governance of Benedictine Abbeys: What can Stock Corporations Learn from Monasteries?' *Journal of Management History* (2009), 16(1): 90-115. We collected data on all Benedictine abbeys that existed in Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria and German speaking Switzerland. The sample covered a total of 134 monasteries (Rost et al., 2009).

Benedictine monasteries in Germany and Switzerland have an average lifespan of almost 500 years. In combination with the reasons for closure, this average lifetime is a strong indication of efficient governance in Benedictine monasteries. Only one quarter of the monasteries studied were unable to survive due to governance problems, including insolvency, lack of discipline and recruitment problems. The vast majority of monastic houses were closed either due to external institutional factors (e.g., secularization), or are still existing today. In the history of the Benedictine Order, a selective process occurred. While some of the organizations failed due to problems of misconduct and governance, the historical analyses show that the Benedictines are capable of adjusting their institutions with regard to governance problems. We show in particular that the monastery of Engelberg adopted an efficient governance system, with an emphasis on internal governance mechanisms. These findings apply to the Benedictine Order as a whole[17].

2. Comparison of Benedictine Governance with Current Concepts of Corporate Governance

A common value system, democratic structures, and hierarchical integration point to three characteristics of Benedictine governance: the emphasis being on internal control, codetermination, and supportive external control. These characteristics are also interesting with respect to motivation. They not only reduce misbehavior, but foster intrinsic motivation. Similar concepts can be found in the literature on corporate governance of profit and nonprofit organizations (e.g., Frey, B. S. and M. Osterloh, 'Yes, managers should be paid like bureaucrats', *Journal of Management Inquiry* (2005), 14(1), 96-111). In the following section, we contrast monastic governance with corporate governance. To deepen our understanding of governance, we utilize Benedictine organizations to illustrate the practicability of the monastic concept and reason why it was so successful through time and history.

Focus on Internal Control

In standard economics, particularly in the principal agency approach, it is assumed that performance measurement and performance pay raises performance. Thus, external incentives like performance evaluations and, in particular, output control have become a common procedure in many profit-oriented firms and in some nonprofit and governmental institutions[18]. Monastic governance supports work moti-

17) It should be mentioned that such an extreme way of life, as chosen by the Benedictine monks can also be discussed from a different perspective. For example, E. Goffman, in Asylums: *Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates* (Garden City, New York: First Anchor Books Edition, 1961), depicts monasteries as 'total institutions', which may deprive an individual of his rights and lead to a degeneration of the personality. Such concerns are not addressed in this paper.

18) E. Inauen, K. Rost, M. Osterloh, F. Homberg, B. S. Frey, Monastic Governance: Forgotten Prospects for Public Institutions. *American Review of Public Administration* (2010), forthcoming; and Weibel, A., K. Rost, M. Osterloh, 'Pay for Performance for the Public Sector - Benefits and (Hidden) Costs', *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* (2010), 20(2), 387-412.

vation in a different way. Instead of output controls, the Benedictines rely on input, process, and clan control. This is in line with managerial control theory[19]. It implies that output control is adequate only for some tasks, in particular simple tasks which can be easily measured. Complex assignments, e.g., leading an organization, require different control modes, such as clan or process control, because the quality of knowledge intensive work is not quantifiable. The theory is applicable to monastic governance: through careful selection and socialization practices, a shared understanding of the rules is advanced and desired behavior promoted[20]. The convent examines the preconditions of contenders and configures the processes and practices within the monastery. The social integration of the members and the internalization of values are given special importance. Thereby, the 'clan', i.e., the community of a monastery, has a supportive and corrective role. With their system, the Benedictines counteract the trend to determine performance criteria only and to control them ex post. This strategy brings considerable advantages, notably, by preventing unfavorable outcomes like excessive manager compensation and fraudulent bookkeeping created by the wrong incentives of external control[21].

Focus on Co-determination

In monasteries, monks are compensated for their (lifelong) tenure not with monetary rewards, but with 'spiritual rewards', and through obtaining considerable voting rights and codetermination[22]. This provides a strong incentive to invest in firm-specific knowledge[23]. Monks are involved in decision making, and thus have the power to discipline and supervise monastic leaders. As such, they are capable of shaping the future of their institution.

Co-determination and members' voice are subjects of intense discussions in management research as well. For many economists, it is indisputable that the key task of corporate governance is to generate, accumulate, transfer and protect

19) M. Eisenhardt, 'Control: Organizational and Economic Approaches', *Management Science* (1985), 31: 134149; W. G. Ouchi, 'A Conceptual Framework for the Design of Organizational Control Mechanisms', *Management Science* (1979), 25: 833-848; and J. D. Thompson, *Organizations in Action*. Social Science Bases of Administrative Theory (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967).

20) E. A. Fong and H. L. Tosi, 'Effort, performance, and conscientiousness: An agency theory perspective', *Journal of Management* (2007), 33(2), 161-179.

21) L. Bebchuk and J. M. Fried, *Pay without Performance. The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2004); K. Foss, N. J. Foss, H. Vasquez, 'Tying the Manager's Hands: Constraining Opportunistic Managerial Intervention', *Cambridge Journal of Economics* (2006), 30(5), 797-818; Frey, B. S. and M. Osterloh, 'Yes, managers should be paid like bureaucrats', *Journal of Management Inquiry* (2005), 14(1), 96-111; S. Kerr, 'On the Folly of Rewarding A, while Hoping for B', *Academy of Management Journal* (1975), 18, 769-83; M. Osterloh and B. S. Frey, 'Motivation, Knowledge Transfer, and Organizational Forms', *Organization Science* (2000), 11(5), 538-50; K. Rost, E. Inauen, M. Osterloh, B. S. Frey, 'The Corporate Governance of Benedictine Abbeys: What can Stock Corporations Learn from Monasteries?', *Journal of Management History* (2009), 16(1), 90-115.

22) A. O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States* (Cambridge, USA, 1970)

23) M. Osterloh, B. S. Frey, 'Shareholders Should Welcome Knowledge Workers as Directors', *Journal of Management and Governance* (2006), 10(3), 325 -45.

valuable knowledge and capability[24]. 'Knowledge workers' are essential for firm performance. However, if their bargaining position is not protected after they enter into the labor contract, employees have no incentive to undertake firm-specific investments[25]. With co-determination, such protection can be ensured[26]. The example of the Engelberg monastery suggests that this form of knowledge protection is accompanied by improved checks and balances. First, co-determination and the involved exchange of information often lead to an adjustment of interests between the parties, and reduce information asymmetries[27]. Second, participation and self-governance is strengthened by the community, as those breaking the rules are more easily identified by colleagues. Finally, co-determination facilitates not only the intrinsic motivation of knowledge workers but also raises their loyalty to the firm[28].

Focus on Supportive External Control

Another trend in management theory, reinforced by the world economic crisis, is the call for rigorous standards and tightened laws[29]. Against these claims, in the last decades external control in the Benedictine institutions has developed in another direction. The Benedictines heavily rely on internal control, as well as supportive external control. Mutual assistance and initiating self-reflection are seen as more important than the monitoring aspect. Such types of external control are not perceived as controlling, and therefore do not reduce intrinsic motivation of the employees[30].

A similar focal point could prove to be a promising path for the future governance of firms. It is highly controversial as to whether an enhancement of external control and tightened regulation lead to satisfactory outcomes. The empirical results on the effectiveness of these measurements are not convincing. Firstly, performance-related executive compensation has contributed significantly to a lack of transpar-

24) E.g., R. M. Grant, 'Prospering in Dynamically-Competitive Environments: Organizational Capability as Knowledge Integration', *Organization Science* (1996), 7, 375-87; J. C. Spender, 'Making Knowledge the Basis of a Dynamic Theory of the Firm', *Strategic Management Journal* (Special Issue 1996), 17, 45-62; D. J. Teece, G. Pisano, A. Shuen, 'Dynamic Capability and Strategic Management', *Strategic Management Journal* (1997), 18(7), 509-33.

25) M. M . Blair, L. A. Stout, 'A team production theory of corporate law', *Virginia Law Review* (1999), 85(2), 247-328; R. B. Freeman, E. P. Lazear, 'An Economic Analysis of Works Councils' in J. Rogers and W. Streek (eds), *Works Councils: Consultation, Representation, and Cooperation in Industrial Relations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 27-49.

26) M. Osterloh, B. S. Frey, 'Shareholders Should Welcome Knowledge Workers as Directors', *Journal of Management and Governance* (2006), 10(3), 325-45.

27) E.g., K. Rost, M. Osterloh, 'Opening the Black Box of Upper Echelons: Expertise and Gender as Drivers of Poor Information Processing During the Financial Crisis', *Corporate Governance: An International Review* (2010), 18(3): 212-33.

28) M. Osterloh and B. S. Frey, 'Shareholders Should Welcome Knowledge Workers as Directors'.

29) L. Snider, 'Accommodating Power: the "Common Sense" of Regulators', *Social & Legal Studies* (2009), 18(2), 179-97.

30) E. L. Deci, R. Koestner, R. M. Ryan, 'A meta-analytic review of experiments examining the effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation', *Psychological Bulletin* (1999), 125, 627-68; B. S. Frey, R. Jegen, 'Motivation crowding theory: A survey of empirical evidence', *Journal of Economic Surveys* (2001), 15(5), 589-611.

ency in pay policy, or even to a loss of control through manipulation[31]. Secondly, the draconian sanctions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act[32] are bound to lead to an explosion in costs, without slowing the explosion in salaries and fraudulent bookkeeping[33]. Thirdly, instead of gaining control of the reward systems, enhanced regulation and monitoring lead to increasing compensation[34]. Therefore, relying solely on external control is a dangerous strategy. Consequently, even in the today's financial industries, the reliance on output control has been abandoned[35].

Focus on Intrinsic Motivation

The concepts described in the previous chapters have a common denominator. They influence motivation in a desirable way and reduce misconduct. Very briefly, we explain how motivation is arranged in Benedictine monasteries. People are not just driven by external incentives like rewards, punishments or regulations. Rather, people are motivated by enjoyment at work and from internalized obligations to adhere to particular norms, i.e., people are intrinsically motivated. Benedictine institutions take into account such intrinsic motivation in an exemplary manner, and point to an alternative way for governing an organization. To induce correct behavior, they create a work environment which encourages loyalty to the institution. Self Determination Theory[36] provides an appropriate framework. The theory posits three basic psychological needs as a central function of motivation development and dynamics - the needs for relatedness, competence and autonomy. If the needs are satisfied, intrinsic motivation can be developed. Relatedness plays a key role for the padres and brothers. A strong embedding in social relations, e.g., the feeling of being the member of a family, fosters the internalization of values and ideals, as well as enabling identification with the organization. Intrinsic motivation emerges. With the psychological needs of autonomy and competence, the case is more complicated. On the one hand, Benedictine organizations are strongly regulated; on the other hand, the needs for autonomy and competence are taken

31) D. Aboody, R. Kasznik, 'CEO stock option awards and the timing of corporate voluntary disclosures', *Journal of Accounting and Economics* (2000), 29(1), 73-100; K. Rost, M. Osterloh, 'Management Fashion Pay-for-Performance for Ceos', *Schmalenbachs Business Review* (2009), 61(4), 119-149; D. Yermack, 'Good timing: CEO stock option awards and company news announcements', *Journal of Finance* (1997), 52(2), 449-76; L. Zingales, 'The Future of Securities Regulation', *Journal of Accounting Research* (2009), 47(2), 391-425.

32) A US federal law, which set new or enhanced accounting standards in 2002.

33) R. Romano, 'The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the making of quack corporate governance', *Yale Law Journal* (2005), 114(7), 1521-612

34) R. E. Hoskisson, M. W. Castleton, M. C. Withers, 'Complementarity in Monitoring and Bonding: More Intense Monitoring Leads to Higher Executive Compensation', *Academy of Management Perspectives* (2009), 23(2), 57-74.

35) R. Schmidt, 'Are Incentives the Bricks or the Building?', *Journal of Applied Corporate Finance* (2010), 22, 129-36.

36) E. L. Deci and R. M. Ryan, 'The Empirical Exploration of Intrinsic Motivational Processes' in L. Berkowitz, *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* (New York: Academic Press 1980), 13, 39-80; E. L. Deci and R. M. Ryan, 'The "What" and "Why" of Goal Pursuits: Human Needs and the Self-Determination of Behavior', *Psychological Inquiry* (2000), 11(4):, 227-68; M. Gagné and E. L. Deci, 'Self-determination theory and work motivation', *Journal of Organizational Behavior* 26 (2005), 331–62.

into account through broad participation rights. The trust and responsibility given to the members also satisfy these basic needs. Coincidentally, external incentives play only a minor part in Benedictine governance. When they do, the supportive character of external control prevents a crowding out of the intrinsic motivation of members.

A survey among 17 Benedictine and Cistercian abbeys, who also refer to the *Rule of Benedict*, substantiates the fact that intrinsic motivation is successfully enabled[37]. An average of some 20% of padres and brothers deals with regular motivation problems during their daily work routine. Only two (out of seventeen) of the interviewed monastic leaders list motivation problems as a relevant issue in their organization. Further, it appears that intrinsic motivation is strongly present in most of the communities, with external motivation having little impact. When compared to non-monastic organizations, the picture is quite different. In the last decade, the motivation and engagement of employees is shown to be low through all hierarchical levels, whether in the US, Germany, France or Switzerland (GALLUP 2010). Switzerland is showing the highest figures for motivation - only 22% of the people give their fullest to their work activity. We conclude that Benedictine monasteries have been successful in developing and maintaining the intrinsic motivation of their members.

3. Conclusion

Benedict would be stunned if he could see what emerged out of his Rule. The basic principles inherent in the governance of the Benedictine Order may again play a trend-setting role in the future. In the last decade, the call for more external control was loud and clear. Benedictine monasteries illustrate that internal incentives offer a promising alternative, and can be seen as a reasoned plea for a new direction beyond stricter regulation.

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37) More information and data can be made available by the first author.

ECONOMY OF LIFE: CHARISMATIC DYNAMICS AND RELATIONAL GOODS

The paper ties Balthasar's essentially Christological argument for "charismatic personalism" to Pope Benedict XVI's strongly Trinitarian account of relationality and the concomitant accentuation of relational goods that bridge the gap between the charism embodied by the Church and the social reality of secular societies. In an article the then Cardinal Ratzinger links the sacramental nature of church office to what he calls the "charism or event of the Holy Spirit" whose interruption in the world mediates between divine creativity and human agency. Just as the Church cannot be reduced to a rival society which consists of purely formal institutions governed by abstract rules, so society is not cut off from the operation of charismatic principles and practices within the living tradition of the Church.

di
ADRIAN PABST

1. Charisma, Calvinism and Capitalism

We owe the dominant modern understanding of the term 'charisma' to Max Weber. In his 1918 lecture at Munich University on *Politik als Beruf*, he describes charismatic authority as 'resting on devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him'[1]. Likewise, in his seminal book *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, he defines the nature of charismatic leadership as

> «a certain quality of an individual personality, by virtue of which one is 'set apart' from ordinary people and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities. These as such are not accessible to the ordinary person, but are regarded as divine in origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them the individual concerned is treated as a leader»[2].

In Weber's typology of different forms of domination or rule *(Herrschaft)*, charismatic authority exceeds and supplants both traditional authority (grounded in informal habits and customs) and rational-legal authority (based upon formal rules and state law). That is because charisma for Weber is truly extraordinary, originating in the divine 'gift of grace' bestowed on the elect few.
What is striking about Weber's account of charisma in both texts is the same emphasis on divine predestination as in the Calvinism which he rightly associates with the birth of modern capitalism. But by focusing on the Protestant work ethic, Weber's thesis about the origins of the capitalist economy is at once too broad and too narrow. Too narrow because he neglects the counter-Reformation Baroque scholasticism of influential Catholic theologians like Francisco Suárez that sunders 'pure nature' from the supernatural and thus divorces man's natural end from his supernatural finality. As a result, human activity in the economy is separated from divine deification and the market is seen as increasingly autonomous. Too broad because Weber fails to recognize the more specific, historical origins of capitalism in Henry VIII's dissolution of the monasteries and the English 'enclosure movement' that started the process of repeated 'primitive accumulation' and provided the surplus capital for financial investment in non-reciprocal, piratical trade - two arguments to which I will return in this paper.
Thus, Weber is right to highlight the Calvinist gospel of prosperity that conflates the elect with the wealthy and sanctifies the pursuit of power and prosperity - a justification for free-market capitalism that cuts across the liberal-conservative divide in the Anglo-Saxon West and remains influential to this day[3]. But linked to the divine predes-

1) Max Weber, 'Politik als Beruf', tr. 'The Profession and Vocation of Politics', in Max Weber, *Political Writings*, tr. Ronald Speirs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 309-69.
2) Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie* (Paderborn: Voltmedia, 2006 [orig. pub. 1922]), ch. III, § 10.
3) See H. Richard Niebuhr, *The Social Sources of Denominationalism*, repr. (New York: Holt, 1957), esp. 94-5 where he suggests that there is a 'harmony of the Calvinist conception of individual rights and responsibilities with the interests of the middle class' and '*Laissez-faire* and the spirit of political liberalism have flourished most in countries where the influence of Calvinism was greatest'. Cf. William E. Connolly, *Capitalism and Christianity, American Style* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 17-68.

tination of the prosperous is the Calvinist separation of human contract from the divine gift of grace and the Lutheran divorce of faith and works[4]. The same dualism between transcendence and immanence underpins the Baroque Catholic sundering of 'pure nature' from the supernatural and the concomitant claim that human beings have a natural end that is unrelated to their supernatural finality. Taken together, these dualistic theories view the market either as morally neutral or as positively conducive to human freedom or else as the 'invisible hand' of divine providential intervention converting rival self-interest into mutually beneficial cooperation - or as all of the above at once.

In any case, Weber's theory neglects not just this series of dualisms but also the interaction of shifts in theology and philosophy with changes in political economy. Just as certain theological and philosophical ideas shaped the conception and institution of new political-economic models, changes in political and economic conditions led to changes in theological and philosophical thinking. Indeed, the modern dualism, which split asunder human natural goods and the divine supernatural Good in God, brought about a market economy that is increasingly disembedded from the social bonds and civic virtues of civil society. So configured, the market was seen as a system that requires little more than a state-policed legal framework. The underlying secular logic marks a departure from orthodox, creedal Christianity which considers all human arrangements as somehow mirroring a divine, cosmic order. Thus, the secular turn of post-Reformation Christian theology laid the conceptual foundations for the emergence of capitalism.

Nor was this a purely abstract theoretical change brought about by shifts within theology. On the contrary, new religious ideas were embraced by the English gentry who massively increased their land holdings after the 'enclosure' of common land and the dissolution of the monasteries under Henry VIII and his son Edward VI. Both these events transferred over one quarter of national wealth to the landed gentry who seized the full economic benefits of their new assets, whilst ignoring the old social and political duties towards the peasantry and the locality. Thus, private investment was sundered from public charity, not in the sense of handing out alms to the poor but rather as a kind of asymmetric mutual assistance in a spirit of free self-giving. Separating investment from charity foreshadowed the growing abstraction of finance from the real economy that has brought about virtually all financial crises in the last eight hundred years, including the Dutch Tulip mania of 1637 and the English South Sea Bubble of 1720[5].

Indeed, the newly enriched landed gentry mutated into Calvinist agricultural capitalists who invested their surplus in the activities of the guild-excluded merchants who practised non-reciprocal trade and more piratical modes of enterprise[6].

4) Marcel Hénaff, *Le prix de la vérité: le don, l'argent, la philosophie* (Paris: Seuil, 2002), 351-80.
5) Charles P. Kindleberger, *Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises*, 5th ed. (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2005); Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, *This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (*Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).
6) Robert Brenner, *Merchants and Revolution: Commercial Change, Political Conflict and London's Overseas Traders*, 1550-1653 (London: Verso, 2003), 3-37. In this paragraph I draw on arguments made by John Milbank in his 'A Real Third Way: For a New Meta-Narrative of Capitalism and the Associationist Alternative', in Adrian Pabst (ed.), *The Crisis of Global Capitalism: Pope Benedict's social encyclical and the future of political economy*, (Eugene, OR, USA: Cascade, 2010), ch. 1, *forthcoming*.

Coupled with new lending practices and state intervention, this consolidated the nexus between finance and government. In this process, material landed assets were stripped of their social, cultural, symbolic and religious significance and increasingly commodified through their link with maritime fortune - itself closely connected with speculative wealth. From the outset then, capitalism is predicated upon the Calvinist division between earthly matter and heavenly spirit. In turn, this division is based on a literalist, non-allegorical reading of the Fall and our post-lapsarian predicament.

By contrast, creedal Christianity and the episcopally-based Churches of Rome, Constantinople/Moscow and Canterbury all refuse such and similar divisions, emphasizing instead that the Incarnation of Christ restored and renewed God's original creation and that divine love is open to all through the event of the Holy Spirit. In the words of St. Paul, this event is the advent of 'charism'. Just as our material world is always already infused by divine grace, so wealth is not the product of divine election but rather the fruit of faith and works. Faith is a supernaturally infused virtue that habituates reason to recognize that the origin and end of rationality is the divine *logos*. Likewise, our capacity to work and excel in some labours more than others is intimately intertwined with our supernaturally infused natural vocation - exemplified by Jesus' mission embodied and carried forward in the Church. Here 'charisma' is not some superhuman quality of the few or a simple character trait of the many but instead the reception of God's universal grace open to all and the unique vocation of each and everyone.

2. The Source of Charisma: State, Market and Church

Weber's influential theory of modern statehood is inextricably intertwined with his account of charismatic leadership. In 'The Profession and Vocation of Politics', he defines the modern state as 'a human community that (successfully) claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory'[7]. According to Weber, political legitimacy can derive from three different sources: charisma, tradition or law. In liberal market democracies, traditional and legal sources of legitimacy and authority are necessary but not sufficient conditions in order to guarantee the stability of a system torn between the anarchy of the free market, on the one hand, and the centralized control of the bureaucratic state, on the other hand[8].

Leaving aside the question whether absolute self-rule of the people is feasible or desirable (it is neither), this constitutive tension between state and market requires a further source of authority and legitimacy beyond tradition and law. That is why in 1919 Weber called for a 'leader-democracy' *(Führerdemokratie)* which is based on strong, charismatic leadership. The potentially authoritarian outlook of this conception gives credence to Jürgen Habermas' well-known critique that the con-

7) Max Weber, 'The Profession and Vocation of Politics', 310.

8) Cf. Adrian Pabst, 'Modern Sovereignty in Question: Theology, Democracy and Capitalism', *Modern Theology*, Vol. 26, no. 4 (October 2010), 570-602.

troversial jurist Carl Schmitt who further developed the idea of 'leader-democracy' in the 1930s and early 1940s was in fact 'a pupil of Weber's'[9].

However, Habermas' attack ignores Weber's own emphasis on the importance of associational life and corporatism which the Frankfurt Professor neglects. For Weber, charismatic leadership is not merely fuelled by electoral competition for state power but tends to be nurtured and nourished by involvement in the public, localized life of associations. Such participation is conducive to the formation of character and instils a sense of professional and civic ethos on which a vibrant democracy and market economy depend[10]. Similarly, in his book *The Concept of the Political*[11], Schmitt endorses the importance of professional, religious and cultural organizations and corporations to guard against a 'total state' that subordinates all intermediary institutions to its administrative and symbolic order and seeks to absorb the economy and society as a whole.

Yet at the same time, both Weber and Schmitt in the end privilege the primacy of central state authority over the relative autonomy of intermediary institutions and the freedom of individuals. Paradoxically, this is done in the name of counterbalancing liberal individualism. The trouble is that both the state and the individual are part of the same voluntarist and nominalist poles upon which the liberal tradition is founded[12]. First, the voluntarism of collective state power and the voluntarism of self-governing, negatively choosing individuals. Second, the nominalism of 'the sovereign one' linked with the political 'right' and 'the sovereign many' connected with the political 'left' since the secular settlement of the French Revolution. These double poles reinforce each other to the detriment of the autonomy of the 'radically middle' composed of human relationships within groups, associations and communities. By entrenching the voluntarism of central state power, Weber and Schmitt ignore not only theories of state pluralism put forward by G. D. H. Cole and Harold Laski but also the best elements of the shared Anglo-Saxon and continental European tradition of non-statist corporatism and guilds-based associationism - as detailed in the work of Otto Gierke, Frederic William Maitland and John Neville Figgis.

Common to these thinkers is the argument that corporate bodies such as associations, communities and fraternities form a 'complex space'[13] of overlapping jurisdictions and multiple membership wherein sovereignty tends to be dispersed and diffused horizontally and vertically. In consequence, such and similar economic,

9) Jürgen Habermas, 'Discussion on value-freedom and objectivity', in Otto Stammer (ed.), *Max Weber and Sociology Today*, (New York: Harper, 1971), 66.

10) Max Weber, 'Voluntary Associational Life (*Vereinswesen*)', ed. and tr. Sung Ho Kim, in *Max Weber Studies*, Vol. 2, no. 2 (2002): 199-209.

11) Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, 2nd edition, tr. G. Schwab (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1996). The second edition published in 1932 contains important revisions in relation to associational life and other key themes.

12) Pierre Manent, *Histoire intellectuelle du libéralisme. Dix leçons* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1987); André de Muralt, *L'unité de la philosophie politique. De Scot, Occam et Suárez au libéralisme contemporain* (Paris: Vrin, 2002).

13) John Milbank, 'Complex Space', in *The Word Made Strange. Theology, Language, Culture* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 268-92.

political and religious 'intermediary institutions' are not - and should not be - creatures of the modern central state or, for that matter, the modern 'free' market. Far from being opposed, state and market (or, more precisely, the nexus between finance and the executive branch of government) centralize power, concentrate wealth and usurp the sovereign legitimacy of parliament and corporate bodies[14]. The old guilds-based system of intermediary institutions, which characterized politics in Europe since the Middle Ages[15], has been sidelined by the complicit collusion of state and market. That is why much of contemporary 'civil society' represents little more than an extended arm of the new 'market-state'[16].

Thus, the imperative now is to pluralize the 'market-state' by remaking it in the image of the corporations and associations that constitute society on which state and market are - or should be - modelled. In turn, what underpins the freedom of state, market and society is the freedom of the Church. For only the Church can secure the 'free space' between those who rule and those who are ruled by mediating between the sovereign will of 'the one' and the sovereign will of the 'the many' - a voluntarism and nominalism bequeathed to us by the French Revolution and its late medieval origins, as I have already indicated[17].

Not unlike the operation of the modern state (which is essentially a secular simulacrum of the Church), the legitimate exercise of power by the Church can also be distinguished according to charisma, tradition and law. However, the source and meaning of ecclesial 'charisma' is of course profoundly different from Weber's charismatic leadership at the head of modern states. The Swiss theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar rightly attributes the origin of 'charisma' firmly in the Church and stresses the dynamic, complementary interaction between the Church's 'charismatic' and 'institutional' principles. 'Charisma' for Balthasar describes the personal participation in the universal mission of Christ of which the Church is the embodiment anticipating heaven on earth. As such, 'charisma' outflanks the secular, dualistic divide between the sacred space of the Church and the non-sacred realm of society, including the market.

In the following sections of this paper, I argue that Pope Benedict modifies Balthasar's theological conception of 'charisma' and develops it in the double direction of a theological anthropology and a civil economy - so far most clearly expressed in his encyclical *Caritas in veritate*. Bound together by an 'integral humanism' that accentuates the relational nature of mankind, Benedict's vision shifts the focus towards notions of the natural desire for the supernatural Good in God and the centrality of relational goods as a way of challenging the moral relativism and the

14) Giorgio Agamben, *State of Exception*, tr. Kevin Attell (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), 1-40.
15) Antony Black, *Guild and State: European Political Thought from the Twelfth Century to the Present*, rev. ed. (London: Transaction Publishers, 2002).
16) See Adrian Pabst, 'The Crisis of Capitalist Democracy', *Telos* 152 (Fall 2010), 1-24.
17) I have argued elsewhere that the left-right rule of individual and collective wills and other such dualisms can be traced to late medieval and early modern shifts within theology - from the realism and intellectualism of Christian Neo-Platonist metaphysics to the nominalist and voluntarist alternative of Avicennian-Aristotelian ontology. See Adrian Pabst, *Metaphysics. The Creation of Hierarchy* (Grand Rapids, MI: W.B. Eerdmans, 2011), ch. 4-6.

liberal separation of the private realm from the public sphere underpinning contemporary capitalism and democracy. Linked to this is a conception of the Church that differs in some crucial respects from Balthasar's. By rethinking the 'role' of the Holy Spirit in the mission of the Church, Benedict sets out a refreshingly orthodox ecclesiology whereby the Church secures and governs the 'free space' between the state and the individual - a kind of 'corporation of corporations' that ensures the autonomy of civic society and all the intermediary institutions therein.
This complements and transforms existing ideas on associative democracy and civil economy in at least two ways: first, accentuating ideas of reciprocity and mutuality that overcome Adam Smith's separation of moral sentiments from the institutions and processes of the market; secondly, fostering bonds of mutual help and reciprocal giving and thereby restoring and extending the universal anthropological reality of gift-exchange - the bestowing of gifts on others in the hope of a reciprocal gift-return. Benedict's call for a gift economy is theologically more orthodox than Balthasar, economically more egalitarian than Smith and politically much more radical than Weber.

3. "Charismatic Personalism": Balthasar and Benedict

In an important article on the concept of person published in 1986, Balthasar refers to St. Paul's notion of 'charisma' as participation in the mission of the Church[18]. Charisma is defined in this text as that which is 'given to each as his eternal idea with God and his social task'[19]. For Balthasar, 'charisma' is the divine gift of vocation that transforms our 'bare individuality' into real personhood. Since we discover our own unique vocation within the life of the Church, 'charisma' combines a strong Christological and Trinitarian focus on our relationship to God with a socio-economic and political outlook that explicitly rejects secular ideas such as choice-based negative individual freedom and collective dependence on statist control.
Indeed, Balthasar goes on to say in the same article that 'The world situation today [in 1986] shows clearly enough that whoever discards this Christian or at least biblical view (in theology or philosophy) must in one way or another find his downfall in a personless collectivism or individualism (which converge upon one another)'[20]. Balthasar's prescient argument about the complicit collusion of centralized bureaucratic statism (whether left- or rightwing) and 'free-market' liberalism (both economic and social) resonates with Pope Benedict's indictment in *Caritas in Veritate* that 'the exclusively binary model of market-plus-state is corrosive of society'[21]. Both agree that the only genuine alternative to liberalism in its leftwing or rightwing guise is personalism, but they developed a different conception of the person that has implications for charisma in civil and economic life.

18) Hans Urs von Balthasar, 'On the Concept of Person', *Communio: International Catholic Review*, Vol. 13, no. 1 (Spring 1986), 18-26.
19) Von Balthasar, 'On the Concept of Person', 25.
20) Ibid.
21) Benedict XVI, *Caritas in Veritate* (Dublin: Veritas, 2009). Henceforth, references to the section of the encyclical will be in brackets in the main text.

Balthasar's distinction between the Church's 'charismatic' and 'institutional' principles is inextricably intertwined with his account of personhood. To become a person, rather than merely being an individual, is to receive and accept a mission from God which is properly pursued and accomplished by participating in Christ. Following the model of the saints, participating in Christ transforms general, 'bare individuality' into real, embodied personhood which is distinct and unique to each and everyone. Since to participate in Christ is to partake of his universal mission, life in the Church involves an ongoing ontological process of conversion whereby we are at once individuated and universalized. We can describe this process like an ever-unfolding event that blends our own self with our God-given mission. In this manner, we discover in our mission our own, true identity which is both personal and social[22]. This is exemplified by the fusion of Eucharistic celebrations and social practices in late medieval and early modern mass, notably processions that combined religious acts of thanksgiving with social rituals aimed at strengthening the bonds of mutual trust and friendship which sustain fraternities, guilds and communities[23].

Like his erstwhile contemporaries Karol Wojtyla, Henri de Lubac and Joseph Ratzinger, Balthasar was strongly influenced by the early and mid-twentieth century work on Christian personalism. Together they challenged pre-Conciliar scholasticism and post-Conciliar liberalism by recovering and extending the legacy of the Church Fathers and Doctors. Coupled with important insights from the Romantic tradition, their writings shaped the *nouvelle théologie* (or 'ressourcement theology') that informs the best reforms of the Second Vatican Council.

But whereas Balthasar and Wojtyla tend to draw a clearer line between philosophy and theology, de Lubac and Ratzinger explore the mutually augmenting interaction of reason and faith. Building on de Lubac's work, Ratzinger - both in his pre-papal and papal writings - develops an integral humanism that underpins his call for a civil economy in *Caritas in Veritate*. At the heart of this humanism lies a daring new theological anthropology that centres on the idea of relationality - the idea that human beings stand in mutually irreducible relations with each other and their transcendent source in God. By contrast with Balthasar's focus on beauty, the current pope shifts the emphasis towards goodness, both at the level of philosophical theology and political economy. This shift brings to the fore notions such as, first of all, the natural desire for the supernatural Good in God; second, the conflict between modern market capitalism and the natural law tradition; third, the new theological imperative to view all production and exchange ultimately in terms of the idea of relational goods that outwits in advance the false, modern liberal dichotomy between private, individual goods, on the one hand, and public, social goods, on the other hand.

Before I can develop some of these points, let me briefly revert to the link between 'charisma' and personhood. Theologically, Benedict connects the sacramental nature of Church ministry with what he calls the 'charism or event of the Holy Spirit'

22) See Stephan Ackermann, 'The Church as Person in the Theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar', *Communio: Catholic International Review,* Vol. 29, no. 2 (Summer 2002), 238-49.
23) John Bossy, 'The Mass as a Social Institution', *Past & Present*, Vol. 100 (1983), 29-61.

whose interruption in the world mediates between divine creativity and human agency[24]. 'Charisma' provides a universal and inter-personal bond that cuts across the modern divide between the sacred realm of the Church and the secular space of society. In this sense, the Church is the true and ultimate locus of sociality in which we participate according to our own specific, unique, God-given vocations. That is why for the pope 'truth in charity' is '*Caritas in Veritate in re sociali*: the proclamation of the truth of Christ's love in society' (sec. 5).

Anthropologically, Benedict argues in his first encyclical *Deus caritas* est that the economy of life into which we are all born is governed by the universal vocation to love . For Christians, the love which moves all men is a gift of God revealed in Christ and infused by the Holy Spirit - hence the idea of 'charismatic dynamics'. But independently of one's faith and belief, we can say that the love we receive and give is itself perhaps evidence that society is ultimately held together neither by a social contract nor by pre-rational moral sentiments but rather by an 'economy of gift-exchange' - a 'spiral paradox of "non-compulsory compulsion" in which the giving of gifts […] half-expects but cannot compel a return gift'[25]. Since the call to love is the most universal reality of mankind, love is 'the principle not only of micro-relationships (with friends, with family members or within small groups) but also of macro-relationships (social, economic and political ones)' (sec. 1). What binds together the theological and anthropological dimension of Benedict's account is that love is both one and triune (*eros*, *agape* and *philia*), thus mirroring the Trinitarian origin and end of creation and underpinning the relational outlook of human life.

In line with *Deus caritas est*, Pope Benedict argues in *Caritas in Veritate* for a comprehensive new model of 'integral human development' based on 'charity in truth' - the recognition that '[e]verything has its origin in God's love, everything is shaped by it, everything is directed towards it' (sec. 1)[26]. The call to love, for Benedict, is at the heart of human nature - 'the vocation planted by God in the heart and mind of every human person' (sec. 1). In other words, love is a deep anthropological desire to enter an economy of gift-exchange where gift-giving (and the giving of ourselves) occurs in the real hope of a reciprocal gift-return. So configured, love translates into solidarity practiced through the exercise of charity.

Building on Balthasar's conception of love as the form of all virtues, the current pope views love as that which infuses all other virtues - theological and classical. Without love, moral and civil virtues are deficient and lack ordering to their final end in God. Beyond the Old Testament, the New Testament fuses the commandment to love God and to love our neighbour equally and without priority. What underpins this is the mystical union with God as revealed in the Eucharistic mystery that is both sacramental and social, as John Milbank has argued[27]. In this manner, Benedict retrieves and extends the patristic and medieval vision of the Church as

24) Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, 'The Theological Locus of Ecclesial Movements', *Communio: International Catholic Review*, Vol. 25, no. 3 (Fall 1998), 480-504.
25) Milbank, 'The Real Third Way', 6.
26) Benedict XVI, God Is Love: *Deus Caritas Est* (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 2006).
27) John Milbank, 'The Future of Love. A Reading of Benedict XVI's Encyclical *Deus caritas est', Communio: International Catholic Review*, Vol. 33, no. 3 (Fall 2006), 368-74.

the *corpus mysticum* which he inherited from the *nouvelle théologie* of Henri de Lubac (rather than the slightly watered-down version of von Balthasar).
Indeed, the current pope eschews the Baroque scholasticism of Francisco Suárez and the nominalist voluntarism of Calvinist-Lutheran theology in favour of the Romantic orthodoxy that is common to Augustine, Dionysius, Chrysostom, Aquinas and other Christian Neo-Platonists in both the 'Latin' West and the 'Greek' East[28]. The latter envision the ecclesial *corpus mysticum* as the highest community on earth, a profound and permanent spiritual union within the Church in the reciprocal love of the Holy Spirit (in the words of Saint Paul). By contrast, Suárez contends that the mystical body refers to the sacraments and that the primary community is the nation or population - not the universal brotherhood of the Church. Linked to this is the Baroque scholastic separation of 'pure nature' *(pura natura)* from the supernatural and the concomitant relegation of divine grace to an extrinsic principle that is superadded to the natural realm, rather than a supernaturally infused gift that deifies nature from within. Against Baroque scholasticism, Benedict contends that love is received and returned trough our participation in the universal Eucharist community of the Church that enfolds the social-political body of human society and directs it to the supernatural Good in God.

4. The Church and Civil Economy

Why does all this matter for the charismatic principle in economic and civil life? Well, Baroque scholasticism, by divorcing 'pure nature' from the supernatural, introduces a series of dualisms into theory and practice such as faith and reason, grace and nature or transcendence and immanence. Such and similar dualisms are incompatible with the (theo)-logic of the Incarnation and undermine the continuous link between Creator and creation. Specifically, the idea that 'pure nature' correlates with a purely secular (non-sacred) social space unaffected by divine grace is linked to the 'two ends' account of human nature. According to this theory, human beings have a natural end separate from their supernatural end. Instead of participating in the Trinitarian communion of love by which we are perfected, human society and the economy operate independently and are ordered towards a different finality.
Concretely, this means that the market is viewed as morally neutral and committed to the promotion of human freedom - exactly the neo-Baroque position of contemporary Catholic commentators, in particular the neo-conservatism of George Weigel and the 'Whig Thomism' of Michael Novak. However, this is merely the *laissez-faire* liberal side of the modern coin whose reverse face is the socialist utopia of statism and collectivism. How so? Both uproot the market and the state from the communal and associationist networks of civil society, thereby severing production as well as exchange from the civic virtues that are embodied in intermediary insti-

28) For a detailed account of the argument in this paragraph, see Pabst, *Metaphysics*, chs 5 and 7.

tutions and from the moral sentiments that govern interpersonal relations.
For the current pope, it follows that neither society nor the economy are purely non-sacred, self-standing, self-sufficient realities. Instead, they either reflect some revealed cosmic order, for example Augustine's *Civitas Dei* that is governed by theological virtues embodied in real, primary relations among its members (self-organized within communities, localities, and associations). Or else society and the economy represent a human artifice built over against the inalterability of 'given' nature, such as the modern tradition of the social contract where ties between the state and the individual and also among individuals are determined by abstract standards like formal rights and proprietary relations (a vision which finds its original expression in the works of Hobbes and Locke). The objective of Christian social teaching is to transform the earthly city in accordance with the heavenly city - a foretaste of the heavenly banquet in anticipation of the beatific vision so vividly depicted by the Fathers and Doctors of the Church.
Crucially, in *Caritas in Veritate* Pope Benedict locates the logic of gratuitous gift-exchange and inter-personal trust at the heart of the economic system. Since the work of Adam Smith, the economy represents an increasingly autonomous space, consisting in market exchange based on formal contracts policed and enforced by the state and operating according to Smith's famous principle of 'cooperation without benevolence'[29]. Benedict's insistence that the logic of contract cannot function properly without the logic of gratuitousness marks a radical departure from the Smithian legacy and a return to the civil economy tradition of Genovesi.
Far from simply restoring this tradition, the Pope blends the Neapolitan Enlightenment with the Christian Neo-Platonism of the Church Fathers and Doctors and the Romantic Orthodoxy of nineteenth-century theology[30]. Central to Benedict's vision is the 're-hellenization' of Christianity, which he delineated in his groundbreaking Regensburg address[31]. By appealing to the Neapolitan tradition of Neo-Platonist metaphysics and civil economy, Benedict shifts the emphasis away from a more Aristotelian concern for individual substance towards a more Christian Neo-Platonist focus (in Augustine and Aquinas) on the self-diffusive Good that endows all things with goodness and makes them relational. In turn, this draws on Plato's argument that we have a natural desire for the transcendent Good that 'lures' us erotically - the *Meno* paradox of desiring to know that which we do not as yet understand. It is the presence of the transcendent Good in immanent nature that directs human activity to the common good in which all can share. Concretely, the common good is neither purely publicly provided nor exclusively privately owned but instead distributed communally across the whole of societies and embodied in intermediary institutions and structures such as cooperatives, employee-owned

29) Cf. Adrian Pabst, 'From Civil to Political Economy: Adam Smith's Theological Debt', in Paul Oslington (ed.), *Adam Smith as Theologian*, (London: Routledge, 2011), *forthcoming*.
30) Tracey Rowland, *Pope Benedict XVI - A Guide for the Perplexed* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2010), 9-47.
31) See Adrian Pabst, 'Sovereign Reason Unbound: The Proto-Modern Legacy of Avicenna and Gilbert Porreta', in Peter M. Candler Jr and Conor Cunningham (eds), *The Grandeur of Reason: Religion, Tradition and Universalism*, (London: SCM, 2010), 135-66.

partnerships, community banks, and civil welfare. For unlike the collectivist state or the unbridled free market, such and similar structures work for the social good open to all rather than exclusively nationalized ownership or purely private profit, as *Caritas in Veritate* reaffirms.

5. The "Metaphysical" Economy of Christian Neo-Platonism

Benedict's appeal to Christian Neo-Platonism is significant for a relational politics and economics on (at least) six accounts. First of all, it modifies existing genealogical accounts of the tradition of civil economy in the direction of a stronger recognition of the central significance of the Christian Neo-Platonist metaphysics of relationality. The opposition between an active, civic Aristotelian and Ciceronian humanism (associated with Coluccio Salutati and Leonardo Bruni), on the one hand, and an individualistic, contemplative Neo-Platonist and Epicurean humanism (wrongly ascribed to Pico della Mirandola and Marsilio Ficino), on the other hand[33], must be qualified by linking the heritage of Dominicans like St. Thomas Aquinas (and his Neo-Platonist reading of Augustine) to the Neapolitan tradition of civil economy. Here the conceptual link is the idea of horizontal and vertical relationality of human beings. Metaphysically, patristic and medieval Christian Neo-Platonists reject the earlier radical Aristotelian idea of autonomous individual substance disconnected from the efficient causality of the Prime Mover by arguing that we are created in the image and likeness of the Trinitarian God whose creative activity sustains us in actuality. As such, being is situated in the intermediary realm of 'the between' (Plato's *metaxu*) where the original relation among the divine persons and the participatory relation between creation and creator intersect without however collapsing into one another. Humans can thus be described as relational substances participating in the substantive relationality of the triune Godhead.
This vision resonates with Salutati's civic humanism and his vision of a horizontal, relational orientation of humanity that is nevertheless always already linked to its transcendent source in God: 'The two sweetest things on earth are the homeland and friends […]. Providing, serving, caring for the family, the children, relatives, friends, and the homeland which embraces all, you cannot fail to lift your heart to heaven and be pleasing to God'[33]. This is also reflected in Genovesi's relational anthropology and 'musical metaphysics,' for example in his 1766 treatise *The Philosophy of the Just and Honest* where he writes that '[we are] created in such a way as to be touched necessarily, by a musical sympathy, by pleasure and internal satisfaction, as soon as we meet another man; no human being not even the most cruel and hardened can enjoy pleasures in which no one else participates'[34]. Likewise, in his *Lectures on Civil Economy* (1765-67), he links the social nature

32) Luigino Bruni and Stefano Zamagni, *Civil Economy: Efficiency, Equity, Public Happiness* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2007), 27-99, esp. 45-57.
33) Coluccio Salutati, quoted in Bruni and Zamagni, *Civil Economy*, 47.
34) Antonio Genovesi, *Della diceosina o sia della filosofia del giusto e dell'onesto* (Milan: Marzorati, 1973 [orig. pub. 1766]), 42.

of human animals to the principle and practice of reciprocity: 'How is man more sociable than other animals? […] [It is] in his reciprocal right to be assisted and consequently in his reciprocal obligation to help the others in their needs'[35].

In turn, inter-personal relationality at the metaphysical and anthropological level translates into an emphasis on shared, communal happiness and the mutual enjoyment of 'relational' goods at the civil and economic level. In the *Lectures*, Genovesi argues that 'even among people that are corrupted by the luxury and bad custom there is no one, a chief of family or whatever person4 who does not feel an inner pleasure in doing good things to other people, in making others happy […] It is a characteristic of man of not being able to enjoy a given good without sharing it with somebody else. Some say that it is self-love or pride [*superbia*] to show our happiness to others. I do not think so: it seems to me that there is in us an inner need to communicate to each other our happiness'[36]. In this manner, Genovesi links happiness to goodness and conceives both in terms that outwit in advance the modern, liberal separation of private happiness and individual commodities from public welfare and public, 'relational' goods. The civil economy tradition combines an Aristotelian-Ciceronian emphasis on happiness and a Neo-Platonist-Epicurean insistence on the good.

Second, Genovesi's accentuation of metaphysical and anthropological relationality is neither naïve nor utopian but acknowledges the reality of human vice and sinfulness. Precisely because his account of civil economy is explicitly grounded in a conception of human nature, he recognizes that there are natural instincts (such as self-preservation, seeking comfort or distinguishing oneself)[37] that can direct us away from the quest for the common good towards the pursuit of self-interested wealth and utility. In this process, human vice that leads to practices such as usury 'converts friendship and humanity into merchandise', and utility is divorced from the natural outlook towards the supernatural good[38]. Thus, the institutions and practices of civil society governed by both higher and lower virtues are required to correct human deviation from the natural law of seeking happiness that is itself relational: '[i]t is a universal law that we cannot make ourselves happy without making others happy as well'[39].

Third, Genovesi argues against the ontological atomism of Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, and Mandeville that neither the economy nor society can function properly without cooperation and trust and that in turn these require more than either egoism or altruism. Beyond this false divide, what is needed is a network of practices and institutions that blend the strive for utility with the quest for happiness and direct man's ambivalent nature (virtue and vice, unsociability and sociality, etc.) to the pursuit of the common good in which all can participate. It is precisely the civic

35) Antonio Genovesi, *Lezioni di commercio o sia di economia civile*, ed. M. L. Perna (Naples: Instituto Italiano per gli studi filosofici, 2005 [orig. pub. 1765-67]), part I, ch. 1, §17, 14.
36) Genovesi, *Lezioni di commercio o sia di economia civile*, part I, ch. 16, §2, footnote.
37) Ibid., II, ch. 13, §5, 195.
38) Ibid., II, ch. 13, §5, 196.
39) Antonio Genovesi, *Autobiagrafia e Lettere* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1963), 449. Here Genovesi echoes Doria's 1710 book *On Civil Life* which begins with the following words: 'without any doubt, the first object of our desire is human happiness'.

relations of civil society that constitute the nexus of relationships where individual interest and public welfare coincide without ever being fully identical.

This link between personal and public goods and happiness in the civil economy tradition can be traced to the Italian philosopher and historian Ludovico Antonio Muratori, another key figure of the Italian Enlightenment. Long before the discourse on happiness bequeathed to us by the American and French Revolutions, he wrote in 1749 that 'the master desire in us, and father of many others, is our own private good, or our particular happiness […]. Of a more sublime sphere, and more noble origin, is another Desire, that of the Good of Society, of the Public Good that is Public Happiness. The first is born of nature, the second has virtue for a mother'[40]. Once more, it is clear from such and similar texts that the patristic and medieval Neo-Platonist emphasis on man's natural desire for happiness and the supernatural infusion of virtue, which directs us to the common good, is at the heart of the civil economy tradition.

Fourth, Genovesi looks to early Renaissance civic humanism and also the legacy of Giambattista Vico, Celestino Galiani, and Paolo Mattia Doria in order to make the case that intentional human actions do indeed have unintentional consequences thanks to divine providence and grace, rather than fate and fortune as for Machiavelli and Mandeville. Here Vico and Galiani are particularly important, with the latter speaking of the 'Supreme Hand' and the former writing that 'Man has free will, though it be weak, to turn passions into virtue; but is helped by God with divine Providence and supernaturally with divine grace'[41]. In this context, we are reminded of Augustine's *City of God*, notably the fusion of coercive and persuasive elements in the operation of public institutions. For the Neapolitans as for the Bishop of Hippo, state law, education, and civil life constraint self-interest and direct it towards the 43common good which is always more than the collective sum of its individual parts (*pace* Bentham) because it is eminently qualitative rather than merely quantitative - enhancing as it does the capacity of each individual and of the whole of society to actualize our potential to do good. The twin accentuation of virtuous practices and civil institutions provides the 'civic' nexus between (private and public) happiness and the economy. This aspect that is wholly absent from Smith's conception of the 'invisible hand' metaphor which fuses a questionable understanding of theodicy with a similarly questionable account of human cooperation with divine providence[42]. In part, this explains why Smith is suspicious of the intermediary institutions of civil society with which he associates cartel-like collusion and price-fixing.

Fifth, by contrast with Smith's more Calvinist separation of human contract from divine gift, Genovesi and the other members of the Neapolitan School view the institutions and practices of civic life as a supernatural dynamic that seeks to perfect the natural, created order and calls for human cooperative participation. Linked to this is the insistence upon public trust or faith *(fede pubblica)* as an indispensable condition for socio-economic and political development within the framework of

40) Quoted in Bruni and Zamagni, *Civil Economy*, 73.
41) Giambattista Vico, Scienza Nuova, II, §7, quoted in Bruni and Zamagni, *Civil Economy*, 84.
42) See my 'From Civil to Political Economy'.

civil life and cognate notions such as honour and 'the mutual confidence between persons, families, orders, founded on the opinion of the virtues and religion of the contracting parties'[43]. In this manner, Genovesi emphasizes the importance of social sympathy and reciprocity in economic contract, such that mutuality binds together contractual, proprietary relations, and gift-exchange. From its inception, the tradition of civil economy rejects any separation of the market mechanism from civic virtues and moral sentiments. That is why in *Caritas in Veritate*, Pope Benedict argues that the genuine development of each person involves the fostering of human, social, economic, and political bonds as exemplified by practices of gift-exchange, mutual help, and reciprocal giving. As such, economics is entirely reconfigured, away from the demand- and supply-driven market production of individually consumed goods and services or the paternalistic state provision of uniform benefits and entitlements towards the co-production and co-ownership of relational goods and civil welfare.

Sixth (and finally), the Christian Neo-Platonist vision is not merely abstract and conceptual but on the contrary translates into real, concrete practices which we can also trace back to the Dominicans rather than the Franciscans. For example, the idea of a 'just price' which reflects the true value and not simply the prevailing market equilibrium of demand and supply. This has a wide variety of possible applications today, from the practice of paying workers a 'living wage' (as opposed to merely a minimum wage) to anti-usury legislation and limits on interest rates and also the introduction of asset-based welfare and employee-ownership. Coupled with Benedict's appeal to the ecclesial *corpus mysticum* as the most universal human community and in some sense the condition for sociality, the emphasis in the Christian tradition of Neo-Platonism on relationality ties together the sacramentally ordered universal community of the Church with the network of overlapping intermediary institutions, businesses, and the so-called 'third sector' which operate on the basis of reciprocity and mutuality. Ultimately, this shows just how artificial the old barriers between or across state, market and civil society really are.

As such, the Neo-Platonist metaphysics of relationality is closely correlated with the civil economy tradition of Genovesi's civic humanism. Taken together, they have the potential to transform the state, the market and civil society in such way that state regulation and governmental welfare no longer play a merely compensatory role within the anarchism of 'free-market' capitalism. Instead, state and market are re-embedded in a civil compact. The idea is to foster civic participation based on self-organization, social enterprise, reciprocity, and mutuality which help produce a sense of shared ownership around 'relational' goods. This approach seeks to balance liberty and responsibility as well as rights and duties in a spirit of individual and communal 'charism' where the talents and particular vocations of each person are mutually augmenting and beneficial to society as a whole. That is what *Caritas in Veritate* seeks to articulate.

So in charting a path that seeks to re-embed markets and states into the complex network of human relationships, the pope deploys a pre-modern, theological

43) Genovesi, *Lezioni di commercio o sia di economia civile*, II, ch. 10, §5, 132.

metaphysics and anthropology in order to develop a post-modern, post-secular civil economy that transcends a variety of essentially modern, secular dualisms (sacred-profane, nature-supernatural, charismatic-institutional, individual-collective, etc.). Beyond Balthasar, Benedict shifts the emphasis away from a more Aristotelian concern for individual substance towards a more Christian Neo-Platonist focus (in Augustine and Aquinas) on the self-diffusive Good that endows all things with goodness and makes them relational. For Benedict, we can have knowledge of the supernatural Good in God because it makes itself known to us through the creative self-diffusion of divine goodness and love. As the Pope puts it in section 5 of *Caritas in Veritate*, 'Love is revealed and made present by Christ (cf. Jn 13:1) and "poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit" (Rom 5:5)'. The twin emphasis on both the Son of God and the Holy Spirit underscore once more the link between Trinitarian theology and anthropological humanism, as well as an accentuation on the divine wisdom of the Spirit which Roman Catholicism shares with Eastern Orthodoxy.

The 'charism' or event of the Holy Spirit permeates the human and natural world; it sustains the charismatic dynamics of economic and social life; and it directs human activity to the common good in which all can share. In turn, the common good is neither purely publicly provided nor exclusively privately owned but instead distributed communally across the whole of societies and embodied in intermediary institutions and structures such as cooperatives, employee-owned partnerships, community banks and civil welfare. For unlike the collectivist state or the unbridled free market, such and similar structures work for the social good open to all rather than nationalized ownership or private profit.

Concluding remarks: On Relational Goods

Let me recapitulate. Just as the supernatural Good in God is relational and endows all things with goodness, so the common good is diffused across the whole of society and the economy in diverse ways and to varying degrees. To illustrate this point, take the extreme example of global finance. Rather than viewing money as a universal means of exchange that measures relative economic worth in accord with social and even moral value, finance treats it as a commodity in its own right - something that can be accumulated, hoarded and multiplied through speculation at the margin. However, even obscure financial instruments such as CDSs or CDOs must ultimately be securitized against physical assets, for money in and of itself is in fact worth less than the paper it is printed upon. Thus, monetary abstraction must in the end relate back to the real economy. Without some link to material resources, disembodied capital loses its value and therefore its proper purpose. Since the real economy depends on our shared natural habitat and the earth's common wealth, even global finance and its propensity to privatize and over-exploit natural resources cannot definitively dispense with notions such the public, common good. So if it is true to say that the common good is distributed universally, then this it calls into question the dualisms that are constitutive of both the Smithian tradition of political economy and the modern science of econom-

ics - notably private vs. public goods, individual vs. collective preferences or animal spirits vs. rational choice.

It is clear that the rise to power of the Smithian tradition of political economy preserved the ancient and medieval primacy of human happiness over material wealth but sundered market production and exchange from civil institutions and civic virtues. With the birth of Bentham's utilitarianism, political economy is redefined as the science of wealth and individual material welfare is seen as the foundation for public happiness. With Marshall and Pigou, political economy becomes economics, the science of rational choice and marginal utility. Since wealth is now viewed as a means to satisfy needs rather than fulfil the natural desire for the supernatural good, economics breaking the link between the pursuit of wealth and the quest for happiness. Likewise, human relationships governed by the bonds of trust and friendship are merely instrumental and no longer good in themselves.

By contrast, we can say in line with the civil economy tradition of Genovesi that there is a fundamental difference between pure commodities, on the one hand, and relational goods, on the other hand. The point is that virtually all production, trade and consumption involves sharing in inter-personal relations to varying degrees. As such, the separation of individual goods from the 'good' of relationships in some of the early literature on relational goods is unwarranted. On the contrary, the imperative is to restore and extend the 'radical middle' of human relationships in the economy, politics and society. Such a vision - and the policies to translate it into concrete action - has the potential to transform secular modernity and the dominant ideologies. Indeed, modern politics has been dominated by nominalist, horizontal poles of the 'one' linked with the 'right' and the 'many' linked with the 'left'. This is mirrored by the voluntarist, vertical poles of the absolutely sovereign state and the absolutely sovereign individual. By focusing on real, primary relations governed by theological and civic virtues, Pope Benedict's integral humanism provides a genuine alternative to the secular settlement since the French Revolution.

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OPUS DEI: PRAYER OR LABOR?

di
JAMES BERNARD MURPHY

The paper critically discusses the charism of Saint Benedict spirituality and its motto ora et labora or sometimes orare et laborare. In particular, the author notes the common practice of misquoting this motto to say: "laborare est orare", in relation of Opus Dei spirituality. The paper underlynes that the Latin motto cannot be found in the writings of Escriva, but the idea captured in "Laborare est Orare" is the basis for the spirituality of Opus Dei. The paper then arguments how Sts. Benedict and Escriva represent the fundamental alternative charisms of work. In Benedict, work the necessary precondition for the spiritual freedom of prayer while for Escriva work is itself offered up as a form of prayer. In the first, we encounter God through the spiritual exercise of prayer, in the second, through the exertion of our daily occupation.

One Latin Letter: The Charism of Work in St Benedict and in St Josemaría Escrivá

Sometimes simple errors can lead us to important truths. The motto of the world-wide Benedictine Confederation is *ora et labora* (prayer and work). This motto is often attributed to St Benedict himself but cannot be found in his *Rule*. Many Benedictines believe that their motto accurately captures the spirit of the *Rule* (RB, chapter 48), which describes the monk's day as alternating among the Divine Office of the Hours, manual labor, spiritually-uplifting reading[1]. What is most amusing and illuminating, however, is the common practice of misquoting this motto to say: *laborare est orare*. For one of infinite examples, see this article in Time Magazine: ' "*Laborare est orare*" said St Benedict (work is prayer)[2].' So deep is this modern misreading, that some writers even mistranslate the Benedictine motto to fit it: 'Thus, his (Benedict's) motto - *Ora et Labora* (to work is to pray) - became a standard of the Rule[3].' I have traced this very creative and suggestive error back to that great charismatic prophet of the Victorian work ethic, Thomas Carlyle: 'The old Monks had a proverb "*Laborare est Orare*," to work is to pray[4].' Such pervasive misunderstanding, misattribution, misreading, and mistranslation, reflects more than mere bad scholarship: these are the errors, not of individuals, but of an age. No matter what Benedict may have said, we moderns cannot help but hear that 'work is prayer'.

The modern spiritualization of work is nowhere more influential than in the doctrine of St Josemaría Escrivá and his Opus Dei. I have not found the Latin motto in the writings of Escrivá, but the idea captured in *Laborare est Orare* is the basis for the spirituality of Opus Dei: 'Let us work. Let us work a lot and work well, without forgetting that prayer is our best weapon. That is why I will never tire of repeating that we have to be contemplative souls in the middle of the world, who try to convert their work into prayer[5].' St Escrivá invites every Catholic layman to identify his own work with the *operatio Dei*. To measure the chasm between Benedict and Escrivá, we need only consider the contrasting ways in which they understand 'the work of God'. For Benedict, the *Opus Dei* means only the divine office, the liturgy of the hours[6]. The divine office is the only activity of the monk

1) The standard edition of the *Rule of St. Benedict*, in Latin and English, is *RB 1980* (hereafter RB), (ed.) Timothy Fry OSB (Collegeville, USA: Liturgical Press, 1981).
2) www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,891459-9,00.html#ixzz0dGjHPYpi
3) Quentin Skrabec, *St. Benedict's Rule for Business Success* (West Lafayette, USA: Purdue University Press, 2003), 30.
4) http://carlyleletters.dukejournals.org/cgi/content/full/15/1/lt-18421008-TC-JO-01?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=&fulltext=laborare+est+orare&searchid=1&FIRSTINDEX=0&resourcetype=HWCIT
5) *Furrow*, 15. All of Escrivá's works can be found at www.Escrivaworks.org. All quotes of Escrivá are from this website, identified by the name of the book and the chapter. See 'Those who are pious, with a piety devoid of affectation, carry out their professional duty perfectly, since they know that their work is a prayer raised to God.' *The Forge*, 9.
6) Thus, Dom Cuthbert Butler says: 'by "Work of God" (*opus Dei, opus divinum*) St Benedict means precisely the public recital of the office, and nothing else…' *Benedictine Monachism* (London: Longman Green, and Co., 1924), 30.

whose sole object is God himself. Indeed, the divine office is the work of God not only in the sense that it is an activity only for God, but also in the sense that the words recited are themselves the work of God in the Scripture. But for Escrivá, *Opus Dei* refers to our daily labor in whatever occupation we pursue. Because of the immensely successful and pervasive influence of Escrivá's movement, many Catholics now think of their own occupations in terms of The Work of God: by our daily labors we participate in the God's work of creation and redemption. So the meaning of *Opus Dei* has evolved from the liturgy of the hours to the ordinary daily occupations of lay Catholics, raised up as an offering to God.

Is there one iota of difference between *laborare et orare* and *laborare est orare*? Does it matter whether we think of the Work of God as the divine office or as our daily chores? Yes, I think that the contrast between Benedictine and Escriván spirituality will illuminate our understanding of what we mean by prayer and by work. These two saints express fundamental alternatives in any spirituality of work: either work is a necessary precondition for prayer or work is itself raised up as prayer. Benedict's sources, both classical philosophy and the Bible, both Athens and Jerusalem, teach the subordination of work to prayer. In Genesis, work is described as a punishment for the disobedience of the Fall. In Plato and Aristotle, work belongs to the realm of necessity: work is a necessary precondition for the spiritual freedom to be found in thought and contemplation. Both of these themes are evident in St Benedict, who describes work (in chapter 48) as both a remedy for the evil of idleness and as a necessity of life[7]. Work is undoubtedly subordinated to prayer: work belongs to the body (*opus corporis*) and to this world while prayer belongs to the spirit and to God. Although both Athens and Jerusalem subordinate the realm of work to the realm of prayer, they do so for different reasons. There is no doubt that Benedict, following St Paul, values manual labor much more than does any ancient philosopher. For Plato and Aristotle, manual labor is for slaves or metics; the only 'work' that might be worthy of a philosopher would be statesmanship. But, after all, Jesus was a carpenter and St Paul prided himself on his tent-making, so Jerusalem esteems manual work much more than does Athens. Still, both Athens and Jerusalem, in different ways, agree that we divinize ourselves primarily through activities of the mind, especially the contemplation of God. Neither Jesus nor St Paul ever confused their labor for their prayers, or doubted the spiritual superiority of prayer. In short, Benedict's elevation of verbal prayer over manual labor still belongs to the ancient hierarchies of soul over body, freedom over necessary, spirit over matter.

Charles Taylor identifies 'the affirmation of ordinary life' as a central strand of modern thought[8]. Indeed, in Thomas Carlyle, work becomes the highest good and the highest calling of man. 'All true work is sacred.' For Carlyle, truly *laborare est orare*. The charism of work in Escrivá follows closely in the path blazed by Carlyle.

7) 'Idleness is the enemy of the soul. Therefore, the brothers should have specified periods for manual labor … to do whatever work is necessary … if poverty should force them to do the harvesting themselves' (RB 48.1, 6, 7).

8) Taylor, *Sources of the Self* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), ch. 13.

To begin with, Escrivá champions the example of the early Christians, who, before monasticism, lived out their Christian vocations through their ordinary occupations. Escrivá embraces a characteristically modern 'affirmation of everyday life' as he calls Christian laymen and women to embrace their worldly occupations as the primary vehicle of sanctification. Escrivá denies that Genesis presents work as a form of punishment: he claims that God made man for work in the Garden even before the Fall. We can also see a modern democratic impulse in this sanctification of work, since only a few men can hope to follow the ancient path toward sanctification through the cloister or through philosophy. St Escrivá develops this spirituality of work into a doctrine he calls 'Christian materialism': an incarnational theology of divinizing ourselves through our immersion in worldly occupations. Here all the ancient hierarchies are inverted, as material work is elevated to the realm of the spiritual.

1. Work and Prayer in the Benedictine Tradition

In the fifteen centuries of Benedictine monasticism, there have been many different understandings of the relation of work to prayer. This is not surprising, given the immense temporal and geographical diversity of Benedictine life. In any living tradition, we must expect constant change, and the Benedictine tradition has seen many waves of decline, reform, and renewal. True, the *Rule of St Benedict*, like any written code or grammar, does reduce the scope of change, compared to any purely oral tradition. But Benedict's *Rule* is notoriously terse and incomplete: far from specifying all important aspects of life in a monastery, it neglects even some fundamental activities. Modern readers are often surprised that the *Rule* makes no explicit provision for either the celebration of the Eucharist or for private prayer; yet it would be foolish to conclude that Benedict or the Benedictines ever neglected either the Mass or silent prayer. Conversely, Benedict provides a very detailed schedule of punishments for infractions of his Rule, a schedule almost totally ignored in modern monasticism. So the living tradition of Benedictines is essential for understanding and interpreting the *Rule of St Benedict*. It is no accident that all of the important scholars of the *Rule* have been monks. Only someone who has lived and practiced Benedictine monasticism can understand its rules, because all rules are parasitic on the practices they regulate. As the philosopher Michael Oakeshott said, 'rules are like birds: they must live before they can be stuffed.' The *Rule of St Benedict* did not create monasticism but aimed to reform and regulate an ongoing tradition; apart from that lived tradition, the rules are incomprehensible.

So it is not possible to recover a pure and original Benedictine spirituality, untouched and uncontaminated by the subsequent fifteen centuries of lived monasticism. Nonetheless, historical research has persuasively shown that modern Benedictine ideas are often quite different from those of the founder. In the case of work, in particular, we see powerful forces of historical anachronism that lead many writers, both Benedictine and lay, to read Benedict's *Rule* in term of a modern spirituality of work. Although we cannot avoid interpreting the past in the light of the present (our very focus on work reflects our modern concerns), still we

must attempt to uncover Benedict's own understanding if we are to learn from him. Although the Benedictine tradition of commentary is an invaluable guide to the meaning of Benedict's Rule, it is not infallible. Our understanding of Benedict's own intentions has been hugely improved by comparing his *Rule* with the *Rule of the Master*, an anonymous code of monastic life that dates from the beginning of the sixth century. By noting what Benedict borrows and what he ignores in the *Rule of the Master*, we get a better sense of what he wanted for his community[19]. We should want Benedict's *Rule* to be not merely a mirror but also a challenge for our own ideas. If we want a genuine conversation between ancients and moderns, then we have to respect their differences. I will try to show that Benedict's understanding of work and prayer differ quite strikingly from his modern admirers. But my interest is not primarily historical but philosophical: I want to argue, further, that Benedict's implicit philosophy of work and prayer has important lessons for moderns. What does Benedict mean by work and prayer and how did he rank them?

The first thing to note is that work occupies, both in theory and in practice, a much larger place in modern life than in Benedict's world. Depending upon the season, Benedict's monks are supposed to work 4 to 6 hours a day, excluding Sunday. By contrast, according to Terrence Kardong OSB, today's American monks work 10 to 12 hours a day. He says that the work ethic is undermining monastic life: 'I consider work the most pressing issue for American Benedictines, I contend it is killing us[11].' Nor is this merely an American problem. De Vogüé also notes that whereas Benedict needed to encourage his monks to work, today 'there is less need to arouse monks to it than to keep them from being completely absorbed in it[11].' Similarly, Benedict devotes only a few verses to the topic of work, whereas he devotes thirteen entire chapters (8 to 20) and many other scattered verses to the topic of prayer. Yet a huge proportion of modern commentary on the Benedictine tradition focuses on work.

It is obvious to almost everyone that 'work is prayer' is not genuinely Benedictine; indeed, Kardong argues that the converse 'prayer is work' is closer to Benedict. Kardong reminds us that even the official Benedictine motto (emblazoned on the refectory napkins) *ora et labora* is not originally Benedictine and arose only in the nineteenth century[12]. What does Benedict actually teach about work and prayer? Benedict divides up the monastic day into three essential activities: the *Opus Dei* (divine office), productive labor, and biblical study (*lectio divina*). Depending both

9) The standard edition of the *Rule of the Master* is Adalbert de Vogüé OSB, *La Règle du maître*, 3 vols (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1964); De Vogüé's authoritative edition of Benedict's Rule is then based on a close study of the relation between these two Rules, see '*La Règle de Saint Benoît,* 7 vols (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1972).
10) *Assumption Abbey Newsletter* (Richardton, ND 58652), Vol. 23, no. 4 (October 1995); also at: www.osb.org/gen/topics/work/kard1.html.
11) Aldalbert de Vogüé, *The Rule of St. Benedict: A Doctrinal and Spiritual Commentary*, tr. John Baptist Hasbrouck OSB (Kalamazoo, USA: Cistercian Publications, 1983), 247.
12) Kardong, *Assumption Abbey Newsletter*, cites the research of M.D. Meeuws 'Ora et Labora', *Collectanea Cisterciensia* 54 (1992), 193-214.

upon the season and the liturgical calendar, work takes 4-6 hours, liturgy about 3 hours, and biblical study about 2-3 hours. What is striking about these three primary activities in the *Rule* is that none of them corresponds to what we normally think of as Christian prayer. Jesus warned against the public prayer of the Pharisees and told his disciples to pray privately and in secret (Mt 6:6). The opus Dei, however, is public worship, not private prayer. True, Benedict permits monks who wish to pray alone to remain in the oratory after the divine office (RB 52), but he does not require any private prayer nor set aside specific times for it.

According to Adelbert de Vogüé, before Benedict, the divine office originally alternated recited psalms with silence for private prayer; but, over time, this silent void was filled with recited antiphons. He says that reciting the psalms was not originally described as prayer; instead, the prayer followed the recitation. But he concedes that for Benedict, the psalmody was prayer[13]. Some Benedictines see the *Opus Dei* as the required public homage due in justice to the divine king; while others see it as merely a convenient way to organize the personal obligation of each monk to pray[14]. What about the *lectio divina*? Was that prayer? Reading the Scriptures was certainly regarded as propaedeutic to prayer. If we think of prayer as a conversation with God, then we must first listen to God's holy word and then, in response to that word, offer a prayer. In the divine office, as in the *lectio divina*, the monk listens to and meditates upon the word of God, preparing him to respond in prayer. The study of the Bible and of biblical commentary was thought to be a first rung of a ladder of ascent: *lectio, cogitatio, stadium, meditatio, oratio, contemplatio*. For this reason, many Benedictines say that the *lectio divina* essentially is prayer[15].

Despite our modern tendency to see work as a vehicle for personal fulfillment and even as a spiritual vocation, Benedict was much more prosaic about manual work (*opus manuum*). First, he saw work as a duty of justice: monks ought to earn their own keep and not be a burden on others (RB 48.8). Second, work was a necessary evil: monks must do 'whatever work is necessary' and they should not complain even if 'their poverty should force them to do the harvesting themselves' (RB 6, 7). Third, work helped the monk escape the dangers of what parents today call 'unstructured time': 'idleness is the enemy of the soul' (RB 48.1). Here Benedict sounds a specifically Christian note, since his word for 'idleness' (*otiositas*) comes from the classical Latin *otium* meaning leisure. For the pagan Greeks and Romans, leisure was a great good, making possible the supreme enjoyments of politics

13) Aldalbert de Vogüé, *The Rule of St. Benedict*, 139, 142 and 148.
14) 'The central figure of the society (of the monastery) was the divine King. The monastery was a palace, a court, and the divine office was the daily service and formal homage rendered to the divine Majesty. This, the opus Dei, was the crown of the whole structure of the monastic edifice.' Butler, *Benedictine Monachism*, 31. 'The monk is not a member of the Church specially assigned to public praise. He is simply a disciple of Christ who seeks to put into action, alone or with others, the command "Pray without ceasing".' De Vogüé, *The Rule of St. Benedict*, 139.
15) Dom Paul Delatte, *The Rule of St. Benedict: A Commentary* (London: Burns Oates and Washbourne, 1921), 305 and 306.

and philosophy. Benedict's *Rule* makes no provision for any unstructured leisure or recreation, though, of course, meals and siestas afforded opportunities for recreation. Why the fear of idleness? Benedict does not say, but one of his sources, the *Rule of the Master*, said that 'the idle man is a prey to his desires'; and much later Thomas Merton warned about the dangers of daydreaming[16]. Benedict was less worried about idleness than the Master, who attempted to fill every spare moment of the monk's life[17].

Benedict does not tell us whether he thinks that work reflects the goodness of God's creation or is merely a punishment for sin: Did Adam and Eve work in Paradise or only after the Fall?[18] His commentators agree that Benedict does not emphasize the ascetic dimension of work and that he is at pains not to impose undue burdens of labor on his monks (RB 48.9)[19]. Benedict also doesn't specify what kind of manual labor monks may be required to perform: workshop or field, skilled or unskilled? His commentators point out that any kind of labor is acceptable as a school of obedience: 'It doesn't matter what we do, so long as we've got to do it[20].' When he discusses the skilled work of the artisans (RB 57), Benedict does not wax poetic about how skilled work actualizes and develops our latent powers or how fulfilling we find it to transform natural materials into useful and beautiful artifacts. Instead, he warns against the danger of pride lurking in the mastery of an art: 'If any one of them becomes puffed up by his skillfulness in his craft … he is to be removed from practicing his craft …' (RB 57.2,3). Nonetheless, Benedict does welcome artisans, if they 'practice their craft with all humility' (RB 57.1). Benedictine commentators do not agree about the value of even skilled manual labor. Delatte says that manual work 'has no efficacy of itself for the formation of an intelligent nature and less still for the development of the supernatural life[21].' But Thomas Merton and Dom Sighard Kleiner insist that 'even humble skills are gifts of God and enable men to participate in some measure in the creative activity of God[22].'

16) De Vogüé, *The Rule of St. Benedict*, 239; Thomas Merton, *The Rule of St. Benedict*, (ed.) Patrick F. O'Connell (Collegeville, MN, USA: Liturgical Press, 2009), 131.
17) See Terrence Kardong, *Benedict's Rule: A Translation and Commentary* (Collegeville, MN, USA: Liturgical Press, 1996), 48.1.
18) Benedict's commentators do not agree about the divine origin of labor. Dom Sighard Kleiner says: 'As soon as he left paradise, Adam received this law.' Kleiner, *Serving God First*, tr. James Schavinger (Kalamazoo MI: Cistercian Publications, 1985), 174. But Delatte claims that work is 'anterior to sin' in *Rule of St. Benedict*, 304.
19) 'Manual work is imposed on the monks as an economic necessity and as an exercise of ascesis and a religious duty.' De Vogüé, *The Rule of St. Benedict*, 133. 'The utilitarian predominates over the ascetical or aesthetical when it comes to work.' Kardong, *Benedict's Rule*, 48.6. 'So manual labor is a process of mortification' yet 'work is not simply a penalty and a punishment; it is a divine law anterior to sin, of universal validity.' Delatte, *The Rule of St. Benedict*, 305 and 304.
20) Butler, *Benedictine Monachism*, 374. Butler may be recalling the traditional maxim of the English school master: 'It doesn't matter what the boys study, so long as they don't like it.'
21) Delatte, *The Rule of St. Benedict,* 305.
22) Merton, *The Rule of St. Benedict,*, 136; Kleiner uses the same language in *Serving God First*, 179.

The history of Benedictine monasticism casts some doubt upon whether Benedict was right that manual labor (*opus manuum*) is a necessary part of the monastic life. Terrence Kardong observes that the Benedictine tradition combines frequent praise of manual work with the frequent desire to avoid it in practice[23]. Kardong argues that manual labor is not a necessary part of the monastic vocation but Thomas Merton, reflecting the Cistercian tradition, disagrees: 'manual labor is an integral part of the life of a monk….[24]'

At first glance, the three essential daily activities of the monk, liturgy, biblical study, and manual labor all seem unique and incommensurable. They don't seem to have much in common, beyond requiring attention and effort - though very different kinds of attention and effort. One cannot be really substituted for another and they have no obvious common measure. If I miss the liturgy of the hours can I read the Bible instead? Or can I skip Bible study to take in the harvest? Yet beginning with Benedict and continuing down to the present, writers have attempted to show that these are not unique and incommensurable activities but are somehow just different expressions of the same activity. By means of analogies and metaphors, we can compare anything to anything else: work is like prayer in that both can be offered up to God; work is like prayer because both involve effort. As Romeo said, Juliet is like the moon because both are always changing; but Juliet is not literally the moon and work is not literally prayer. In Benedictine discussions of *lectio divina*, *opus manuum*, and opus Dei, however, writers tend to forget the distinction between analogical and univocal speech. These writers do not claim that work can be likened to prayer, but that work literally is prayer. So all three activities are described sometimes as work and sometimes as prayer. I think this tendency to insist upon a common denominator among these disparate activities stems from a deep-seated but unstated conviction that the life of a monk must have a special unity and integrity so that all of his essential activities are really just one activity.

Benedict himself unifies the three activities through various rhetorical devices. Consider, for example, his metaphors for the monastery itself. He famously states in the Prologue: 'Therefore we intend to establish a school for the Lord's service' (RB Prol. 45). Now a *schola* (from the Greek word for leisure) is place free from the pressure of work. So if the monastery is a school, then all of its activities are leisurely and freely pursued without any economic necessity. If the monastery is a school, then work is a form of study or prayer. But the monastery is not literally a school because Benedict later describes the monastery as a workshop (*officina*) whose tools are prayer and study (RB 4.78, 75). In this sense, all the monk's activities are kinds of work, the work he calls a 'spiritual craft' (*ars spiritalis*). Indeed, just by call-

23) Kardong, *The Benedictines*, 166-7. 'Although manual labor cannot be said to be intrinsic to the monastic vocation, and soon became unknown for choir monks in early medieval Europe, the Cistercian reform recognized it as one of the components of an integral life of simplicity and contemplation.' Kardong, *Benedict's Rule*, 48.8.

24) 'To say that any kind of labor - clerical, apostolic, etc - fits the bill is to distort the meaning of the Rule…' Merton, *The Rule of St. Benedict*, 132.

ing the liturgy of the hours the *Opus Dei* and calling work *opus manuum* or *opus laboris*, Benedict is comparing labor and liturgy[25]. Of course, at a deeper level, Benedict does not treat liturgy, study, and work as the same activity. He assumes, in fact, that they are mutually exclusive, which is why they must be performed at separate times; nor are monks permitted to substitute one for the other. The abbot, however, is permitted to require a monk to work if he unwilling or unable to study, on the theory that both work and study protect us from the danger of idleness (RB 48.23). That work and *lectio divina* can thus occasionally be interchanged has led some Benedictines to argue that *lectio divina* is actually a kind of work[26]. But Kardong observes that Benedict often says (RB 48) that his monks are 'free' (vacare) for reading (lectio) - free, that is, from the necessity of work, meaning that reading, like prayer, is 'holy leisure, time spent only for God and with God.' Kardong contrasts activities enjoyed for their own sake, like biblical study, from those that are meant to serve other purposes, like work[27]. For these reasons, most Benedictines treat biblical study as prayer. So if the life of the monk is to be divided between prayer and labor (ora et labora), and if work is labor and the divine office is prayer, then where do we put biblical study? Benedict himself treats the *lectio divina* sometimes as work and sometimes as prayer, as do his commentators.

But some Benedictines and others want even more unity to the monk's day. This leads them either to describe all the monk's activities as work or to describe them all as prayer. According to Kleiner, 'St Benedict considers all our occupations work: the opus Dei, the *opus manuum*, the *lectio divina*….' Indeed, Kleiner insists that the liturgy is 'real work' and 'useful employment' - on the assumption, presumably, that we honor any activity by calling it 'work'[28]. But by calling all our activities work, we efface the important distinction between those activities we enjoy purely for their own sake and those we use as instruments for other purposes. Are monks really essentially worker bees? Perhaps liturgy, study, and work are all labors of love, three kinds of service to God?[29] I would explain these kinds of service in terms of the three-fold law of love: liturgy is service to God himself, which is why it comes first; work is service to our neighbor, as an image of God; and biblical study is service to the image of God within ourselves.

A more common strategy for unifying the activities of the monk is to describe them all as prayer, as in the modern mantra that 'to work is to pray.' This doctrine of implicit prayer goes back to Origen, who articulated an influential ideal of a life wholly given over to prayer: 'the entire life of the Christian, taken as a whole, is a

26) 'this last [*lectio divina*] is also considered a work because anyone who cannot apply himself to it is to be given some manual work (48.23).' Dom Sighard Kleiner, *Serving God First,* 174.
27) Kardong, *Benedict's Rule* 48.4 and 48D.
28) 'To consider the *opus Dei* in any other way than as real work would be to adopt positivistic and Marxist views…. But, we do not expect that today's society will consider the opus Dei a useful employment, and still less, that it would pay for it.' Kleiner, *Serving God First*, 175-6.
29) Butler says that since the monastery is a 'school of the service of God' then study, prayer and work are the three main kinds of service. *Benedictine Monachism*, 29.

single great prayer, and what we normally call prayer is only a part of this.' Origen was famous for his allegories, and he offers an allegory of human life in which everything we do is offered up as prayer to God: 'to act well is to pray[30].' This notion of implicit prayer was never the dominant strand of thought or practice in the history of monasticism, but it never disappeared. With the rise of the modern work ethic, Origen's idea came roaring back in the form of 'to work is to pray'. We find this doctrine even in Thomas Merton: 'Work with the hands, the exercise of a skill, is truly a prayer…. But we must know how to work, peacefully, silently, humbly, and for the glory of God.' Merton even says that we should not use machines to finish the work quickly so that we have time for prayer, since work itself, done properly, is prayer[31]. The danger of this doctrine of implicit prayer is that it seems to undermine the requirement for both formal, public, prayer and for informal, private, prayer. If everything we do is prayer, then what is the need for actual liturgy or personal conversation with God?

Still, the ideal of a life wholly devoted to prayer was a powerful one. Among the Greek Fathers of monasticism, the expression 'opus Dei' (*ergon tou Theou*) referred, not to the liturgy but to the whole of the monastic life[32]. Yet in Benedict, as we have seen, the 'opus Dei' refers only to the liturgy of the hours. Far from seeing work as prayer, Benedict insists that every activity cease when the monk hears the call to the divine office: 'Therefore nothing is to be preferred to the Work of God' (RB 43.3). This famous maxim is often cited to prove that the *Opus Dei* is the most important activity of the monk, but in context it seems to mean only 'when the bell for office rings, nothing is to be put ahead of the Office[33].' The fact that the office takes priority over other activities at its appointed hours does not prove that the office is absolutely prior to all other activities. One might say that Benedict values work above all because he devotes the greatest number of hours to it or that Benedict values biblical study above all because he devotes the best hours of the day to it. What makes the *Opus Dei* the most important activity of the monk is that it is the only activity of the monastic community directed wholly to God. If the monastery is a school of service to God, then the *Opus Dei* is the unique service offered by the whole school to God. Thus, most Benedictines agree with Dom Butler: 'the divine office is the soul of the monastic life[34].' A monastery might cease doing every other activity, but if it ceased the office of the hours, it would cease being a monastery[35].

30) Origen, cited in Korneel Vermeiren OCSO, *Praying with Benedict*, tr. Richard Yeo OSB (Kalamazoo, USA: Cistercian Publications, 1999), 20; and in De Vogüé, *The Rule of St. Benedict*, 152.
31) Merton, *The Rule of St. Benedict*, 136.
32) Korneel Vermeiren, *Praying with Benedict,* 44-5.
33) Kardong, *Benedict's Rule*, 43.3.
34) 'This means that the essence of a Benedictine vocation is the celebration of the liturgy.' Butler, *Benedictine Monachism*, 32 and 30. Merton agrees: 'the principal core of the monastic family is the common praise of God in the Opus Dei.' *The Rule of St. Benedict*, 14.
35) To see the monastic origins of the modern university, consider what Alan Ryan, the Warden of New College, Oxford told me: 'By the terms of the endowment of this College, I am permitted to discharge the entire faculty and all the students. But I cannot touch the choir, which must recite evensong every day until Kingdom come.'

The New Testament commands every Christian to 'pray constantly' as well as to 'work, or you shall not eat.' Ever since the time of the Desert Fathers, some Christians have sought to devote their lives wholly to prayer; but other Christians saw this as an unfair attempt to shirk the common duty of work. But how can we pray constantly if we must devote so much of our time to work? Must we then divide our days and our lives between sacred prayer and profane work? Is there someway to combine these commands, so that prayer is compatible with work or work becomes a prayer? According to some Benedictine scholars, the Greek Monastic Fathers developed strategies for unifying the monk's life and for overcoming any division between profane and sacred activities. For example, the Desert Fathers often picked very simple forms of work, such as making rope, so that their minds were free for reciting memorized psalms and for being constantly aware of God's presence. Basil the Great (died 370), for example, offered this example of how monks can unify prayer and work: 'While our hands are occupied, we can with our tongue praise God with psalms and hymns and spiritual songs … we can thank God who has endowed our hands with the capacity to work … finally, shall ask God that the work of our hands may be guided toward their object, in order that they may be acceptable to God[36].' According to De Vogüé, this oral or mental recital of memorized texts from the Scripture was known as meditation. In this original ideal 'the monk was doing the same thing at work as at the office; in both the time flowed by in the continual recitation of Scripture, and especially of the psalms. Prayer was the response, both at work and at office, to this incessant hearing of the word of God.' Biblical study also fit harmoniously with this integrated vision of a monk's day. 'The purpose of these studies is to furnish the memory with inspired texts to recite continually, either at the office or at work[37].'

Compared to this vision of a harmoniously integrated life, in which work, liturgy, and study are all unified by the activity of continual meditation on God's word, the *Rule of St Benedict* seems to create a life fundamentally divided between sacred and profane activities. Benedict divided the monk's day into distinct and mutually exclusive activities, work, biblical study, and the divine office. Although he often makes analogies between them, he never talks about the prayer and meditation that might hold them together as a coherent whole. He does not tell monks to pray privately during the office, during biblical study or during work. The Benedictine monastery is even physically divided between the sacred space of the oratory, which he says, is only for prayer (RB 52), and the profane workshops. Of course, just because Benedict's *Rule* makes no mention of private prayer during work does not mean that monks did not actually pray frequently during work, as well as during the office and during their reading. But, as monastic work became less manual and more clerical (in both senses of that word), it became much harder to combine work and prayer. De Vogüé argues that the Benedictine ideal is not *ora et labora* nor even *ora, labora, lege but ora, labora, lege, meditare*, for it is the mindfulness

36) Basil, cited in Vermeiren, *Praying with Benedict,* 15. Augustine also said about his monks: 'A person can very well sing the divine songs while working manually.' Cited in De Vogüé, *The Rule of St. Benedict*, 154.
37) De Vogüé, *The Rule of St. Benedict*, 135.

of meditation, the constant awareness of God, that holds the disparate activities of the monk together and in harmony[38]. But whether Benedict himself saw such a unity to the monk's day is doubtful.

2. St Escrivá: Opus Dei as Daily Labor

What we find in Escrivá's sanctification of work is in part a return to the ancient ideal of continual prayer and in part modern affirmation of the moral and spiritual value of ordinary work. Although Escrivá often claims that he is returning to the earliest traditions of lay Christianity, before the rise of monasticism or clerical orders, his spirituality of work is closer to early Greek monasticism than to anything we find in the Book of Acts. True, the earliest Christians usually did normally keep their worldly occupations; but there is no evidence that they treated those occupations as modes of sanctification or as forms of implicit prayer. Like Paul, these first Christians worked so as not to be a burden to others and to provide alms to the poor: they seem to have interpreted their work as a duty of justice, not as mode of sanctification. But, as we have noted, the Desert Fathers articulated a vision of the unity of life in which prayer permeates every activity, including work; and Origen developed a doctrine of work and works as implicit prayer. Escrivá is opening up the path of the Desert Fathers to every Christian layman.

Benedict interpreted the command to pray constantly to mean, at a minimum, to pray the office seven times a day and at midnight (RB 16, 3, 4) but blessed Epiphanius, Bishop of Cyprus, a Greek monk objected to this rule by saying: 'Evidently you are neglecting the other hours of the day when you are not praying. The true monk should be ceaselessly praying and saying psalms in his heart[39].'
Here Epiphanius articulates Escrivá's critique of Catholic spirituality and his ideal of the unity of life. Escrivá sees Catholic life as hopelessly divided between clerical and lay, between the spiritual and the profane, the church and the world. He offers a vision of what he calls 'Christian materialism' which promises a unity of life that transcends all of these divisions. His doctrine of sanctifying work is just a means to his larger vision of life as continual prayer: 'we will be able to turn our whole day into a continuous praise of God[40]'. Escrivá's *Opus Dei* is often described as a democratizing of the spiritual life, in which 'being a saint is not just the province of a few spiritual athletes, but is the universal destiny of very Christian[41].' But actually, Escrivá's ideal of continual prayer amidst work is a much more demanding ideal, in many ways, than Benedict's. St Benedict was fairly realistic about the human capacity for sustained attention on God or anything else, which is why he rotates his monks through a wide variety of tasks every day. He assumes that few people could stand the psychological pressure of attempting to focus on God

38) Ibid., 242.
39) Epiphanius, cited in Vermeiren, *Praying with Benedict*, 25.
40) Christ is Passing By, 119.
41) John Allen, Opus Dei (London: Penguin, 2005), 16-17.

every minute of the waking day. Escrivá's ideal of the unity of life affords no respite whatever from the duty to pray incessantly; indeed, according to him 'even our sleep should be a prayer[42].' The life of his Numeraries, in particular, has proven in practice to be very demanding indeed[43]. Much easier, in many ways, to be a Benedictine monk than an *Opus Dei* layman.

Vittorio Messori, an Italian journalist and friend of Opus Dei, compares Escrivá's ideal to that of Benedict: '… the celebrated precept of Saint Benedict for his monks could be turned on its head: rather than *ora et labora* … one should *labora et ora*, so that the office, the factory, the street, the home become themselves a church, a place of prayer…[44]'As we have seen, *ora et labora* is not a precept of St Benedict and, as we shall see, Escrivá's implicit precept is not *labora et ora* but *labora est ora*: one Latin letter makes a huge difference in meaning. Still, Messori is right in one respect: when it comes to the meaning of Opus Dei, Escrivá does turn Benedict on his head. For Benedict the *Opus Dei* refers only to the liturgy while for Escrivá the *Opus Dei* refers mainly, if not solely, to daily labor. So Escrivá elevates work to the primacy that Benedict accords to the liturgy.

Escrivá's theology is radically incarnational and opposed to any sharp division between spirit and matter: 'Authentic Christianity, which professes the resurrection of all flesh, has always quite logically opposed 'dis-incarnation', without fear of being judged materialistic. We can, therefore, rightly speak of a 'Christian materialism', which is boldly opposed to that materialism which is blind to the spirit[45].' Instead of seeking to rise above our material circumstances or to retreat from the world, Escrivá advocates 'making heroic verse out of the prose of each day' for heaven meets earth, he says 'when you sanctify your everyday lives[46].' Whereas we saw that Benedictines are divided on the question of whether work constitutes divine punishment for sin, Escrivá has no doubt: 'work is not a curse; nor is it a punishment for sin. Genesis had already spoken about the fact of work before ever Adam rebelled against God[47].'

What makes Escrivá so modern is his identification of the world with the world of work. The informal motto of his *Opus Dei* defines the threefold vocation of the laity as: 'To sanctify work, to sanctify themselves in work, and to sanctify others through work[48].' Let us consider what each of these three kinds of sanctification means. How does one sanctify work? By performing it perfectly, both with 'human perfec-

42) Christ is Passing By, 119.
43) Allen interviewed many Numeraries and found lots of complaints of 'inhuman expectations' and of being 'exhausted and drained'; as one said: 'This is not for the faint of heart.' See Opus Dei, 87.
44) Vittorio Messori, Opus Dei, tr. Gerald Malsbary (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 1997), 99.
45) Passionately Loving the World, 115.
46) Ibid., 116.
47) *Friends of God*, 81.
48) *Freedom and Pluralism in the People of God*, 10.

tion (professional competence) and with Christian perfection (for love of God's Will and as a service to mankind) …' When work is performed as perfectly as humanly possible, 'it is sanctified and becomes God's work, *Operatio Dei, opus Dei*[49].' Escrivá likes to quote the Castilian poet who said: 'Write slowly and with a careful hand, for doing things well is more important than doing them[50].' Jesus said that we should 'be perfect, as your Heavenly Father is perfect' and Escrivá interprets this counsel of perfection to apply mainly to occupational diligence. As Giuseppe Romano says: 'Work is well done because we cannot offer God a shabby gift: God deserves better. It is also done well, because it renders service to others…[51]'. What are we to make of his call to perfectionism? Is perfectionism really a way to make our work holy? It seems hard to generalize: some kinds of conscientiousness are certainly morally required while other kinds can become merely scrupulous and neurotic. Sheer attention to detail can sometimes undermine the larger moral purpose of our work, as when workers stall production by 'work to rule'. As for Escrivá's 'doing things well is more important than doing them,' Chesterton famously offered this equally valid riposte: 'Anything worth doing is worth doing badly.'

In Escrivá's doctrine of sanctifying work through careful performance we can certainly see a democratizing impulse. Escrivá follows the maxim of the early modern poet that 'God loveth adverbs': it doesn't matter what we do (consistent with divine law), but how we do it. God does not care about what kind of work we do, just that we do it perfectly, lovingly, and humbly. Escrivá claims to reject the ancient hierarchy of occupations in which the liberal arts were regarded as intrinsically superior to the servile, mechanical arts. At the same time, however, Escrivá's *Opus Dei* has made recruitment of intellectuals a priority. Commenting on the words of Jesus 'I will make you fishers of men,' Escrivá comments 'men - like fish - have to be caught by the head[52].' So, in practice, Escrivá does create a certain hierarchy of callings.

How do we sanctify ourselves in our work? By making our work into prayer: 'any honorable work can be a prayer[53].' What is falsely attributed to Benedict is truly attributed to Escrivá: *Laborare est orare*. But how can work become prayer? Unfortunately, Escrivá does not distinguish literal prayer from implicit or metaphorical prayer. Sometimes he clearly implies a doctrine of work as implicit prayer. In this sense, to work is in and of itself to pray. Escrivá speaks of 'your continual hard work, which you will have learned to turn into prayer, because you will have started it and finished it in the presence of God…[54]' Note that in this passage he does not say that work is prayer when we do it while being aware of the presence of God; the sheer ubiquity of God suffices for our work to be in the presence of God.

49) Ibid.
50) *Passionately Loving the World*, 116.
51) Romano, cited in Messori, *Opus Dei*, 163.
52) *The Way*, 978. On Escrivá's emphasis on the evangelization of the intelligentsia, see Messori, *Opus Dei*, 110-13.
53) *Christ is Passing By,* 10.
54) *Friends of God*, 66.

But in other places he talks about combining work and prayer: 'prayer and work can easily go together[55].' Unfortunately, Escrivá doesn't offer many specifics, but the practice of his followers can help us to interpret these cryptic words. Members of *Opus Dei* say that they sanctify themselves in work by 1) offering their work explicitly to God or to some good cause, such as peace or justice; 2) intending to seek to serve God in their work by treating those they encounter in work with kindness and generosity; 3) spontaneous interjections of prayer amidst work[56]. Indeed, Escrivá does explicitly endorse this last strategy for combining work and prayer: 'Ejaculatory prayers do not hinder your work, just as the beating of your heart does not impede the movements of the body[57].' Like the Desert Fathers, Escrivá here imagines simple manual labor in which the mouth and mind are free to praise God. Escrivá quotes a lathe-worker who found that he could sing God's praise while operating his lathe[58]. In one place, Escrivá does acknowledge the possibility that work might even interfere with prayer: 'Work tires you out and leaves you unable to pray[59].'

What are we to make of these strategies for turning work into prayer? First, we should note that the doctrine of work as implicit prayer seems to undermine our motivations to try to mix our work with actual prayers. If to work is inherently to pray, then what need have we of other kinds of prayer? Further, if to work is to pray, then does it follow that anyone who works is also praying? What makes Christians special? Second, not all kinds of work can be mixed with actual prayers. We don't want our surgeon or barber to burst into spontaneous praise of God, not even mentally. Some kinds of work demand a focused attention that is not compatible with frequent prayer. John Allen reports the amusing example (not amusing to him) of an *Opus Dei* truck driver praying the rosary while they drove at full speed[60]. Still, these kinds of work can certainly be 'offered up' to God when we commence the work day, as Escrivá suggests for intellectually demanding work[61]. Third, Escrivá's imperative of seeking perfection at work seems in tension with some of these strategies for mixing work and prayer. Cognitive psychologists remind us what a scarce resource is our attention: human beings cannot divide their active attention on both work and prayer. Finally, mixing work and prayer may not be consistent with prayer if, as Simone Weil says, 'absolutely unmixed attention is prayer.'

What does it mean to sanctify others through work? The first ecclesiastical decree approving *Opus Dei* in 1950 said: 'The members of *Opus Dei* exercise the annunciation of the Gospel to their fellows above all through means of example which they give to their neighbors, their colleagues and companions at work, in their

55) *Furrow*, 471.
56) See Allen, *Opus Dei,* 79-91.
57) *Furrow*, 516.
58) Ibid., 517.
59) Escrivá consoles the fatigued worker with this comment: 'You are always in the presence of your Father. If you can't speak to him, look at him every now and then like a little child … and he'll smile at you.' In *The Way,* 895.
60) Allen, *Opus Dei*, 91.
61) *Furrow*, 522.

family, social, and professional lives, striving always and everywhere to be better[62].' Escrivá believes that the most important example that Christians can set for others is to excel at their work: 'To attract and to help others, I need the influence of my professional reputation, and that is what God wants[63].' We must strive always to be leaders in our professions, so that our prestige will attract others to our Christian ideals: our 'professional prestige' is our 'bait' as fishers of men[64]. According to *Opus Dei* member Dominique Le Tourneau: 'To win over others, a person must take to heart his need to carry out his duties as well as the best of his companions, and if possible better than the best[65].' Escrivá calls 'our professional prestige' the 'cathedra from which others are taught to sanctify their labor and to conform their lives to the demands of the Christian life[66].'

Here the contrast with Benedict is quite sharp: Benedict expressed grave concern for the spiritual pride associated with professional prestige (RB 57). Escrivá and his followers are aware of the dangers of this emphasis on the duty to strive for professional reputation. We can make an idol of what William James called 'the bitch-goddess, Success.' Although Escrivá says in scores of places that we should pursue our careers and professional success relentlessly, in a couple places he does warn of the danger: 'An impatient and disordered anxiousness to climb up the professional ladder can mask self-love under the appearances of "serving souls"[67].' According to Escrivá, we sanctify others by the example we set in our professionalism and in our professional prestige. How does this work? My co-workers, he says, will be drawn to me because of my success and they will learn that I use my professional success to glorify God. My reputation at work is a kind of magnet that draws colleagues into friendship, who will see that my productivity stems from 'being a collaborator with God in the creation and recreation of the world[68].' Perhaps there are those who think that Christians are losers or that Christianity is incompatible with worldly success? I can remove this obstacle for others if I witness my faith amidst my professional accomplishments.

One shortcoming of this strategy of witnessing to the Gospel through professional success is that many actual saints have been regarded as failures by worldly standards. From Cervantes' Don Quixote to Graham Greene's 'whisky priest,' many fictional saints have also been notorious losers. Escrivá frequently invites us to identify with the 'hidden years' of Jesus' life[69], when he worked as a carpenter. But did Jesus draw anyone to the Father because of his success at the workbench? Did any of his apostles win converts by way of professional expertise? Isn't our professional success just as likely to alienate our colleagues, due to envy or rivalry, as to attract them? Are people drawn to us because of our success or despite it? Moreover, what people most ad-

62) Cited in Messori, *Opus Dei*, 102.
63) *Furrow*, 781.
64) *The Way*, 372.
65) Le Tourneau, cited in Allen, *Opus Dei*, 89.
66) Le Tourneau, citing Escrivá, in Messori, *Opus Dei*, 162.
68) *Furrow*, 701.
69) Giuseppe Romano, cited in Messori, *Opus Dei*, 163.

mire in their co-workers are not the qualities mentioned by Escrivá, such as prestige, perfection, and reputation, but rather dedication and love of the work itself. Escrivá is certainly right that the example we set to others is very important. As St Francis said, 'preach the Gospel incessantly, and, only when necessary, use words.' But Escrivá seems unduly focused on work as the locus of this kind of Christian witness: 'We too, with a holy pride, have to prove with deeds that we are workers, men and women who really work[70].' But isn't it just as likely that we announce the Gospel by the example we set as friends, as spouses, as parents, as siblings, as neighbors, as citizens?

It is instructive to contrast the daily schedule of an *Opus Dei* member with the schedule of Benedict's Rule. Recall that Benedict required, 4-6 hours of work, 3 hours of liturgy, and 2-3 hours of biblical study. The Norms of *Opus Dei* call for daily Mass, at least one hour of private prayer, and at least 15 minutes of spiritually-uplifting reading (including the Bible)[71]. As for work, there is no upper limit: Escrivá demands work and more work. 'Work without rest,' he says, because your models are the leaders of your professions, who 'devote many hours of the day, and even of the night, to their jobs[72].' Nothing is more modern about Escrivá than his devotion to the Gospel of Work and even modern Benedictines are working almost twice the hours set by Benedict himself.
Just as Benedict has nothing good to say about idleness (*otiositas*), so Escrivá constantly seeks to arouse us from our sinful torpor. 'You must fight against the tendency to be too lenient with yourselves…. Sometimes we worry too much about our health, or about getting enough rest[73].' What Escrivá misses completely are the costs of his ideal of relentless work to other equally valuable goods, such as play, the enjoyment of art, friendship, parenting, marriage. All of these goods require leisure, but a word search of his collected writings finds only two mentions of leisure and one of them condemns it[74]. Similarly when Escrivá is not condemning rest and recreation, he defines them merely as opportunities to regain strength for work: 'Rest means recuperation: to gain strength … it means a change of occupation, so that you can come back later with a new impetus to your daily job[75].' So when we are not working we should be preparing ourselves for work: 'He who pledges himself to work for Christ should never have a free moment[76].' Are Escrivá's fellow Spaniards so irredeemably indolent?

At the beginning of the nineteenth century Gospel of Work, John Keats wrote his famous 'Ode to Indolence', which begins with a quote from Jesus: 'They toil not; neither do they spin' (Luke 12:27). Jesus praised the lilies of the field, which in their sheer idleness surpass the beauty of all the human effort devoted to Solomon's

70) *Furrow*, 701.
71) *Friends of God*, 62.
72) For the Norms of Opus Dei, see Allen, *Opus Dei*, 30-31.
73) *The Forge*, 65; *Friends of God*, 60.
74) *Friends of God*, 62.
75) *See The Way*, 530 (negative) and *Christ is Passing By*, 166 (positive).
76) *Furrow*, 514. Cf. 'Certainly it is necessary to rest, because we have to tackle our work each day with renewed vigour.' *Friends of God*, 62.

finery. If Jesus were preaching the Gospel of Work, why would he heap such praise on the lilies? Christians must learn, not only how to actively serve God, but also how to passively receive his gifts. Ultimately, our active efforts pale in comparison with the infinite and unmerited bounty God bestows on us. The deepest and hardest lesson that Jesus taught his disciples was the one saved for the end: by washing their feet, Jesus attempted to teach his disciples the lesson of how to receive love, of how to accept gifts. In an eschatological perspective, to be a Christian is more about receiving than about giving, more about waiting than about working.

Escrivá's spirituality of work is often attacked for being Calvinist, in the sense that the predestined Calvinist seeks in worldly success the sign of his election[78]. And it is true, as we have seen, that Escrivá places a lot of emphasis on the importance of professional success, as a way to attract and to sanctify others. Moreover, Max Weber famously describes Calvinism as a 'worldly asceticism', in the sense that Calvin's followers brought the frugality, regularity, and self-denial of the monastery into the management of business enterprises. Escrivá's *Opus Dei* can indeed be rightly characterized as a 'worldly asceticism'. But Calvin's overwhelming emphasis on God's unmerited grace is far from the spirit of Escrivá. A true Calvinist is in no danger of thinking that he can earn salvation by any effort of personal sanctification. Escrivá's upbeat optimism is much closer to the spirit of Pelagius than to the grim spirit of Calvin. Escrivá's unrelenting focus on sanctification through work can easily create the hope that we might earn our own salvation. In the words of an *Opus Dei* teacher: 'What the idea of sanctification of work helps me to see is that I can get into heaven by doing this job[79].'

There is an irresistible appeal to the ideal of incessant prayer, as first articulated by the Desert Fathers and now developed by Saint Escrivá. If all of our activities could become forms of prayer, then our entire lives could be offered to God. In the light of this heroic ideal, the *Rule of St Benedict* appears as a pretty sorry compromise, since Benedict does not require or even endorse constant prayer. Benedict's monks alternate between sacred and profane activities, reflecting his deep concession to the limits of the human condition. By contrast, Escrivá hoped to overcome this divide between the sacred and the profane; he hoped that work itself could become a form of prayer. But he never showed how work could function as implicit prayer and his preferred kinds of professional work are usually not compatible with constant explicit prayer. Benedict's monks can work without praying because they have the time to pray without working. By endorsing the modern tendency to let work fill all available hours, Escrivá's followers, who seek a life of incessant prayer, may well end up finding instead a life of incessant work.

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77) *The Way*, 357.
78) See the discussion of Calvinism and Opus Dei in Allen, *Opus Dei*, 87-9.
79) See Allen, *Opus Dei*, 83.

CHARISM AND INSTITUTION: AN ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY CASE STUDY OF THE ECONOMY OF COMMUNION

di
JEANNE BUCKEYE

This paper examines the Economy of Communion (EOC), seen as a form of "charismatic economy", through the lens of organizational theory, seeking a fuller understanding of a movement that continues to resist facile definition. Noting the absence of a unified, comprehensive theory of organizations, two differing theoretical perspectives that share a similar label are explored. "Institutional theory", rooted in scientific rationalism and a teleology of efficiency, views organizations as "closed systems" largely shaped by their external environments. This perspective, originating largely with Max Weber, has evolved to include a teleology of social legitimacy but retains the view of organizations as closed systems. The second perspective, the "institutional school" suggests that organizations are "open systems", both shaping and being shaped by their environments but through differing types of organizational behaviors. The paper considers EOC companies in light of charism; that is, as concrete enactments of spiritual gift. Organizational theory doesn't treat this possibility at all.

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«What is the Economy of Communion - in its essence? An association of businesses? A support group? A new 'ecclesial' expression? A social movement disguised as a business project? A fraternal organization? A franchise?»[1]

The Economy of Communion is not easy to define. Despite an ongoing, multi-year, research study of the business practices of Economy of Communion companies, and close engagement with more than a dozen business owners and managers, we continually find ourselves confronted with questions about its form, structure and business practice. Typical among these are questions like those above. Additionally, when we discuss the Economy of Communion with colleagues, and with other owners of ordinary[2] businesses, related questions frequently surface, e.g., how does one join or become a member? Who is in charge? Who has authority to make key decisions? We recognize that these questions persist because the Economy of Communion is a rich and complex proposition, a phenomenon that is ambitious and international, multifaceted and multidimensional. We recognize also that the questions reflect that, on the whole, the Economy of Communion needs more study, particularly by organizational scientists.

To that end, we explore the possibility that organizational science might shed light on this movement. And, while there exists no single unified body of theoretical work in organizational science, there are two perspectives we wish to explore in this paper. The first perspective is commonly described as 'institutional theory'[3] and views organizations as 'closed systems' - shaped and formed by the interaction with forces in the external environment. This perspective is historically rooted in the seminal observations of Max Weber, and describes a process of institutionalization[4] that organizational scholars have labeled *isomorphic*; that is, it explains why significant homogeneity in organizational structure, form, and practice occurs among organizations[5]. Weber viewed this process as inexorable and at some point irreversible, leading him to characterize it as the iron cage of bureaucracy[6].

1) J. Buckeye, J. Gallagher, and E. Garlow, *Resolving the Tensions in a Culture of Communion*, 2009 (Mundell & Associates: publication pending). These questions are taken directly from our own reflection on the case study.
2) We make reference several times in this paper to 'ordinary' businesses. We recognize this as the very risky generalization that it is, and acknowledge that what we wish to convey is the idea of 'non-EOC' businesses.
3) 'Introduction' in Royston Greenwood, Christine Oliver, Kerstin Sahlin, Roy Suddaby (eds), *The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism* (Thousand Oaks, CA, USA: Sage Publications, 2008), 2.
4) Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology* (New York: Bedminster, 1968).
5) P. J. DiMaggio, W. W. and Powell, 'The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields', *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 48, no. 2 (1983), 147.
6) Weber, *Economy and Society*.

The second perspective is known as the 'institutional school'[7] and builds primarily on the work of Philip Selznick. Here, organizations are 'open systems' capable of shaping themselves and their external environments in powerful ways through two types of internal dynamics: *administration*, or managerial behavior that is forward looking and intentional, and institutionalizing, or behavior that is responsive and adaptive[8]. Since adaptation occurs in response to unforeseen challenges, organizational members, facing that uncertainty, rely on what they hold to be good and true. It is in this way that organizations become a reflection of deeply held and widely shared values and beliefs.

The paper develops in three parts. The first part presents the two theoretical perspectives: 'institutional theory' with its insistence on isomorphism and the powerful external forces found in competitive markets[9], in political and legal environments, and in the characteristics of relevant industries, and then the 'institutional school' holding out the possibility of values as a powerful shaper of organizational form, structure, and practice. This discussion necessarily includes a concomitant examination of organizational ends, or teleology, as both perspectives assume that organizations are rational, i.e., in pursuit of efficiency or social legitimacy, or both[10].

The second part of the paper is an expansive reflection on the Economy of Communion movement in light of this theory. The reflection proceeds through a historical overview of the movement and a review of the extant academic literature, seeking insight from these sources, and then considers what these theoretical perspectives suggest might be shaping and forming the Economy of Communion, and individual Economy of Communion companies in particular. Here we examine the forces of isomorphism that are or might be at work, and we examine the internal dynamics that are or might be at work. Theory suggests that Economy of Communion companies will inevitably begin to resemble one another in their practices; that is, they will tend toward isomorphism. But will they eventually exhibit form, structure, and practice much like every other business in their market or industry? What signs of 'iron cage' institutionalization might we expect to see in the Economy of Communion? Are there discernible differences between the business practices of Economy of Communion companies and others?

The third part of the paper then considers the Economy of Communion as the expression of a charism; the concrete enactment of the spirituality of unity in

7) The astute reader will notice a number of differing uses and therefore intended meanings, of the words institutional, or institutionalization or institutionalizing throughout this paper. This is reflective of the field of organizational science and further supports our contention that there is no unified body of theory that will simplify an understanding of the EOC. In general, 'institutional theory' refers to a view of organizations as 'closed systems' built on the work of Weber, Meyer, Rowan, DiMaggio, Powell, and others, that examines the nature and extent to which organizations are shaped by their environments. In contrast, the 'institutional school' refers to a view of organizations as 'open systems' built on the work of Selznick and others (Bernard, Mayo, Weick principally) that examines the ways that organizations are shaped by internal agents and leaders, and in turn, affect their environments.
8) Philip Selznick, *Leadership in Administration* (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), 5.
9) Ibid.
10) DiMaggio and Powell, 'The Iron Cage Revisited', 148.

economic activity[11]. Since organizational theory offers little here to guide us, we must consider whether and to what extent the idea of charism, and charismatic organization, might also shed light on the question of defining the Economy of Communion. We observe, as have others[12], that charisms - as enacted by human beings - are subject to this process of institutionalizing, and that over time that process can be expected to create tension between preserving or protecting the charism and obscuring or denying it[13]. But we raise a new question, too: whether an organization inspired by a charism, has a teleological dimension different from either efficiency or legitimacy. In other words, is there a third organizational purpose, a communitarian teleology, more important than efficiency or legitimacy which influences the form, structure, and practice of the Economy of Communion.

Finally, we call for more engagement by organization science with questions of charism and institution. Organizational theory has not fully considered or even confronted the possibility of charism, despite its presence at the heart of some of the oldest and most significant institutions in the world. A concluding section summarizes our application of organizational theory in the context of trying to see and understand more about the Economy of Communion. Our hope is that this paper provokes further study and examination of these important questions about charism and institution.

Organizational Theory

Organizations and organizational theory

Organizations are a ubiquitous and pervasive feature of contemporary society and modern life. We are highly dependent on various forms and types of organizations to mobilize our individual and social resources in order to accomplish individual and social objectives[14]. In fact, many observers consider organizations, particularly large scale complex organizations and bureaucracies, to be the dominant social actors of our time[15]. The variety of their stated ends and purposes is staggering. As noted by Richard Scott:

11) Luigino Bruni, *Good Practices: The Economy of Communion*, www.edc-online.org/index.php/en/publications/conference-speeches/111-convegni/964-buone-pratiche-leconomia-di-comunione-.html
12) R. C. Koerpel, 'The Form and Drama of the Church: Hans Urs von Balthasar on Mary, Peter, and the Eucharist' *Logos* (2008), Vol. 11:1. Also, Anselm W. Romb OFM Conv., *The Franciscan Charism in the Church* (Paterson, New Jersey, USA: St. Anthony Guild Press, 1969).
13) Romb, *The Franciscan Charism*.
14) Charles Perrow, *Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay* (New York: McGraw-Hill 1986) 3e, 6.
15) W. Richard Scott, *Organizations: Rational, Natural, and Open Systems* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, USA: Prentice Hall, 1981) 3e, 1. But this same sentiment is echoed by many. Sumantra Ghoshal, Christopher A. Bartlett, and Peter Moran, 'A New Manifesto for Management', *Sloan Management Review*, Vol. 40, no. 3 (Spring 1999). Peter F. Drucker, *Post-Capitalist Society* (New York: HarperBusiness, 1994), Charles Perrow, *Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1986) 3e, and Hans Burckart, 'Sustainable Development and Management: Elements of a New Management Paradigm' in Luigino Bruni (ed.), *The Economy of Communion: Toward a Multi-Dimensional Economic Culture* (Hyde Park, New York: New City Press, 2002) have all made similar observations. Perrow perhaps provides the strongest language to the point; '… all important social processes either have their origin in formal organization or are strongly mediated by them', vii.

> To the ancient organizational assignments of soldiering, public administration, and tax collection have been added such varied tasks as discovery (research organizations), child and adult socialization (schools and universities), resocialization (mental hospitals and prisons), production and distribution of goods (industrial firms, wholesale and retail establishments), provision of services (organizations dispensing assistance ranging from laundry and shoe repair to medical care and investment counseling), protection of personal and financial security (police departments, insurance firms, banking and trust companies), preservation of culture (museums, art galleries, universities, libraries), communication (radio and television studios, telephone companies, the post office), and recreation (bowling alleys, pool halls, the National Park Service, professional football teams)[16].

While very little of modern life is not shaped by these dominant actors, our relationship to them is complex and often uncomfortable[17]. All organizations are, to a degree, bureaucratic[18], and therefore present us with several inherent dilemmas that define bureaucracy[19], and subject us to tensions that are part of their very nature. We might consider three primary dilemmas, or sources of tension: first, the tension between goals and ends; second, the tension between members as persons or instruments; and third, the tension between stability and change.

An organization, by definition, has goals and ends, but also consists of members who have their own desires, wishes, needs, goals, and ends. Each organization must find a way to orient members toward accomplishing the organization's goals, so that personal goals take an inferior place or are totally subsumed. Organizations are actors with goals, aspirations, and objectives in their own right; however, organizations are composed of people who also possess particular and individual goals and aspirations and who belong to or participate in a particular organization with varying degrees of interest and choice[20]. Members may participate less from desire and intention and more from economic circumstances or cultural pressure. In the ideal bureaucracy, all members would act consistently in the organization's best interests; yet an organization free from counterproductive extra-organizational or inter-organizational interests is hard to imagine and probably impossible to construct[21].

If individuals are inclined to act against organizational interests, organizations may act inappropriately as well. All organizations exert varying degrees of coercion on members or participants. They tend to be designed for 'the average' person, thereby allowing little room for the use of unique talents and skills[22]. They are therefore

16) Scott, *Organizations*, 4
17) Perrow, *Complex Organizations*, 3.
18) Ibid.
19) Ibid.
20) These ideas are discussed thoroughly by Perrow, *Complex Organizations*, throughout ch. 1.
21) Ibid., 4.
22) Ibid.

prone to 'instrumentality'; viewing members only as means to organizational ends, with no standing as persons or individuals.
Organizations are designed for stability and resistance to change, which gives rise to a third tension. Bureaucracies, even in an ideal or in the best observable examples, are designed to be stable. Arguably, one of the driving motivations to organize in the first place is a search for stability. Against this basic wish, organizations struggle with considerable tension when faced with the need or necessity or desirability for change[23].

Organizational theory then concerns itself with questions of organizational purpose and behavior, seeking to help us understand these dominant and sometimes disconcerting actors. How do organizations behave, why do they do so, and what are the consequences of that behavior[24]? Organizational theory tends to be prescriptive, that is, using knowledge about the range, causes, and consequence of organizational behavior for the purpose of making the organization better, where 'better' means 'more efficient' in operational and economic, i.e., rationalist terms. Efficiency in pursuit of the goals and ends of the organization trumps virtually any other pursuit, or good, tradition, custom, emotion and, importantly, any idea of morality. Teleological efficiency becomes the reason, the motivation, and the driver of social actions and interactions. Not simply a preoccupation of the modern era, the primacy of efficiency has its roots in the rationalism present throughout the industrial revolution, and is reflected in the analysis and accurate predictions of one of the earliest contributors to organizational theory, Max Weber.

Weber and the seeds of sociological isomorphism

Weber observed that the advent and spread of rationalism - springing from the Protestant work ethic - and its organizational manifestation, bureaucracy, would eventually result in sufficient efficiency and control as to be irreversible. This is his 'iron cage'. Weber envisioned that this process - this dynamic change over time - would result in increases in efficiency because bureaucracy would eventually solve the problems of removing all extra-organizational threats to an organization's single-minded purpose. All members would need to subsume their own ends to the ends of the organization. Weber saw this process as being driven primarily by the capitalist market economy and the concomitant demand of competition. Capitalist markets placed such demands on businesses that they would have no choice but to adopt bureaucratic forms, structures, processes, and behaviors, and in so doing, they would become more and more alike in those capacities, even while their actual ends differed widely. For Weber this was an inexorable process whereby bureaucracy would permit

23) Bureaucratic resistance to change may be the most commonly understood phenomenon about organizations, and change management is one of the largest fields for management practitioners. So, there are sources too numerous to mention, but perhaps, John Kotter's *Managing Change* (HBS Publishing, 1996) is as good a source as is available.
24) Royston Greenwood, Christine Oliver, Kerstin Sahlin, Roy Suddaby, 'Introduction' in Greenwood, Oliver, Sahlin, and Suddaby (eds), *The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism* (Thousand Oaks, CA, USA: Sage Publications, 2008).

the organization the greatest possible efficiency in the pursuit of its goals and ends. The teleology of the organization would thus take precedence over the teleology of any individual member. The power of this change would have implications far beyond the organizational walls, changing society itself, as Habermas observed:

> What Weber depicted was not only the secularization of Western culture, but also and especially the development of modern societies from the viewpoint of rationalization. The new structures of society were marked by the differentiation of the two functionally intermeshing systems that had taken shape around the organizational cores of the capitalist enterprise and the bureaucratic state apparatus. Weber understood this process as the institutionalization of purposive-rational economic and administrative action. To the degree that everyday life was affected by this cultural and societal rationalization, traditional forms of life - which in the early modern period were differentiated primarily according to one's trade - were dissolved[25].

So, in this context, Weber left us with three critical ideas. The first is that bureaucratic organizations themselves would become more prevalent and dominant in modern society. The second is that these organizations respond to and are shaped by their external environments, and in particular for economic enterprises, by the demands of competitive markets. Third, since bureaucracy, as the embodiment of rational-legal authority, can deliver higher levels of efficiency, the response of organizations to the same environmental forces will tend to produce homogeneity in organizational form, structure and practice. Later scholars would build on Weber's construct of homogeneity and describe it as 'isomorphism.'

Legitimacy, isomorphism a nd the new institutionalism

Eventually, organizational scholars challenged efficiency as the dominant understanding of rationality and the primary sculptor of organizational form, structure and practice. Meyer and Rowan introduced the idea of 'institutional context' or widespread social understandings of what it means to be rational[26] and argued that organizations adopt practices, procedures, rituals, customs (e.g., use of titles, managerial methods, hiring criteria) that contribute nothing to efficiency but reflect prevailing standards in their industry, community, and the wider society. Organizations adopt these externally accepted behaviors and forms in pursuit of social legitimacy and thereby improve their chances for long-term survival[27]. Rationality is now two dimensional, demanding not simply economic efficiency but also social legitimacy.

25) Jürgen Habermas, 'Modernity's Consciousness of Time' in *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity* (MIT Press, 1990).
26) J.W. Meyer and B. Rowan, 'Institutionalized Organizations: Formal structure as myth and ceremony', *American Journal of Sociology* (1977), 83: 357.
27) Ibid., 357.

Culture, social understandings, ideologies, rules, norms, common understandings of meaningful behavior[28] and 'normative and cognitive belief systems[29]' may shape organizations in ways that are not efficient, conducive to efficiency, or supportive of efficiency, but that gain the organization a social and/or cultural legitimacy. Tension between efficiency and legitimacy may lead to decoupling; where organizational structures and practices can appear inherently contradictory, or where the organization pursues some practices in search of efficiency, and some opposite or more public practices in search of legitimacy (saying one thing and doing another).

DiMaggio and Powell argued that within the same 'organizational field', that is, the universe of all 'relevant actors' whose environment is bounded by the scope and scale of all interdependent interactions[30], there is an 'inexorable push towards homogenization[31].' Recognizing that while the life cycle of an organization may include 'considerable diversity in approach and form[32]' in its early stages of growth, once an organizational field is apparent and established, all of the organizations in the field - all of the relevant actors - would be led toward homogeneity by 'powerful forces[33]' that emerge from the ongoing interactions. They labeled this process isomorphism:

> The concept that best captures the process of homogenization is isomorphism. In Hawley's (1968) description, isomorphism is a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions[34].

DiMaggio and Powell further defined three types of these powerful forces: coercive, normative, and mimetic. Coercive forces include the power of governments and state agencies to make laws, compel compliance, and levy taxes. Normative forces include professionalization and education through which norms, standards, and expectations are developed and sustained. Mimetic forces derive from copying the practices of other organizations that are known or perceived to provide social acceptance and legitimacy.

Internal organizational behavior and leadership

Weber's primary claim was that competitive markets drive homogeneity (isomorphism) in organizations, shaping them inexorably toward bureaucratic forms and practices. DiMaggio and Powell recognized social legitimacy as a significant driver of isomorphism, and identified coercive, normative, and mimetic forces in addition to com-

28) Greenwood, Oliver, Sahlin, and Suddaby, 'Introduction' in SAGE *Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism*.
29) Scott, *Organizations*, 163
30) Ibid.
31) Ibid.
32) DiMaggio and Powell, 'The Iron Cage Revisited', 148
33) Ibid.
34) Ibid.

petitive markets. Both views essentially describe a closed system, with external factors affecting internal choices, and suggest that a set of organizations facing the same set of environmental conditions[35] and affected by external forces, and pursuing rational ends (efficiency and legitimacy) will intentionally choose similar forms, structures and behaviors, eventually creating bureaucracies or institutions that look and act alike.

The "Institutional School"

The first distinction to be made between the 'institutionalists' and the 'institutional school' is the view of organizations as closed or open systems, that is, shaped strictly by their environment (a closed system), or shaped by interaction with their environment (open system). The institutional school views organizations as open systems, and the theoretical foundation is the work of Phillip Selznick. Selznick argues that organizations are shaped not by external forces alone, but internally by characteristics and commitments of the people who participate in the organization[36]. Organizations can affect or change their environment, just as environments can affect or change organizations. Perhaps the most crucial contribution that Selznick makes, however, is the distinction between two fundamentally different types of organizational behavior or practice. One type is governed by the 'logic of efficiency[37]' (the same efficiency of scientific rationalism) and is intentional, forward-looking, planned behavior or practice. The other is responsive and adaptive behavior that is fueled not by any logic of efficiency but by shared values and beliefs. He labeled the first type of practice as 'administration' and the second type of practice as 'institutionalization'.

> Basic to Selznick's view of organizations is the distinction between the rational, means-oriented, efficiency-guided process of administration and the value-laden, adaptive, responsive process of institutionalization[38].

Moreover, he viewed the choices between these types of behavior as the function or exercise of organizational leadership. In the practice of administration, leadership consists of 'designing' behavior, thinking ahead to what needs to be done, or should be done, and designing the activities and tasks and being intentional about structuring the way those things are done. In the practice of institutionalization, leadership is 'responsive and adaptive' rather than intentional. In this way, an organization evolves as it learns from experience, encounters the unexpected, discovers challenges that must be faced, and it does not deny the reality that things happen which are neither planned nor foreseeable. As the organization finds ways

35) Ibid., 149.
36) Selznick, *Leadership in Administration*, and also Scott, *Organizations*, 65.
37) Selznick, *Leadership in Administration*, 2-3.
38) Perrow, *Complex Organizations*, 167. But here Perrow also references Selznick's article, 'Foundations of a Theory of Organizations', *American Sociological Review* (1948), 13. Perrow contrasts the 'economic' aspect of an organization with its 'institutional' aspect - which we take to mean 'social'.

to respond and adapt, those ways eventually become shared, habitual behavior. The phenomena of responsiveness and adaptation are shared within the organization. Individual responses and adaptations are 'values' driven because there is the possibility for people to act in concert with the values they hold, and with what they believe to be true or right. The responses are neither random nor illogical; a discernible pattern reveals itself. A key contribution of Selznick's thinking is the focus on the concept of acting, of behaving in certain ways. The emphasis is on what the organization 'does' and the claim is that what the organization 'is', is a function of its history[39]. In Selznick's words:

Institutionalization is a process. It is something that happens to an organization over time, reflecting the organization's own distinctive history, the people who have been in it, the groups it embodies and the vested interests they have created, and the way that it has adapted to its environment. For purposes of this essay, the following point is of special importance: The degree of institutionalization depends on how much leeway there is for personal and group interaction. The more precise an organization's goals, and the more specialized and technical its operations, the less opportunity there will be for social forces to affect its development[40].

Before we turn our attention to a reflection on the implications of these theoretical perspectives for defining the Economy of Communion, we need to consider the extent to which a historical account of the Economy of Communion, and the extant academic literature about the Economy of Communion might provide an answer.

Implications for the Economy of Communion

The Economy of Communion (EOC) grew out of the social and spiritual vision of Focolare, a lay, Catholic, ecclesial movement active in more than 140 countries. The Focolare itself began in 1943 in Trent, Italy. Amid the bombed ruins of their city and homes, Chiara Lubich and a small group of friends prayed together, read the Bible, and shared food and material goods among themselves, offering what they could to others. Eventually they came to believe that 'God is the only value worth living for[41],' and that they were called to live out the prayer that Jesus prayed the night before he died: 'Father, may they all be one[42].' They expressed this new found 'spirituality of unity' by living in community, holding possessions in common and sharing generously with anyone in need. Almost immediately Focolare began to grow and after the war it quickly spread beyond Italy. Today Focolare includes men, women and children in all parts of the world, of all faiths and beliefs, some

39) Perrow, *Complex Organizations*, 158.
40) Selznick, *Leadership in Administration*, 16.
41) Jim Gallagher, *Chiara Lubich: A Woman's Work: The Story of the Focolare Movement and its Founder* (Hyde Park, New York: New City Press, 1997). On page 31, Gallagher reports, 'One thing on which they had all agreed was that in this life everything would pass. Only God endured, only God was eternal. Everything else was vanity.'
42) John 17:21.

living together in community. Their prayer and work is directed toward promoting understanding, mutual respect, and love among peoples, and toward establishing a 'culture of giving' that stands in contrast to what they term the contemporary 'culture of having'. On a visit to Sao Paulo, Brazil, in 1991, Chiara observed the significant unmet materials needs of Focolare living in and among the favelas. In concert with others in the movement, she recognized the need for action and called for a new 'economy of communion'. Through economic activity, Chiara said, the EOC would increase the 'communion of goods' available through the creation of competently managed businesses that could provide jobs and generate profits. A portion of those profits would be held in common and distributed to those in need. Almost immediately business people among the Focolare came forward to participate. Initially the call was to accomplish what charitable giving alone could not: to generate enough money to provide, at a minimum, for the poor who participated in Focolare.

Formally known as the 'Economy of Communion in Freedom', the project invited companies to compete, like any business, in local and global markets, and to participate freely in the ideals of the movement. Going beyond a purely transactional view of economic activity, the EOC understood communion or unity to be the true objective of business activity; markets were valuable not for buying and selling alone, but, more importantly, as places for interpersonal encounter and relationship[3]. To those ends, the EOC 'ideal' placed 'persons' at the center of an enterprise. The ideal also upheld the need for a three-part distribution of profits among participating business owners. One part of profits would be reinvested in the business to support the capacity for efficiency, competitiveness and sustainability. A second part would be used in common by the EOC for activities that promoted a 'culture of giving' and that advanced the work of the EOC itself. The final share of profits, to be held also in common by the EOC, would be reserved for job creation and meeting material needs of those who share in the spirit of the project[44].

By 2010, the EOC project included over 750 businesses worldwide. Most were small, entrepreneurial businesses that were integral members of their local communities. Widely dispersed though they are, owners communicate regularly and share information freely with each other. The EOC has preserved the emphasis on freely chosen participation, and has remained relatively non-prescriptive with respect to the business owners. A set of general principles articulates their understanding of good business management[45], and emphasizes that business should be a place of 'unity, manifesting a culture of communion' among employees, customers, suppliers, the local community, investors and trustees. The EOC includes

43) Chiara Lubich, 'The Economy of Communion Experience: a Proposal for Economic Activity from the Spirituality of Unity', presented at Strasbourg Conference of Political Movements for Unity, May 1999, in Luigino Bruni (ed.), *The Economy of Communion*.
44) This is from their current website: www.edc-online.org
45) These are posted on the website, but they are also in a paper from Lorna Gold, Conference of the WCC/WLF/WARC/CEC/RvK, *Economy in the Service of Life*, Amersfoort, Netherlands, 18 June 2002.

numerous companies that are not only successful competitors committed to good management practices, but that also stand as manifestations of faith intentionally integrated and 'lived' in the business world.

Academic interest in the EOC

Published articles on the EOC tend to focus on one of two areas. The first is that of the individual business or owner. These are generally person-centered stories describing circumstances and situations where business owners believe the hand of God has been evident in their work and in their lives[46]. The second area represents most of the scholarly work that has appeared on the EOC and focuses primarily on the project's economic philosophy[47] or the challenges the EOC presents to dominant economic and legal theory[48]. A number of non-reviewed theses are published and available on the EOC website, but most of these are theoretical, examining the link between individual businesses and ideas about corporate responsibility[49].

Among the more extensive scholarly treatments is a collection of papers published in a volume edited by Luigino Bruni, The Economy of Communion: Toward a Multi-Dimensional Economic Culture[50]. The work begins with an essay by Chiara Lubich, in which she indirectly affirms that the EOC's roots lie in charism and not theory. 'When I proposed the Economy of Communion', says Lubich, 'I certainly did not have a theory in mind[51].' Nevertheless she recognizes the genuine and diverse scholarly interests aroused by the EOC project. Proving the point, essays that follow hers reflect on the EOC through the lenses of management science (Burckart), economic history (Bruni), political economy (Zamagni, Gui) and business (Molteni)[52]. The person-centered anthropology of the EOC and its Trinitarian spirituality, exemplified in gratuitousness and reciprocity, are treated effectively by Norris in The Trinity: Life of God, Hope for Humanity[53]. In The Sharing Economy[54], Lorna Gold's treatment of the EOC as a social experiment provides a rich theoretical assessment

46) C. Bozzani, 'Communion in Action', *Living City* (May 2006).
47) Lorna Gold, *The Sharing Economy: Solidarity Networks Transforming Globalisation*, (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2004), 85.
48) There are two sources here: Luigino Bruni, *The Present-Day Situation of the Economy of Communion*, paper presented at the Economy of Communion International Convention, September 2004 see (www.edc-online.org/uk/_idea.htm) and Luigino Bruni, and A. J. Uelman *Religious Values and Corporate Decision Making: The Economy of Communion Project* (New York: Fordham University, 2006), working paper.
49) E. Garlow, *Key Connections for a Way of Communion: Linking the Economy of Communion Project to Corporate Social Responsibility and Workplace Democracy* (2007): www.edc-online.org/index.php?option=com_wrapper&Itemid=125
50) Luigino Bruni, 'Introduction' in Luigino Bruni (ed.), *The Economy of Communion*.
51) Chiara Lubich, 'The Experience of the Economy of Communion', ibid.
52) All of these are in Luigino Bruni (ed.), *The Economy of Communion*.
53) Thomas J. Norris, *The Trinity: Life of God, Hope for Humanity - Towards a Theology of Communion* (Hyde Park, New York: New City Press, 2008).
54) Lorna Gold, *The Sharing Economy*.

of the project. *Essential Writings*[55], a collection of Lubich's own letters, speeches and poetry affirms her understanding of the EOC's charism of unity and her belief that the EOC would help create 'new' lay men and women who could change the culture by living the Gospel in virtually every area of secular life, from education to medicine to business to law. Finally, Jim Gallagher's[56] excellent biography of Lubich places the inauguration and growth of the EOC in the timeline of the founder's life, and in the context of many rich veins of ideas Focolare has followed for 63 years.

Organizational theory and the EOC

Given this history of the EOC, and its relationship to the Focolare Movement, and in the context of the extant academic literature, how can organizational theory enlarge our understanding of the EOC? 'Institutional theory' and the 'institutional school' both suggest an evolutionary process of institutionalization. And both view this as a process by which certain forms, structures, and practices become established, reinforced, and finally embedded in an organization over time. Organizations are subject to external forces and to internal dynamics and are engaged in a continual process of being shaped and formed. Specifically what is being shaped and formed are their structures, behaviors, and practices - the decisions, policies, practices, procedures that develop either in response to external environmental forces or as a result of internal intentional or adaptive behaviors. So, in a broad sense, we might say that organizations define themselves over time, and can therefore be defined at any point in time, by their practices; that is, by and as a result of what they do.

To better understand the EOC then we must examine their organizational practices. In this regard, the movement presents three possible levels of analysis. When we ask after the essence of the EOC, we could be asking about the EOC movement itself, its organization, its governance, and the activities that are carried out worldwide on behalf of the movement. We could also be asking about the Focolare, since the EOC is a movement within a movement, and we could explore the structure, forms, and practice of the Focolare, particularly as those relate to the relationship between the Focolare and the EOC. In other words, to what extent does the Focolare Movement, its governance, form, structure, practice, requirements, shape and define the EOC? Of these two levels of analysis, we would (following additional insights from Selznick[57]), argue that their goals are imprecise, and their operations are neither technical nor specific. This is not to say that their goals are not ambitious and important, or that their operations are not effective and inten-

55) Chiara Lubich, *Essential Writings: Spirituality Dialogue Culture* (Hyde Park, New York: New City Press, 2007).
56) Jim Gallagher, *Chiara Lubich: A Woman's Work*. No known relation to any author of this paper.
57) As we've noted elsewhere, Selznick emphasizes the role of values, adaptation, and past choices in the 'institutionalizing' of an organization and points out that in organizations where goals are not 'precise' and operations are not 'specific' (both of which we take to mean flexible and open to interpretation) then values and adaptive behavior are more influential.

tional, but it is to say that they are technically imprecise and non-specific. Perhaps by the very nature of the spirituality, they are imprecise and non-specific.

But the third level of analysis, the business practices of individual companies, is where we might begin to enlarge our understanding of the EOC. We would argue there are two reasons for this. First, each of these companies is an organization in its own right, and each has its own form, structure, and practice with any number of similarities or dissimilarities among them, united by their participation in the EOC. It is here that we would expect the tension between the powerful external isomorphic institutionalizing forces, particularly of competitive markets, and the powerful internal, value-laden dynamics, particularly the spirituality of unity, to be most apparent. To ask whether EOC companies are being shaped by isomorphic forces which will force them to be similar to ordinary businesses, or whether they are distinguishing themselves from ordinary companies as an affect of EOC values and the spirituality of unity, is to really ask, what sorts of decision, and business practices are being followed, invented, promulgated every day as these businesses face their challenges of business, and what is driving those decisions and practices. It is at this level that the institutionalizing activity of the EOC is taking place.

Second, it is also at this level that the EOC is insufficiently studied or scrutinized and so little is known. We seek to counter this with our own research and call for others to join us.

But, as we have considered in this paper, organizational theory suggests that EOC companies, in pursuit of either efficiency or social legitimacy, or both, are inevitably being shaped by a variety of isomorphic influences:

- Coercive forces such as governments, state agencies, courts, taxing authorities, and licensing authorities.
- Normative forces such as professional standards, managerial education practices, and social norms.
- Mimetic forces such as industry and technology demands, technical standards, competitive markets, and customer demands.

And, at the same time, EOC companies are inevitably being shaped by powerful internal dynamics, perhaps in pursuit of the Focolare ideal of unity:

- The personal values and belief systems of the entrepreneur.
- The values and belief systems of employees, and even of customers, suppliers, competitors, communities, and owners or trustees.
- The Focolare movement itself, and the EOC association with that movement, and the world wide EOC and its guidelines.
- Individual company history and the history of the EOC.

Empirical study of all these factors presents an opportunity for a lifetime of work. Other scholars will, perhaps, make contributions to this effort to study and understand the EOC as it matures. The work that must be done first is to compile a

record of what these companies do, that is, how they conduct business.

Organizational theory then does not reveal particular criteria by which to define the EOC, nor does it propose language or concepts sufficiently precise to help us describe the EOC. But it does suggest that an enlarged understanding of the EOC can begin with an examination of the business practices of individual EOC companies. It is here that the effect of external isomorphic forces will be evident. It is here, also, that powerful internal dynamics and leadership will be evident. The evidence thus observed can shed light on what the EOC, in its unity, is. No consideration of the nature of the EOC can be complete, however, without reference to another factor - the phenomenon of charism. For, by self-definition, the EOC characterizes itself as charismatic[58].

Charism and Organizational Theory

To consider the EOC as a charismatic organization is to understand it as an expression or enactment of a charism. The Catechism of the Catholic Church describes charism as 'graces of the Holy Spirit which directly or indirectly benefit the Church, ordered as they are to her building up, to the good of men, and to the needs of the world[59].' Organizational scholars have studied charism as a personal characteristic (e.g., the charismatic personality) and charism as an organizing influence (e.g., charismatic leadership)[60]. But it is the communitarian dimension of charism as an integral part of an organization that is our primary interest here, and examination of this dimension is virtually absent in the organizational theory literature[61]. Historical studies of charismatic organizations, such as religious orders, universities, hospitals, or charities, are not uncommon, and usually reveal dynamics, pressures and forces similar to those in any other organization. Histories of religious and ecclesial groups may not intentionally describe and analyze the process of institutionalizing as it is understood in this paper, but their accounts of key events and challenges in the life of the group often make the point indirectly[62].

A purely secular perspective on a charismatic organization, while describing structures, functions and other important features, is likely to miss the point, the central reason these organizations exist at all: the enactment of a charism. For example, secular treatments of the Church typically focus on its Petrine dimension (enactment), reducing its essence to that of a large, old and in some ways

58) Luigino Bruni, *Good Practices: The Economy of Communion*.
59) *The Catechism of the Catholic Church* (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1994), 799.
60) Peter G. Northouse, *Leadership*: Theory and Practice (Thousand Oaks, CA, USA: Sage Publications, 2009) 5e.
61) A database (JSTOR) search using the search term 'charism' and searching the entire database (all years) of business, economic, and sociological journals turns up only 41 articles.
62) An excellent example from among this genre is John Allen's investigative study, *Opus Dei: An Objective Look Behind the Myths and Reality of the Most Controversial Force in the Catholic Church* (New York: Doubleday, 2005).

powerful bureaucracy, albeit one claiming moral authority; the question of the source of the that moral authority (its charism) seldom arises. Though incomplete, such treatments of the Church are understandable in light of its size, traditions and global dimensions, all of which accentuate the presence of its bureaucratic organizational forms. Other bureaucratic characteristics can easily be seen as well, e.g., tendencies for stability, resistance to change, subsuming of individuality in favor of the organization, homogeneity in process and thorny questions of membership. Like other bureaucracies, charismatic organizations sometimes show evidence of 'decoupling,' or separation of behaviors that serve efficiency from those that serve legitimacy. Observers and participants may experience this as a loss of integrity. (Here one need only think of the sexual abuse crisis, an awful burden for the Petrine church.)

Historical accounts of charismatic organizations draw attention to the tension between the charism and its enactment, recognizing that the charism (the Marian dimension of the church) must institutionalize (the Petrine dimension) in order to survive[63]. This process may be accompanied by concerns that the charism will be obscured or otherwise diminished. From the perspective of organizational theory this might be viewed as the formative tension necessarily implied in institutionalization. Every day use of the word 'institutionalize', in fact, describes these same concerns.

Implications for the EOC

Organizational theory suggests, and the history of other charismatic organizations demonstrates, that neither individual companies comprising the EOC, nor the organization as a whole can be immune from tensions associated with institutionalizing. Assuming that 'institutionalizing' is necessary to secure the future of the charism of unity and that, in fact, the process is already under way, the direction that the EOC and the participating companies take in decisions about participation, governance, goals and other normative behaviors will be telling. In a fully involved effort to create an institution capable of sustaining a charism over time, one would expect to see within each company patient education and transparent communication about the company mission, persistence and confidence in 'seeing things together[64],' and appropriate employee consultation and participation in decisions. But this raises challenging questions for individual entrepreneurs. Who will be included in the process? Would excluding some potential participants weaken the community? Who holds responsibility for building and nurturing community? Is the entrepreneur alone responsible, or is responsibility jointly held by employees? If the latter, how much do employees need to know or to accept about the EOC and its ideals to be effective participants?
Adding charism and the experience of charismatic organizations to concepts gen-

63) Romb, *The Franciscan Charism*.
64) This is a description provided by one of the EOC company entrepreneurs in discussing an approach to conflict resolution within the company.

erally accepted in organizational theory, offers a more complete and meaningful perspective on the EOC and EOC companies, particularly in their institutional endeavor to protect the charism of unity. For organizational theory on the whole, the proper consideration of charism requires a teleological shift. Charism introduces a teleology that is substantively and qualitatively different from either efficiency or legitimacy. Given the idea of a 'charism of unity' as it is understood by the EOC companies, and of the notion of 'charism' as defined by the Church, we might describe charismatic teleology as 'community,' or as a teleology dedicated to increasing or maximizing the common good. The particular teleology of EOC companies is then, not efficiency or mere social legitimacy, but 'community', and community understood as a partial realization of the kingdom of heaven[65].

For us, this is a new and valuable insight relative to the understanding of the charismatic principle in organizational life and certainly bears further reflection and empirical study. For the moment, it allows us to suggest several possible hypotheses relevant to the current state and future development of the EOC. As we look at the EOC and EOC companies through the lens of organizational theory, and as we ponder a future inspired by the charism of unity, we would expect to the see following:

1. Integrity among form, structure, and process or behavior - and no decoupling of behavior with the organization.

2. Practices that promote organizational virtue[66], particularly as regards introspection, reflection, participation and consultation.

3. Provision of goods and services which in themselves are conducive to developing the common good.

Implications for organizational theory

Given that many of the oldest and most influential organizations in the world are charismatic, we call for organizational theorists to engage the question of charism. No account of the Church and its religious orders, or the monasteries, schools, hospitals, charities or services that are their fruit, can be complete without reference to charism. We would argue that charismatic organizations present us with more than a grace-filled gift, but a fundamentally different organizational teleology: community. Charismatic organizations must be concerned with efficiency and legitimacy to ensure survival, but in their case a transcendent goal and pursuit of different ends,

65) 'Through their capacity to do and to make, human beings, cast in the image of God, are involved in a project of advancing creation toward its destination, the Kingdom of God.' Helen J. Alford, Charles Clark, S. A. Cortright, Michael J. Naughton (eds), 'Introduction' in *Rediscovering Abundance* (Notre Dame, USA: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006), 27.
66) The concept of organizational virtue is rooted in, among others, the work of Alasdair MacIntyre. *See A. MacIntyre, After virtue: A study in Moral Theory* (2nd edn, London: Duckworth, 1985).

take precedence. A charism, rightly understood, is a spiritual gift given to one or more of a small group of persons, but for the benefit of the whole church and for the common good. Where a charism is at work, the ultimate teleology is the kingdom of God. One need not accept a charism as true or real to acknowledge its transcendent organizational purpose, which is to say that the potential for organizational theory to study charism as a teleological force is not dependent on faith or a particular religious perspective, but merely on the will to do so.

Summary and Conclusion

We began this paper with the recognition that the EOC is not easily or readily defined. Providing a concise, complete, and meaningful answer to the question, 'What, in its essence, is the EOC?' is an elusive task. The challenge lies partly in the uniqueness of the EOC itself and partly in our own reactive tendency to view the EOC primarily as an economic phenomenon. Indeed the EOC describes itself as a new style of economic action. Although it is accurate to say that EOC concerns itself with economic activity, strictly focusing on the economic element provides neither a complete nor a fully informative understanding of the EOC.

In this paper we turned to organizational theory to determine where and how such theory could further our understanding of the EOC as a social phenomenon. Our interest is not so much in how the EOC can be described and categorized according to accepted theory, but on the insights and ideas from that theory that can improve and enlarge our understanding of the EOC. By the same token, we are interested in what ways - and why - organizational theory may be inadequate for the task.

As we've noted, given the spirit that posits efficiency as rational organizational teleology, Weber viewed competition as the force explaining the rise and prevalence of organizations and their propensity to bureaucratic homogeneity. The pursuit of efficiency would shape organizational form, structure and behavior, creating homogenous organizations, or bureaucracies, within an industry or field of competitors. Later scholars began using the term isomorphism to describe the observed tendency toward homogeneity in organizational form, structure, and behavior, and proposed socially determined 'legitimacy' as a teleological alternative or addition to efficiency. DiMaggio and Powell categorized the social forces of isomorphism as coercive, normative and mimetic[67]. These scholars, moreover, noted also that organizations might 'decouple' their efficiency seeking behavior from their legitimacy-seeking behavior. For both Weber and the 'new institutionalists', organizational form, structure, and behavior were largely determined by, and in response to, the external environment.

67) DiMaggio and Powell, 'The Iron Cage Revisited'.

Selznick enlarged our theoretical understanding by suggesting two things. One was the notion of the organization as an open, organic system, not solely environmentally determined, but subject to internal dynamics as well. Second was the idea of internal dynamics - that there is more at work in organizations than a logic of efficiency. While such logic might support practices at an operational level, Selznick nonetheless suggests that at higher organizational levels, this is too simplistic. Adaptive responses guided by values, beliefs, and social relationships, among other internal factors, inevitably shape the organizations form, structure, and behavior. Moreover, he argues that where organizational goals are imprecise, where operations are non-technical and non-specific, and where change and uncertainty threaten the status quo, then the expression and interplay of values and beliefs among organizational members, and their lived experience, gives rise to unplanned or organic forms and structures, ultimately becoming the content of the organization's history. We understand these internal dynamics to offer resistance to isomorphism.

This leads us to one important conclusion. Certainly, the EOC and its participating companies are, and will be shaped by isomorphic forces that are competitive, coercive, normative, and mimetic. At the same time, the EOC is a worldwide movement with imprecise goals and non- specific operations, leading us to suggest that the EOC's identity will be shaped predominantly by how individual companies behave. The EOC is - and is at once more fully becoming - a function of the business practices of individual companies. Following Selznick, we contend that the EOC will be predominantly shaped by responsive and adaptive company behaviors that are reflective of, and born from, the values and beliefs of the entrepreneurs and employees of the individual companies. We note, too, that this is keeping with the EOC, and Focolare, emphasis on 'lived experience'. and we invite more organizational scholars to take up this kind of empirical examination of EOC companies.

At the same time, the individual companies comprising the EOC, like EOC itself, claim that as business enterprises there is a difference about what they do, the very difference, in fact, which allows them to suggest that they operate in a new kind of economy. This difference, a kind of gift or 'charism', is central to the self-understanding and purpose of both individual EOC companies and of EOC as a whole. Organization theory, however, is of little value for serious study of EOC as a charismatic movement, because it has yet to address the phenomenon of charism itself. Charismatic movements certainly appear to be shaped and formed by the same external forces and internal dynamics as all other human organizations. Observers of Franciscan and Benedictine orders, for example, or even the Church herself, have noted the rise of an inevitable tension between the charism and the institutionalization of the charism. Features of this process very much fit with traditional organizational theory. But what organizational theory has not addressed is the extent to which an organization can be shaped by the charism. Understood as a 'gift of the Spirit to build up the common good', charism includes, therefore, a

notion of community. One might expect charism to be at least as great a force in shaping the form and structure of an organization as, say, efficiency or legitimacy.

These ideas lead us to a second important conclusion. We argue that charism introduces a third teleology, distinct from either efficiency or legitimacy, and we have named that 'communion' or 'community'. We propose that charismatic organizations will be subject to all of the same external forces, and all of the same internal dynamics, as other organizations, but will be shaped and formed as well by the openness of organizational members to the expression of the charism. So, with a charism of unity as expressed in the case of the Economy of Communion, we would expect to find - at the level of the individual companies - practices that promote the common good, products and services that promote human well-being, an organizational integrity that avoids decoupling, and a 'process' that preserves an openness to the charism as its primary purpose.

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THE CHARISMATIC PRINCIPLE IN AN AMERICAN AND DEMOCRATIC CONTEXT

di
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Many movements inspired by charismatic leaders have had great influence on American culture and society. The paper will examine three leaders and the movements they led: Eugene Debs and Democratic Socialism, Dorothy Day and Catholic Personalism, and Martin Luther King, Jr. and Christian Nonviolence. In particular the paper will examine the charismatic messages, the charismatic leaderships, the social movement or movements inspired by this charismatic message and leader, the cultural impact of message and movement, the response of institutions, particularly economic and governmental institutions, and, finally, the history of principles and associations after the departure of the leader. The paper will end with reflections about the implications of this study (and related studies of charisma in American history) for Catholic social teaching and social and pastoral action, in the USA.

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Introduction

US history is marked by a remarkable array of charismatic leaders, many associated with movements for social reform. Indeed historians of movements to abolish slavery, win equal rights for women, strengthen the role of labor in industrial organization and end racial segregation almost always concentrate attention on charismatic leaders, on whom such movements were often dependent. It seems clear that many of these movements, and the ideas associated with their charismatic leaders, have had great influence on American culture and society. Yet there was always resistance, and considerable conflict, with the result that the degree and quality of cultural change and institutional accommodation is in dispute.

In this paper I will examine three charismatic leaders, Eugene Debs, Martin Luther King, Jr, and Dorothy Day. We will consider the charismatic message, charismatic leadership, the social movement inspired by this charismatic message and leader, the cultural impact of message and movement, the response of institutions, and, briefly, the history of principles and associations after the departure of the leader.

The paper may assist the general discussion by calling attention to the importance of voluntary associations and the social movements built around such associations in receiving, spreading, and implementing the charismatic message. In almost every case in American history the charismatic leader began by addressing people gathered in voluntary associations, including Churches. In each case message and movement led to conflicts. In the case of Debs, he grew impatient with trade union leaders who affirmed his vision but had to respond amid immediate, practical responsibilities to union members. Dorothy Day's witness to Christian social responsibility inspired many bishops, priests and religious but also stirred conflicts when she and her followers took the side of labor unions, the poor, and the marginalized. And one recalls Dr. King's difficulties in leading the civil rights movement often divided by religion, class, regions, and generations. And in all three cases problems arose when the leader applied the foundational charismatic principle to the problem of war.

These cases also call attention to the resistance as well as the accommodation of institutions, which may welcome some innovations and reject others, or subtly transform principles in the very process of adopting them. To take but one example, provision for conscientious objection may accommodate resistance to war, but in the process marginalize the moral questions about public policy and civic responsibility posed by advocates of peace. Thus accommodation is often a two way street, as institutions respond to cultural and social pressures but, at the same time, supporters of charismatic leaders often have to ask when, if ever, prophetic principles can be moderated to accommodate other important ideals and interests.

Eugene Victor Debs and Democratic Socialism

Eugene Debs was born in Terre Haute, Indiana in 1855. He dropped out of high school at age of 14 to take a job as painter in railroad yards. He eventually became

a railroad fireman and a leader of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen. Like many nineteenth century labor associations the Brotherhood emphasized self-improvement and Debs attended night school, served as President of the local literary society and in 1879 he was elected City Clerk. Later he served in the Indiana state legislature. These early experiences shaped a strong commitment to democracy and shared civic responsibility that informed all his later work.

As he rose to leadership in the Brotherhood, Debs became increasingly concerned that the railroad unions ignored the needs of unskilled workers, whom he visited regularly across the Midwest. In 1893 he organized the American Railway Union to unite all wage earners on the roads. A year later the union won a massive strike. Empowered by this victory the members in 1894 responded to pleas for help from striking workers who manufactured Pullman sleeping cars. Ignoring Debs' plea for caution, the union decided to boycott all lines carrying Pullman cars, effectively bringing railroad traffic in the Midwest to a halt. Railroad executives won a court order outlawing the boycott and persuaded President Grover Cleveland to send federal troops to Chicago to break the strike. Debs was jailed for violating the court injunction. This experience, and other recent episodes of official violence, convinced Debs that workers were victims of a one-sided class war. He emerged from jail radicalized and with other labor leaders he helped organize the American Socialist Party. Five times he was the socialist candidate for President, the last time in 1920 when he won a million votes while in federal prison for opposing World War I.

Debs occasionally used Marxist slogans about class, and he occasionally offered personal support to revolutionary workers prepared to use violence, but he was a uniquely American democratic socialist. His ideas had more in common with midwestern populism than European socialism. He was an evangelist for economic justice and democratic politics, a supporter of popular protests and a critic of half-way reform measures. He was impatient with theory and detached from the passionate factional battles within the labor and socialist movements. He was a working class hero, but on practical matters most workers turned to conservative trade unionism working to improve local conditions and to politicians who could deliver concrete benefits. The United States, alone among industrial countries, failed to develop social trade unions or effective socialist parties. Debs successors, Protestant minister Norman Thomas and independent political intellectual Michael Harrington were important voices for civil liberties and social justice, but they worked closely with the non-socialist unions and Democratic party reformers. Democratic socialism was, at best, what Harrington called 'the left wing of the possible'.

Debs' vision, rooted in his early experience in Terre Haute, was profoundly democratic. He traveled the country to support striking workers, to promote class solidarity through industrial as opposed to 'business' unionism, and to do what he could to build a labor party. Class conflict was real, but almost entirely one way, and Debs was passionately committed to defending workers and overturning capitalist power. But his vision was inclusive, far removed from rigid, doctrinaire Marxism of so many of his socialist colleagues. His charisma arose from his ability to envision a future of democratic participation and shared responsibility beyond the conflicts of

the moment. There was also a pastoral dimension to Debs' leadership as he made fiends easily, maintained associations with other radical leaders whose ideological rigidity or revolutionary zeal he simply ignored. His democratic idealism gave him solid ground to challenge prevailing class power, to critique reforms dependent on elites, and to bear witness to democratic responsibility by accepting jail rather than silence in the face of what he regarded as injustice.
Beyond the long discussed question of why the United States never developed socialist alternatives, there were shortcomings in Debs leadership. He failed to develop an effective program that could tie democratic ideals to popular aspirations. To the degree his party did come up with practical proposals, they were absorbed by mainstream politicians. In later years working class families would recall the way in which conservative unions, machine politics and religious congregations combined to support families, sustain hope, and enable them to achieve growing levels of civic participation. Socialists, at odds with all three, could assist with protests but never found distinctive constructive proposals to offer aspiring families. Secondly, Debs never organized his own followers to maintain the democratic socialist voice in cultural dialogues and democratic deliberations. There were few organizing centers for socialist analysis and deliberation. And finally Debs life and work posed the central and perennial question confronting democracies: how to develop a spirit of solidarity to inspire public, and peaceful, work for the common good. That problem remains. Others, liberals, Marxists, technocrats, faced with that problem turned to elites, Debs refused that option in favor of faith in democracy. 'Too long have the workers of the world waited for some Moses to lead them out of bondage. I would not lead you out if I could; for if you could be led out, you could be led back again. I would have you make up your minds there is nothing that you cannot do for yourselves.' (From an address on Industrial Unionism delivered at Grand Central Palace. New York City, 18 Dec. 1905). That kind of commitment to democracy and acceptance of democratic rules of the game may be the missing ingredient in US politics, culture and religion.

Martin Luther King, Jr. and Christian Nonviolence

Martin Luther King was the son and grandson of Christian pastors. He attended segregated public schools in Georgia, graduating from high school at the age of fifteen. He received his B. A. degree in 1948 from Morehouse College, a distinguished Negro institution of Atlanta from which both his father and grandfather had graduated. After three years of theological study at Crozer Theological Seminary, he enrolled in graduate studies at Boston University where he received a Ph.D. in 1955.

In 1954, King became pastor of the Dexter Avenue Baptist Church in Montgomery, Alabama. Always a strong worker for civil rights King was, by this time, a member of the executive committee of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. In Montgomery local activists, centered in his Church and the local NAACP chapter challenged segregation with a bus boycott and before long their eloquent young pastor was their spokesman. The boycott lasted over a year, King

was arrested, his home was bombed, he was subjected to personal abuse, but he emerged as the leader of a spreading movement for civil rights. He and other ministers formed the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. Between 1957 and 1968 King traveled over six million miles and spoke over twenty-five hundred times. A massive protest in Birmingham, Alabama, caught international attention. Birmingham and later Selma sparked national mobilization and eventual passage of landmark civil rights legislation. King was awarded the Nobel Peace, but violence in northern cities, King's decision to oppose the Vietnam war, and his plans to lead a massive march of poor people on Washington divided the civil rights coalitions and sharpened partisan divisions. On the evening of 4 April 1968, in Memphis, Tennessee where he was supporting striking garbage workers, he was assassinated.
More than any American of his era King practiced Christian nonviolence and democratic politics. From Montgomery on King responded to local initiatives and local people, sometimes as in Montgomery drawn to leadership he did not seek, then once launched, called time and again to intervene in local struggles where his presence was affirming and supportive. CORE members who rode buses into southern cities and students who sat in at lunch counters welcomed King's support but made their own judgments about strategies and tactics. King's words inspired activists and touched the conscience of observers, his presence drew attention to racist violence and brought connections which could assist the process of negotiation of particular demands. Remarkably King maintained this style of movement leadership, working with multiple local and national groups, even in situations where others were unsympathetic with his commitment to nonviolence or his willingness to negotiate compromise solutions. With angry young militants on a Mississippi march, with northern protesters less engaged with religion, even with Black nationalists King always tried to find common ground and embrace all in a wide ranging movement for social change.
As with Debs his charisma was intimately linked to an almost pastoral care for those he saw as his people. Always he was alert and responsive to personal experiences, anxious to embrace everyone into the wide movement. In the last struggle of his life in Memphis, this pastoral tone was evident. He came to Memphis to help striking sanitation workers even though he was skeptical about the possibility of success and feared it would distract attention from the planned 'poor people's march'. Emotionally and physically exhausted he was moved by the courage and commitment of these impoverished workers. He returned to their meeting hall a second time on the night before he was killed. There he spoke eloquently of his vision, and seemed to anticipate what was to come.
King's charismatic vision had three central components. Oldest and deepest was his commitment to the liberation of African Americans from the legacies of slavery and segregation. He understood better than most the levels of personal, social and political oppression they were up against. His commitment to their cause was relentless, effective and wise. Second was his commitment to Christian nonviolence, not as a tactic or strategy, though he believed nonviolence could 'work', but as arising from principles of human dignity and solidarity essential both to Christianity and democracy, principles he would not compromise even in the most conflict-ridden circumstances. Nonviolence led him to an expanding global vision associated with the Nobel Peace Prize, his travels abroad, and his anguished decision, against the

advice of almost all his associates, to publicly condemn the Vietnam War. And the third component of his vision was solidarity, an ever expanding vision of a single human family. This commitment to solidarity, the good of everybody, even the oppressor, was evident in sermons, clarified as an agenda in his last book, and enshrined forever in the iconic 'I Have a Dream' Speech of the 1963 March on Washington. It is the ground of nonviolence and the frame that allows for truthful conflict.

King was murdered, of course, the poor people's march was a failure, and the war on poverty, which he hoped to expand, was sharply curtailed by a new administration a few months later. After King was gone the country turned in a conservative direction, placing civil rights organizations on the defensive and weakening many components of reform coalitions, especially labor unions. The many organizations working for civil rights continued their work, but the loss of King's charismatic ability to maintain unity in the movement and build supportive relationships across racial, religious and cultural boundaries exposed how dependent reform hopes had been on his leadership, despite his efforts. Yet the substantial achievements of the civil rights movement are evident and ensure that honoring King with a national holiday is not entirely a domestication of his challenging message. Placed near the center of national symbols, King's democratic dream and call to radical Christian discipleship remain important resources for disciples and citizens.

Dorothy Day and Catholic Personalism

Dorothy Day was an American radical who supported labor, worked for women suffrage, protested against war and mingled with the cultural avant-garde of the World War I era. In the 1920s she became a Catholic and in 1933 she met French itinerant philosopher Peter Maurin who helped her find Catholic ways to express her American democratic values. Together they founded the Catholic Worker movement to offer a depression-era Catholic alternative to communist agitators among the workers. Their radical newspaper found an audience among Catholics anxious to respond to the depression within the framework of faith. Houses of hospitality in urban centers attracted young idealists ready to 'go to the poor' in the practice of voluntary poverty and the works of mercy. Maurin urged them to think about constructive Christian alternatives to capitalism and socialism. He advocated a 'green revolution' centered on self-sufficient farming communes where modern segmentation could be overcome by blending 'cult, culture and cultivation', creating a 'new [Christian] society within the shell of the old'. This agrarian option never caught on but Maurin's deep engagement with Catholic tradition suggested themes of community, mutuality, work as a gift for the common good rather than a commodity, and self-sufficiency as capitalist or socialist.
In the late 1930s Dorothy Day and the Catholic Worker movement resisted efforts to enlist Christians in war, first during the Spanish Civil War, then in World War II when Day's commitment to pacifism conflicted with the sincere patriotic responsibilities of many movement participants. These decisions set the movement at odds with both ecclesiastical and civil authorities. The movement shrank in size

but revived in the 1960s when Day herself helped the entire Church find its way to allow for Christian nonviolence and conscientious objection just as resistance was growing to the Vietnam war. Day's inspiring leadership, and the movement she founded, played an important role in evolving American Catholic theory and practice of peace making. In the years since her death in 1980 the small but vital Catholic Worker movement, with settlement houses, independent newspapers, and farming communities, has continued to offer witness to Christian love in direct service to the poor and vulnerable, and campaigns for social justice and international peace.

Dorothy Day's courage and compassion expressed deep faith and an ever changing spiritual life shared in columns and books. In her democratic spirit, wide ranging imagination, and complete commitment to the Catholic community of faith, Dorothy Day stood at the center and not on the margins of the American Catholic Church. Her love for the poor, her invitations to the non-poor, and her continuing search for constructive and creative initiatives to meet human needs without violence and exploitation all witnessed to the best aspirations of her country and her Church. At the same time she was a deeply devoted Catholic who combined respect for conscience with reverence for pastoral leadership and ecclesiastical authority. In her case charismatic leadership was associated not with inter-group conflict or mass mobilization but with personal conversion, creative discipleship and the practice of hospitality. At times she made bishops and clergy uneasy and there was talk of bringing her movement under closer supervision but, to their credit, Church leaders for the most part trusted her, and many Catholics thought of her as a witness to the way one ought to live.

Dorothy Day was very Catholic, and one explanation of her influence was that her ideas and actions were always so closely linked to scripture, prayer and the liturgy. One explanation of why the Catholic Worker movement has persisted since the founder's death is that its members continue to hold fast to the Church, drawing on its spiritual, liturgical and cultural resources and also on the relationships it makes available through its networks of parishes, dioceses, schools, religious orders, and social service agencies. Another explanation is the discipline required by the daily offering of food, clothing and shelter to the poor. Practicing the works of mercy (along with what members call the works of justice and the works of peace) provides daily occasions to practice what one preaches, and to recall the central place of people, shared basic needs, and community. Studying the life and work of Dorothy Day leads to reflection on the charismatic consequences of daily efforts to follow the little way, such as that of St Thérèse, to whom Day was devoted.

Debs and King, through circumstance more than choice, were drawn into mass movements for liberation. Day backed many mass movements against war and weapons and in support of economic and racial justice and for economic justice. But for Day her small movement was an experiment in love, an experiment shaped by Day's remarkable faith and equally remarkable intelligence. Her love for the poor was never naïve or sentimental. Nor was it love as obligation, as if Christians should go to the poor to relieve their woes, nor was it a form of evangelism, to demonstrate Christian goodness. No, Catholic Worker commitment to voluntary poverty and hospitality was for the sake of Christians themselves, so they might live with integrity. It was what the great Jane Adams once called the subjective necessity of settlements: if you believe noble things and never do noble deeds, those

noble thoughts fade and die. For the young who stopped in at the Worker for a time and then went on to other things, their Worker period was a bright light, not because they worked, which they did, not because they eliminated poverty, which they didn't, but because for a brief time they lived with a kind of integrity never to be recaptured. They had given of themselves and practiced the works of mercy not to gain merit in heaven but to be brothers and sisters to all. This companionship and acceptance was a mark of Day's character that caught the attention of innumerable visitors to her House of Hospitality.
The Christian commitment to people is a commitment to real people, as they are, not as we would like them to be. Pope John Paul said men and women must be loved for their own sake. Dorothy Day could be angry and she could be tough but in the end she trusted in people and knew that it was wrong to judge others. Robert Coles argued that the Catholic Worker was meant to address plain, ordinary working men and women. She never wanted to lose contact with those people, never wanted to lead them or tell them that they were being tricked or duped.

Dorothy Day's charisma was within and never apart from the Church. For herself, she knew the dramatic moments of conversion were rare and grace-filled. At least as important were the daily experiences of life. None defined the responsibilities of Christian commitment in more dreadful and demanding ways, none bore those demands with greater wit, modesty and courage. Dorothy had no wish to challenge the institutionalized Church or make life uncomfortable for anybody in it, even Bishops. 'I did never see myself as posing a challenge to Church authority,' she told Coles. 'I was a Catholic then and I am now and I pray to die one. I've not wanted to challenge the Church not on any one of its doctrinal positions. I try to be loyal to the Church, to its teachings and its ideals. I love the Church with all my heart and soul. I never go inside the church without thanking God Almighty for giving me a home. The church is my home and I don't want to be homeless. I may work with the homeless but I have no desire to join their ranks.'

Day had her own well thought out version of the former Speaker of the dictum that all politics is local. Responsibility like justice and charity begins at home and requires not only the Worker's gentle personalism but decentralization of power and continuing experiments in participation. As she saw it, without such communitarian strategies political and economic ideas of human dignity and democratic self-government become meaningless language covering the continuous atrocities of the twentieth century. 'A good citizen uses the Bill of Rights, says what he believes to be true and shares his thoughts with others,' Dorothy said. 'A good citizen takes part in democracy and doesn't leave it to others, some big shot, to speak for him and act for him.' This is the language of American radicals. She and Maurin were serious people who meant to launch no cute little ministry but a movement to explore better ways of human living and working, ways which could and should attract and convince serious people. She was also democratic to her bones. On his first visit to the New York House as a troubled medical student, Robert Coles found Dorothy Day engaged in a long one-sided conversation, silently nodding to another woman's alcoholic 'ranting'. Finally Day politely excused herself, came over to Coles and asked, 'Are you waiting to talk with one of us?' With those

words, Coles recalls, she cut through layers of self-importance and scrapped the hard bone of pride. Later she told him 'as a youngster, there was something in me that made me stop and look at the people, how they lived and wonder if I could ever do it and live the way they did.' She felt a joy and pride in the courage of unemployed men who marched on Washington in 1932. She 'wanted to go and be with the people I heard all those learned folks talking about.' Thus the charisma of Dorothy Day drew from the Catholic tradition, was nurtured by prayer, liturgy and persistent inquiry, was persistently democratic, and found expression is simple acts of compassion, truthfulness, and peacemaking. Gandhi suggests each person must 'be the change'. Debs would have understood that, King certainly did, and Dorothy Day expressed that idea in a lifetime of generous and intelligent service to church and society.

Summary

There are many points about the work of these American democratic leaders which could be helpful to ecclesial movements. I will mention three.

Personal responsibility

Critics of American culture often decry its extreme individualism, but these leaders welcomed America's emphasis on personal responsibility. Debs was almost unique among socialist leaders in his insistence on the agency of individual workers. He rejected self-interested business unionism increasingly controlled by union bureaucrats and the Leninist elitism of most Marxist factions. Instead he told workers that they would have to be the agents of their own liberation. Similarly King's activist career was launched by the actions of just such agents, first in Montgomery, then in communities across the south and the nation. He offered advice, linked local efforts to wider coalitions, and insisted to all audiences that the witness of self-sacrificing idealism, even love, evident in the protests should awaken the conscience of all Christians and all citizens. In Dorothy Day's case voluntary poverty and the works of mercy, later the works of justice and peace, arose from personal conversion amid a supportive community. Debs went to jail in 1918 because he insisted to challenging the military draft. Rarely has the case for civil disobedience been more clearly stated than by King in his Letter from Birmingham Jail. And Dorothy Day brought that democratic principle - 'vote with your whole self' - into American Catholic life through word and witness to what she and Peter Maurin called personalism, most evident voluntary poverty and in conscientious objection to war and nuclear weapons.

Movements and organization

Social movements associated with charismatic leaders have been a major feature of American history. Debs hoped to mobilize working class Americans in to a broad based labor party which would change the structures of the country's political economy. He was at his best holding forth that democratic vision without specifying public ownership, guaranteed social supports or worker participation.

King was more successful in leading mass mobilizations that brought about important changes. He found common ground across multiple organizations, built coalitions and drew allies attracted by his vision. But in both cases of democratic socialism and Christian nonviolence no organized institutional support developed to sustain those visions. Solidarity and the common good, so central to each, is still the missing ingredient in US political culture. In Day's case a movement does carry on her ideals, and the larger Church has responded at least partially to her insistence on peacemaking and finding Jesus among the poor. Catholicism does bring some important and unique resources to democratic society, and some are found in unexpected places.

Vision

Christianity's dynamism arises in part from the tension between present experience and the promises of God. Neither world nor church is yet the Kingdom of God. American democratic idealism often is built upon a similar tension between the promise of American life and its always sordid reality. Each of these charismatic leaders held forth a vision of the future based on Christian and American promises of equality, rights and community. On this basis they critiqued the existing order and summoned people to action. In each case the vision expanded with experience, for Debs transnational working class solidarity, for King American responsibilities in an emerging 'world-house', for Day the worldwide search of the poor for a dignified place in history. For each solidarity was a central and expanding virtue, the value without which the fight for justice can become not only divisive but self-defeating. The most important American question, perhaps, is whether or not a free, open and diverse democratic society can experience genuine solidarity and construct institutions capable of building the common life of the human family.

So a concluding Focolare comment: Debs, King and Day shared a faith in personal commitment, shared social responsibility, and solidarity grounded in visions of the promised single human family. Perhaps this suggests that there may be unappreciated dimensions of American culture potentially hospitable to a new ecclesial movement grounded in Chiara's charism of unity and the daily practice of Christian love. American Christian communities all struggle with a sense of loss associated with changing regional, ethnic and religious subcultures. In the past religious energies have been renewed by ideas about the future, and about personal and communal commitments to bringing the beloved community to life. May US Catholics, with the help of Focolare and unexpected new charisms, make such commitments the basis of spiritual and community renewal.

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DR MARTIN LUTHER KING AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT: CHARISMATIC AND INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVES

di
IAN WEINSTEIN

The paper applies Weber's idea of charismatic authority to the role of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. in the American struggle for racial equality and social justice. Viewing Dr. King as a paradigmatic example of the charismatic leader, the author recounts a bit of the story of his central role in the American civil rights struggle from the mid 1950s to his death in 1968. The thesis of the paperi t that much of Dr. King's work and his legacy is well explained in Weber's framework. In particular, some questions are put at the core of this research: Do Weber's ideal types capture the possibilities for the role of charismatic leadership in a society dramatically more dynamic, informed and democratic than Germany in the early 20th century? Can Weber's deep insights be usefully expanded by attention to the important roles of professional and private corporate authority in America? The conclusion of the paper claims that contemporary life permits us to imagine a future in which the spark of charism need not be extinguished in the name of social stability but can remain an integrated force for change and ongoing transformation, whether that happens primarily on the individual level or the level social structure.

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In *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*[1], the first part of his magnum opus *Economy and Society*, Max Weber identified three kinds of authority - legal, traditional and charismatic[2]. Legal authority, which is exemplified by modern bureaucratic structures in which authority flows from a formal role in a system of rules and procedures, and traditional authority, which relies upon past Practices and assigns power to the person rather than the role, each tend toward stability. Charismatic authority, which is based upon the recognition by others of a particular leader's special endowments, is dynamic and change-oriented. Inherently unstable in Weber's view, charismatic authority burns brightly for a brief time and then fades into the everyday routines of rational bureaucratic or traditional authority[3]. It is evanescent in its nature and some may think that the disruptive force of true charismatic authority must be channeled into more stable forms of authority, lest constant change overwhelm us and deny us the opportunity for sustained social life.

Weber's three kinds of authority remain a powerful analytic device. History offers many examples of individual charismatic leaders who seem to birth a movement by sheer personal force. That movement then develops institutions, practices and relationships that become central organizing principles of a new or changed order. Sometimes the leader controls these changes and sometimes they play out over more years and in more places than the leader could know. But figures as diverse as Francis, Luther, Napoleon and Gandhi have been understood through Weber's ideal type of the charismatic leader. In each case, we can analyze the processes by which their disruptive, innovative and challenging ideas came to permeate the accepted social structures of a later time. And in becoming part of routine life, we might ask what is lost and what is gained of the goals and ideas of these leaders? Must we join Weber in seeing two stable institutional paths[4] - one leading to the more efficient but more bloodless world of bureaucracy and the other leading to the less efficient, more personal world of traditional authority? And what is our individual and collective place in this process? Can we know it in prospect and perhaps influence it or can we only see in retrospect and describe it as history?

1) Max Weber, *Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, tr. A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (Oxford University Press, 1947). All citations to Weber's work are to this edition, which introduced this part of *Economy and Society* to English speaking audiences in the immediate aftermath of WWII. The complete work was not available in a single English edition until 1968. Although the Henderson-Parsons translation has been criticized, Parson's introductory essays are well worth reading. It is fascinating to glimpse Weber, who predicted many elements of the Nazi movement before he died in 1920, through Parsons' midwar translations. Particularly revealing are Parsons' comments about the uncertain future of the Nazi party and the open possibility, from that perspective, that its charismatic authority could undergo institutionalization, depending on the outcome of the war. These remarks are at pages 72 and 73 in Parson's introductory essay to this volume of Weber's work. Fortunately, Parsons' anxieties about the future of that system proved unfounded and the post-war period gave rise to very different concerns in the social sphere.

2) Ibid., 324-82.

3) 'In its pure form charismatic authority has a character specifically foreign to everyday routine structures.' Ibid., 363.

4) Hans Urs von Balthasar followed Weber to develop the important dialogue between institutional and charismatic authority in the structures of organized religion.

And perhaps even those questions are unfair to the depth and insight Weber brought to these questions. For he recognized that ideal types were the gateways to broad social theory, but captured neither the nuances of lived experience nor had any direct purchase on the normative realm[5]. So I note from the outset that Weber's ideal types of legitimate authority are powerful categories that must be understood as analytic tools in the social realm, not statements of normative commitment. We must look outside social theory for our normative commitments.

But Weber's views remain one of the most important starting points for investigating and interrogating the dialogue between charismatic and institutional authority in contemporary social life. And in what follows, I hope offer an account of a particular instance of charismatic leadership as illuminated by Weber's categories and use the ideal type to bring some order to the vast social landscape. I also hope to remember that the ideal type is a departure point, not a destination.

This paper applies Weber's idea of charismatic authority to the role of Dr Martin Luther King, Jr., in the American struggle for racial equality and social justice. Viewing Dr King as a paradigmatic example of the charismatic leader, this paper will recount a bit of the story of his central role in the American civil rights struggle from the mid-1950s to his death in 1968. Much of Dr King's work and his legacy is well explained in Weber's framework. Dr King's individual leadership, legitimated by his extraordinary personal gifts, inspired millions to action. After he passed, leadership of his movement devolved upon a group of leaders legitimated largely by their individual relationships with Dr King but much of the ongoing work passed into a diffuse network of agencies, courts and other rational, bureaucratic structures. In one light, the story will appear as a clear progression of legitimate authority from a charismatic figure to both traditional and bureaucratic structures of authority in American society. The channeling function of both kinds of institutional authority is clear from the course of American history. Dr King's strongest ideas and America's best hope for deep change were captured and domesticated. Each form of institutional authority played and plays its role in dampening change and stabilizing social structures at the expense of the ideals Dr King championed. Or at least that narrative will be brought to the foreground by attention to Weber's ideal type of charismatic leader and offers an intelligent, sensible history of the period. It is a view that explains how America found a bit of racial justice but failed to make more dramatic changes many still seek.

But telling that story will also permit its interrogation. Without reducing the truly world historic impact of Dr King, we can retell his story to highlight the ongoing ferment into which he stepped and the social and historical conditions that supported his uniquely powerful voice and message. Seen in this light, the charismatic figure may be disruptive to his or her peers but quite in tune with the conditions of his or her age. So in that retelling, first we deconstruct a bit of the idea of the disruptive core of the charismatic figure.

The retelling will also highlight other sources of Dr King's authority, beyond the

5) Weber, *Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, 89-115, n. 2 (defining meaning as having two types, actual and pure, and discussing the uses and limits of pure or, as they have more commonly come to be known in English, ideal types in the analysis of social action).

Weberian idea of a non-rational recognition by other of the leader's special endowments or gifts. While Dr King was undoubtedly understood by many of his followers as uniquely endowed, he also derived significant authority from the power of his ideas and the widely shared revulsion of the gross injustices against which he fought. Many also saw a good deal of rational self interest in the civil rights struggle, recognizing the many opportunities for personal and group advancement in the material sphere in an era of greater racial equality. So here too, we can deconstruct Dr King's authority and better understand how his charism was rooted in the social conditions he encountered.

Lastly we can problematize the routinization of Dr King's legacy. While the picture of progression to a mixed legacy of bureaucratic and traditional authority is quite powerful, analysis at the level of social structure misses the degree to which individuals were themselves transformed and the degree to which new versions of social life may arise within those structures. So first we will ask if routinization at the level of social structure is always so successful in cabining change. In the larger dynamic, individual change can drive social change and alter the landscape in the longer term. Second, and less confidently, we may ask whether new social conditions can give rise to social structures Weber did not imagine? Do Weber's ideal types capture the possibilities for the role of charismatic leadership in a society dramatically more dynamic, informed and democratic than Germany in the early twentieth century? Can Weber's deep insights be usefully expanded by attention to the important roles of professional and private corporate authority in America? I think contemporary life permits us to imagine a future in which the spark of charism need not be extinguished in the name of social stability but can remain an integrated force for change and ongoing transformation, whether that happens primarily on the individual level or the level social structure.

1. Dr King as the Ideal Type of Charismatic Leader

In 1955, the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr, turned 26 and received his Doctorate from Boston University[6]. The year before he had become the pastor of the Dexter Avenue Baptist Church in the midsized Southern American city of Montgomery, Alabama. The son of a well known Baptist minister in Atlanta, now Dr Martin Luther King, Jr, felt the uncertainty and anxiety characteristic of young people at the start of their professional lives[7]. Those emotions are near universal, even as aspects of Dr King's situation were quite particular to his time and place.

6) This account of Dr King's life draws heavily upon a very concise and very insightful biography. Marshall Frady, *Martin Luther King, Jr.: A Life* (Penguin, 2002). Frady, a journalist, captures Dr King's path from uncertain young man to martyr with great style and feeling. Of course the serious student of Dr King must turn to Dr King's own writings and the important secondary literature that has developed, but Fray's account offers a sufficient and accessible version for this modest project.

7) Frady, *Martin Luther King, Jr.*, 19-27, describing Dr King's student years and his uncertainties about where and in what setting to begin his professional life.

If you have never traveled in the American south and talked to those who lived in that time, it may be hard to appreciate the stone cold racism that pervaded that society, even after World War II. In many white towns across the south, segregation remained total. Black labor was exploited and black social life was rigidly separated from white social life. Where mixing was inevitably required by economic structures - even blacks had to ride the buses to get to work in the white homes and businesses - physical separation was enforced as one of the many markers of the two worlds. Blacks rode in the back of the bus and their material lives presented constant reminders of not just the separation but also the constant readiness to use physical coercion to enforce the social order and sometimes just to remind folks of the social order. Beatings, lynching and rape were among the bodily manifestations of the violent insistence on separation and inequality that characterized all of economic and social life.

This was the world that Dr King knew so well. And the inner strength he found to lead his church and soon all of black Montgomery in the act of massive peaceful resistance that marked the beginning of the great American civil rights struggle of the post WWII era, suggests the kind of 'supernatural, superhuman or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities[8]' that Weber puts at the heart of charismatic authority. Still a very young man, Dr King was able to bring his interest in the ideas of Gandhi and Bayard Rustin into the lived experience of that community and steer those people through 358 days of a bus boycott that combined exemplary organization of an alternative transportation system with successful navigation of a complex landscape of hostile entrenched political authority and a national media quite uncertain of both its new role and the meaning of these very dramatic and unfamiliar events.

In this telling, the Montgomery bus boycott marks the emergence of the charismatic leader whose special gifts are rather suddenly recognized by a large community which follows him in a dangerous, disruptive and entirely new course of action. The leader relies on mechanisms and structures almost wholly outside the existing sphere, including a new transportation system and an alternative power structure. And, in keeping with Weber's ideal type, King made no effort to profit from or build economic structures in this work[9]. He did not organize a competing transportation system for profit nor play the heroic warrior to seek booty or as we would say in the contemporary world, monetize his fame through media exposure. And, again in close agreement with Weber, we see that Dr King's charisma was 'the greatest revolutionary force ... involv[ing] a subjective or internal reorientation ... result[ing] in a radical alteration of the central systems of attitudes and directions of action[10].' For there can be no doubt that the Montgomery bus boycott and the integration of that transit system, turned that world upside down. But the power of Weber's ideal type to illuminate Dr King's journey is not nearly exhausted. Selecting just a few highlights from his world changing career, we see Dr King attracting and selecting the circle of disciples through which much of his authority

8) Weber, *Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, 358.
9) Ibid., 362.
10) Ibid., 363.

would be exercised. For as Weber noted, the charismatic leader has disciples or followers, not officials[11]. So with Dr King, as a group of inspiring and inspired lieutenants soon collected around him. Their names, including Ralph Abernathy, Jesse Jackson, Andrew Young, Fred Shuttlesworth and Medgar Evers, remain well known, along with the important stories and works of each. But in keeping with Weber's type, while these men formed organizations and their work took on some of the forms of both rational and irrational authority, their work together, particularly in the early days, was not characterized by centralized administration, formal rules or limited by notions of precedent. This brief sketch does not permit more detailed illustrations but the history of Dr King's work is quite consistent with Weber's view that the charismatic leader's authority comes from the recognition of his special gifts by others. They willingly follow the leader on the path he takes, not because they understand, approve or agree, but because they think the leader possesses unique insight.

So Dr King's path, not apparently evident even to him, led from Montgomery to Albany, Birmingham, Selma and Washington, D.C. The political, social and religious activities that combined in each of these periods of social action unfolded over ten years and on the level of social structure, have more in common with military campaigns, crusades and pilgrimages than with everyday, routine social life. The path from one to another was dictated by neither rational bureaucratic planning nor tradition. Dr King did not move smoothly from one to another. Rather his path was uneven and periods of great progress were interspersed with times of great doubt, contention and inaction. Somewhat famously, Dr King's last years were characterized by a great expansion of his vision as he cast his eyes beyond racial segregation supported by law and looked toward the greater subjugation of the oppressed by the reigning economic structures. His murder completed his fulfillment of the ideal type of charismatic leader, as he passed from prophet to seer to martyr.

Even at his death, America was already struggling to routinize the extraordinarily disruptive forces Dr King had unleashed. And as Weber foresaw, the routinization took both rationalizing lawful bureaucratic and traditionalizing forms[12]. On the rationalizing side, the existing structures of lawful authority worked through the two American subsystems that generate law in the common law system. Both judicial and the legislative branches worked quite hard to both tame and stabilize these impulses. Judicial and legislative routinization offer two characteristic examples but they do not begin to catalogue the changes made to accommodate and control Dr King's work against injustice.

The judicial routinization is well known through the many court cases establishing and protecting the new understanding of racial justice in America. These cases have come to form a complex web of rights and limitations that establish grand standards and limit the government's power to enforce those standards, taming and stabilizing through judicial authority. The legislative aspect is also well known. The Civil Rights Acts are just the most famous of a now complex body of Ameri-

11) Ibid., 360.

12) 'Indeed, it its pure form charismatic authority may be said to exist only in the process of originating. It cannot remain stable, but becomes either traditionalized or rationalized, or a combination of both.' Ibid., 364.

can statutes and rules that also mark a complicated, convoluted set of boundaries that redefine but do not wholly reshape the territory Dr King first encountered in Montgomery Alabama.

In looking to the role of traditional authority in the routinization of Dr King's legacy, we must first look to the forces of reaction and remember the long, hard, grinding struggle to give lived experience to the changes in the rational, lawful order. The gap between the law and life remained wide for quite a few years. While the Federal government in Washington, D.C., acted, in large part, through lawful authority to advance a mild version of King's agenda, local authorities throughout the South and much of the rest of the nation tended toward resistance based on traditional authority. This is particularly evident in the strong and typical appeal to history and tradition in support of the maintenance of segregation and other forms of oppression.

But there were also many exercises of traditional authority in support of an array of modified, stabilized forms of Dr King's charismatic agenda, particularly among American religious movements. Black churches were clearly central in this struggle and Jewish Congregations and progressive White Protestant denominations also played very important roles. These organizations of traditional authority were, and remain to some degree, central loci for Dr King's agenda. They supported his work during his life and have played a key role in sustaining parts of his vision.

A final example of the traditional side of the routinization of Dr King's legacy is the history of the movement he founded after his murder. As Weber predicts of the general case, problems of succession and the development of administrative structures proved very difficult for Dr King's closest associates to navigate. Of course we cannot know how he might have addressed this problem had he lived. But the experience in America was that the particular movement or group of which Dr King was the direct leader quickly lost its very central place in the ongoing struggle and became one of many competing ongoing structures offering leadership and exercising authority on these issues.

Seen in this light, which I think a fairly standard reading of Dr King and the American experience in the twenty five years after WWII, the explanatory power of Weber's ideal type of charismatic leader is striking. Most of the central features, including the nature of Dr King's authority over his followers, the structures of the social groupings around him, the nature and development of his personal vision, as well as the course of the forces he unleashed, are all strongly consistent with Weber's theory. It is a testament to Weber's genius that his insights can still powerfully illuminate a landscape so different from the early twentieth century German perspective out of which his ideas emerged.

2. Dr. King and the Lived Experience - Deviation from the Ideal Type

But the application of Weber's powerful model does not begin to exhaust the power of *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* to help us understand Dr King or the nature of charismatic authority in social structures. For as Weber tells us in this work:

> For purposes of a typological analysis it is convenient to treat all irrational, effectually determined elements of behavior as factors of deviation from a conceptually pure type of rational action ... The construction of a purely rational course of action in such cases serves the sociologist as a type (ideal type) which has the merit of clear understandability and lack of ambiguity. By comparison with this it is possible to understand the ways in which actual action is influenced by irrational factors of all sorts ... Only in this respect and for these reasons of methodological convenience, is the method of sociology 'rationalistic.' … It certainly does not involve a belief in the actual predominance of rational elements in human life …[13]

As I understand Weber's idea, having highlighted the ways his conception of charismatic authority explains a particular case, we can usefully turn to the ways in which that case deviates from the pure or ideal type. This methodological turn can now bring the particular factors, of all sorts, which also influenced Dr King's extraordinary journey, from background to foreground. For while Dr King was a charismatic leader, like all such figures, his charism played out upon and responded to particular social conditions.

As I am about to retell the story of Dr King and offer a different view, some may wonder which of the two stories is true. At this stage I can only say that both have a lot of truth and neither are the truth. I offer this other version to highlight the spaces where theory and lived experience diverge. I understand from Weber that if we look in that space, we can often see how theory can better account for the social reality. And once I have sketched this other view, I will offer my very rudimentary thoughts on what the deviation between the ideal type and Dr King's lived experience can tell us about the social reality of charismatic leadership.

In 1955, the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr, turned 26 and received his Doctorate from Boston University. The son of well known Atlanta minister, the Reverend Martin Luther King, Sr, young Martin had grown up in the heart of America's Black elite. Educated at the well known historically Black Morehouse College, he went north to Crozer Seminary in Pennsylvania and then Boston University in Massachusetts for his graduate work. Exposed to the intellectual currents in Boston, the cradle of American elite education, he was torn between staying in the north and returning to his southern roots. Although ministers were often among the black educated elite, Martin Luther King's strong interest in Gandhi and Bayard Rustin marked him out as unusually intellectually adventurous among his peers. To no small degree, his path to the place where he became famous was determined by the happenstance that the Dexter Avenue Baptist Church in Montgomery, Alabama, a midsized southern city very different from his native Atlanta, Georgia, was looking for a pastor.

Although much of the rural American south seemed timeless and unchanged in the mid-1950s, the inevitable creep of modernity was starting to leave its mark. Many more Americans than ever before had traveled extensively, serving overseas

13) Weber, *Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, 92. A more generalized statement of this idea is found in *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*.

or in other parts of the country during the war. Mass media, which had spread so widely in the form of radio and periodicals by the start of the war was bolstered by TV. Urbanization, mechanization and bureaucratization proceeded apace. The descent of the Iron Curtain in Europe united Americans more closely on issues of foreign affairs and created more space for domestic disagreement.

Into this shifting material and political culture came powerful new ideas. Many Americans were influenced by their understanding of the war. For what was more evident than that God fearing, equality loving Americans had beaten back the horrific threat of subjugation by a regime of singular injustice and brutality? In the immediate years after WWII, many Americans, like others, were too shocked and disoriented to make sense of the overwhelming yet fragmentary and unbelievable evidence of the depth of the Nazi atrocities. Although it would take another twenty years until the term 'the holocaust' took on its current American meaning, by the mid-1950s the brutality of the Nazis had already become proverbial and America's role as a protector of the oppressed was widely celebrated.

This was the world Dr King found in Montgomery. And full of ambition as well as anxiety, this was the world that brought a nascent social movement to his doorstep. Dr King did not invent the idea of the bus boycott, nor was he so obviously the leader Montgomery's Black citizens needed. Young, inexperienced and not from around those parts, he was led by his church members and his colleagues in those early days and not well able to respond to his adversaries or manage the media. He participated in a process that cobbled together an action that cost many individual Blacks money, time and significant effort but finally moved the local power structure through economic action and federal intervention. It was the first of the mass movements of the period but the social reality made them inevitable. Only the particulars remained to align in some specific form.

In this retelling the leader was a contingent particular in a historical system and followed the community in a dangerous and disruptive action. He gave some great speeches but the people of Montgomery followed him because they were sick and tired of being oppressed and had gotten wind of larger social changes that emboldened them to act. The necessary improvisation attendant upon the emergency drove them to create an informal organization but the legitimacy of its leaders was based upon shared values and goals, as much or more than upon the perceived special gifts of the leader.

And perhaps the claim that charismatic leadership brings forward new conceptions must also be reconsidered. For as much attention as Dr King received in 1955, it must be remembered that others were already long-engaged in the very significant effort to invoke lawful authority against racial segregation. The law was already shifting when Dr King gave his famous sermon in December, 1955. Some part of his authority also flowed from his identification with and invocation of the lawful authority that Thurgood Marshall, Charles Hamilton Houston and others had worked so famously, so brilliantly and so hard to develop. And of course even they stood on the shoulders of others who had been writing and speaking about the conditions of Black America since before the American Civil War.

From this perspective, while the Montgomery bus boycott received national attention and led to a successful legal challenge, was it really the product of or an example of 'the greatest revolutionary force', as Weber characterizes charismatic

leadership? Even if it altered some internal compasses, the social world of Montgomery, Alabama was shaken but not significantly altered for many years. Perhaps Dr King was not a prophet with new disruptive ideas but was particularly able to hear and apply the ideas abroad in his day to the social problem the members of church brought to him. And looking forward, Dr King's thoughts and actions became progressively less charismatic and tended more toward the economic sphere, with an eye toward the long-term stability of any change he might accomplish.

And as we think about the ways Dr King's ideas and life still exert influence in American culture, it is important to note a third path in which they have run, perhaps outside of either rational or traditional authority. In the American experience, a third, more private kind of authority plays an important social role for which Weber did not really account[14]. While Weber's account stresses the role of the State and Church, the two dominant official repositories of authority in his society, the American experience has long been characterized by important reservoirs of authority outside of either the state or a single dominant church. For example, a very important force for continued change in the struggle for racial equality and social justice has been a cohort of lawyers who used the law but were not official actors and whose understanding of their professional role was changed by Dr King and his movement. Unlike their predecessors, many lawyers came to understand themselves as social change agents in the era of the civil rights struggle.

Of course the unique role of lawyers in American society has received comment since Alexis de Tocquevill's famous treatment of the topic in his 1835 classic, Democracy in America. Important actors in a vast sphere of private action and authority, largely unregulated by either lawful or traditional authority through much of nineteenth-century America[15], lawyers continue to exercise significantly more authority in common law countries than in civil law jurisdictions. Another aspect of the sphere of private authority in America is the important role of non-governmen-

14) This argument follows Talcott Parson's comments on Weber's inattention to private professional practice as an important source of social authority in contemporary societies which is neither bureaucratic nor traditional (Parson's introductory essay, 58, n.4). It is not surprising that Parsons, an American, would be more sensitive to the role of private authority than Weber. The distinctive character of Anglo-American law, for instance, is due in part to its continued heavy reliance on private actors and private enforcement, relative to the civil law tradition. Parsons developed this insight in a number of works, including 'Law as an Intellectual Stepchild', 47:3-4 *Sociological Inquiry*, Vol. 11 (1977). Parsons is among the distinctive twentieth century voices in American sociology and his insights into American conditions are powerful, whatever views one may hold on structural-functionalism, a label Parsons himself did not seem to much like.

15) The private quality of so much American law in the nineteen century has been much remarked upon and cannot be overstated. Inefficient communication, coupled with strong tendencies toward local control and rejection of social hierarchy made bureaucratic control in the form of appellate review and other modes of central control neither feasible nor desirable. On the other hand, the widely shared understanding that American conditions were exceptional and novel militated strongly against traditional authority, as did the fact that in many places, there simply was no tradition or precedent upon which to rely. Although I am suspicious of American exceptionalism (which all too often attempts to excuse or justify), Weber's categories do not appear to capture all the nuances of authority in the American experience.

tal actors in providing social services and other kinds of community support most often assigned to official actors in the European tradition. These two aspects of private action in America came together in the late nineteenth century in a nascent private legal movement in support of social justice for immigrants and the poor.
This conception of lawyerly role and authority fits comfortably within the American tradition of private social services and was a small part of the legal landscape until the era of the civil rights movement. Of course lawyers had long been involved in the pursuit of social justice through law, but as the mass movement arose, a new conceptualization of the possibilities for lawyers' work developed. In addition to manipulating the levers of legal authority from within, lawyers began to look for ways to change the legal system and make its promise of justice real for many more people. Characteristic of this change in the profession's idea of its mission was the rapid growth of programs that tried to deliver legal services and bring legal protections to people and communities who had never been afforded legal representation in the past. The number of lawyers representing the poor and disempowered funded by either government or private not-for-profit organizations exploded. While this movement, often known as public interest or social justice lawyering, in the United States has undergone many changes and its disruptive energies have been challenged and channeled, it remains an important source of social action in the field on which Dr King struggled.
Aspects of private practice make it particularly well suited to carry on the disruptive work of the charismatic leader. Even as professional practice in America is heavily regulated by rule and moderated by a strong professional culture, authority and hierarchy remain much more decentralized and diffuse than is found in structures of either official lawful or traditional authority. Individuals can and often do pursue disruptive agendas, unrestrained by either a bureaucratic or traditional controls. American law is often shaped by private actors and so much of Dr King's legacy can be seen in the work of thousands of lawyers who are neither exercising rational lawful authority within bureaucracies nor traditional authority. While this authority has affinities and tendencies that can be assimilated to either category, the American experience suggests that in this case, at least, the energy of this charismatic leader has resisted routinization by flowing into this third path[16].
While traditional authority tames charisma largely through appeal to historical precedent and rational lawful authority tames charisma through bureaucratic control, the private arena diffuses charisma but does not control it directly. So, in the legal sphere, any private actor in America can challenge almost any law on almost

16) This brief discussion highlights what the sociologist Talcott Parsons called the 'professional complex' in American society. Another, perhaps even more significant repository of private authority in America, coordinate with but distinct from state authority is the for-profit corporation. This sector exercises tremendous power in America, often through authority that can also be understood through Weber's lens but differs first because it is independent of state authority and while bureaucratic, is rational primarily in a particular economic understanding rather than a particular political legal understanding. On the continuing special role of for-profit corporate authority in America, consider the U.S. Supreme Court case holding that corporations have a right to free speech in elections and striking down campaign contribution limitations. See *Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission*, 558 U.S. (2010).

any ground. While it is quite unlikely that any one challenge will have significant impact, American law is full of important, even decisive cases that were initiated and pursued without any input or control by the structures of lawful or traditional authority[17]. This has certainly been true in the area of racial equality. Indeed, in recent years, some of the most significant cases in the ongoing reaction against government authority to promote racial equality have arisen in just this way[18]. On balance, however, the emergence and continued significance of public interest lawyering in America as a significant aspect of the legal profession is an important outgrowth[19] of the civil rights era and has played an important role in sustaining and advancing Dr King's work.

So in this retelling of Dr King's work I have highlighted ways in which his path diverged from that of the ideal charismatic leader. His leadership in the early days was hesitant and in important way, collaborative. His ideas were much in the air before he began to advocate them and his followers were motivated by their agreement with him and self interest, as much as by their recognition of his special endowments. And his spark was not only routinized by bureaucracy or tradition but in its dynamic aspect also found more welcome ground in the American sphere of private authority, where it lives on in the actions of lawyers and others who use structures of both lawful and traditional authority but are themselves best understood as members of a separate structure, the professional complex.

3. Reflections on Charismatic Leadership

I have told two stories of Dr King. One foregrounds his unique contribution and how it was absorbed by Weber's two stable structures of authority. In this account, Weber's powerful analysis fits the facts quite well and yields enduring insights. The second story foregrounds the inevitability of the social changes in which Dr King participated and the way they also flowed into a kind of private reservoir of authority that may be distinct from Weber's three categories. In many respects, even the account of professional and corporate authority in America also relies upon and

17) Of course, the courts in which these cases are heard are central organs of lawful authority. And this is a very important limitation on this argument, even as we recognize that Anglo-American courts are closer to fora in which disputes are resolved by the parties than the typical conception of the civil law court, where the central activity is not the party's actions but the court's application of the law.

18) *Ricci v. DeStefano*, 557 U.S. (2009). In this recent U.S. Supreme Court Case, several white firefighters brought their own civil action against the government body that authorized a civil service exam which they alleged discriminated against them. The Supreme Court reversed lower courts and held in favor of these plaintiffs, who initiated a private action that has now become the vehicle for an important and binding statement of American law regarding racial equality.

19) Some have argued that the idea of professionalism upon which 'public interest lawyering' is based is an outmoded structure, offering only the balm of false consciousness to lawyers who cannot accept that they are truly engaged in business. Russ Pearce, 'The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar', *New York University Law Review*, Vol. 70, (1995), 1229. On this view, public interest lawyering will always be an elitist preserve with marginal impact.

illustrates Weber's theory of charismatic authority. And to the degree the second version highlights deviation from the ideal type, it helps us understand the particular contours of Dr King's work and also refine our idea of the type.

So first we might consider the genesis of charismatic leadership in the context of action for social change in America. What are the relative roles of the individual charismatic leader and the larger social needs that leader encounters, in bringing change? In retrospect, social action always has a cast of inevitability about it, as it is always grounded in the social reality of its day. While the distinguishing features may be hard to see in prospect, historical exploration always reveals some regularities and continuities. Yet the charismatic leader, as well illustrated by Dr King, is often distinguished by his or her ability to perceive and act upon new social realities before others. The idea of the truly original, discontinuous idea as the ground for disruptive change is quite attractive, particularly to the American attuned to individualism and exceptionalism.

But Dr King, for all the change he wrought, is best understood as an example of a leader rooted in his time and place. His was an agenda responsive to the great injustice of his time which did not sweep away but changed his society. Much of the power of his leadership flowed from his ability to give voice to deeply held and widely shared aspirations and realize them through skilful melding of ideas then current but not often held together. Though the ideas of peaceful civil disobedience and equality did not originate with Dr King, it is hard to deny that he emerged as the powerful expression of the concrete needs of his time.

Any retelling of his story must recognize, as Weber put it, the exceptional quality of his leadership. While he developed and elaborated fundamental ideas about justice and the power of love to shape communities, his was not primarily a rational gift in Weber's terms. While he was part of a rich and ancient religious tradition, his power was not primarily based on claims of history and tradition. And while he participated in a movement that aimed at broad legal change as an important part of its agenda, his power did not flow from any direct effort to change the law[20]. His charismatic gift, endowment or ability was his ability to gather strands of thought that others had developed and give voice to a uniquely powerful way they could be combined to address the conditions he encountered.

Particularly later in his career, and sometimes to his frustration, it became true that it was not what he did or said that mattered to some, but only that he was. In that later phase, he exemplified a mature example of Weber's ideal type of charismatic leader. But if we seek the core of his unique gift, we should look to its emergence. For it was in the formative time when his vision encountered the social ground on which it took root and flourished that the nature of the gift is best displayed. The widely acknowledged charismatic leader who received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1964 was already an institution, of a sort. The uncertain young man of 1955, just beginning to reflect his special endowments, exemplifies the core of Weber's ideal type for it was then he stood as a true agent of dramatic change with nothing but his gift to see the moment to guide himself and others.

20) At least not as an agent. He was famously a subject of the legal system, but that is quite different. See Martin Luther King, Jr., *Letter From a Birmingham Jail* (1963).

Weber also tells us that social structures respond to charismatic leaders by routinizing their authority. And we have seen how the American experience offers many ready examples of that process. But Weber's analysis of social action leaves open two areas in which charismatic authority may be less susceptible to routinization and may maintain more of its disruptive force than Weber discussed. One area, explicitly left open by Weber is the potential for individual change and the impact of individual change upon social structures. Weber's concerns were broader than the individual. And many different conceptions of the individual and how he or she may flourish or be diminished can be lived out in the same social structures. While it is true that some social structures better support some kinds of normative commitments, those relationships are quite complex and not the focus of *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*.

But individual change can be an important aspect of how charismatic authority can bring societal change. Probably best analyzed through psychology, rather than social theory, the followers' experience of the charismatic leader, which Weber names but does not really discuss, quite characteristically involves an experience of personal growth and often a shift in normative commitment. In the experience of being drawn to and recognizing the authority of a charismatic leader, so many of us are touched and changed as individuals, often in ways we cannot fully analyze. The American experience illustrates how important individual change can be in sustaining and extending the disruptive force of charismatic leadership. So even as social structures contain the energies unleashed by a charism, the individuals whose normative commitments have shifted press back and over time. The social structures react to that new normative pressure and reach a new equilibrium, (perhaps in this case) not fundamentally altered but receptive to new orientations toward legitimacy.

This has clearly been the American experience. While institutional structures changed to some extent, norms have shifted quite strongly over time. While race clearly and unequivocally remains a significant and difficult social issue in America, much has changed in the fifty years since Martin Luther King, Jr, went to Montgomery, Alabama to become the pastor of the Dexter Avenue Church. Overt public racism has all but disappeared, Black economic life still lags but is an order of magnitude more vibrant than it was in the earlier period and physical separation is less common and much less likely to be violently imposed. These deep and important changes reflect changes on several levels but the importance of shifting individual views, supported by changes in social structure but distinct from those changes, cannot be denied[21].

And beyond individual change, we might also wonder about the possibility of a kind of authority Weber did not foresee: an authority neither lawful and bureaucratic nor traditional, but one which resides in smaller, more autonomous groups and is more diffuse and less constrained. This is the authority typical of the American professions, including medicine, law, architecture and journalism, at least in

21) Of course there is a vigorous debate over whether individual or structural shifts are truly generative of changing societal normative commitments. I only note that debate here and offer the merest of speculation that individual change is a significant factor.

the heyday of the printed newspaper. This form of authority is sometimes thought characteristic of Anglo-American legal authority[22] and distinctive from the continental understanding of law. As Parsons noted[23], while the professional's authority is rooted in his or her role defined competence, like the bureaucrat, the professional does not derive authority from his or her place in larger system but stands in an individual relationship to his or her client or patient. The client or patient relies upon the professional's expertise but from his or her perspective, the expertise, if often quite hard to evaluate, takes on a bit of the quality of the charismatic endowment. And, as noted, professional authority is regulated by but is not part of state authority. So in these ways, the important American example of professional authority exemplifies a distinct type.

While modern democratic states have given rise to mass movements, as Weber foresaw when he worried about how such societies could devolve into more traditional and repressive kinds of regimes, as Weimar Germany descended into National Socialism, today it is also common to foresee a utopian future of flatter, less hierarchical societies empowered by information efficiency. In this ideal, there is more room for innovation and disruption as contemporary communications, transport and connectivity enable much greater diversity in relationships and empower local communities to shape their own lives in more powerful ways.

On this reading of Dr King's legacy in the contemporary world, there is space for each of us to be agents of radical change, if we are so motivated. The flexibility and power of modern means of production create opportunities for a multitude of new forms and permit us to consider and respect relationships that may not have been possible or feasible in an earlier age. Of course, as Weber warned and the history of the twentieth century so clearly illustrates, dynamism and ready change are just the other side of the coin of social instability and can slide all too quickly into irrationality. Traditional authority still offers the clearest path to stability and maintaining ordinary routines. Rational bureaucratic authority clearly has advantages in managing complex societies but the stability of tradition and the efficiency of bureaucracy are each problematic in their own ways.

Tempting though the utopian vision of small interconnected communities of strong individuals can be to an Anglo-American temperament, it too has its dystopian side. When everyone makes all their own choices, for just their own reasons, social cohesion is lost and the war of all against all rages[24]. But whether we come to think there are three or four kinds of authority, Weber's dynamic picture of the

22) Mirjan Damaska, 'Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure', *Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 84 (1975), 480-544. Using the criminal procedure to illustrate how English common law reflects a preference for diffuse, competing authority and pragmatic resolution while continental conceptions of law emphasize hierarchy and theoretical consistency.

23) See note 15, above.

24) So one dystopia points toward the breakdown of mass culture and the denial of the possibilities of diverse and integrative communities. Another dystopian vision sees the maintenance of mass culture but worries that the for-profit corporation will replace the all encompassing state to create a regime of mass oppression oriented more toward economic than political subjugation. In this world, political slogans are replaced by advertising jingles but are no less fierce in their denial of individual worth and their power to destroy true community.

interaction among these structures remains very powerful and the story of the American struggle for racial equality and social justice well illustrates the ways these forces can interact as a matter of abstract theory. Those categories, in turn, help us understand the ways those force did interact in that particular time and place.
As Parsons captures so well, the American tendency is to diffuse and balance competing authority, rather than concentrate it. On the one hand, this tendency lessens the probability of dramatic change and makes it that much harder to make a clear break with the wrongs of the past. On the other hand, the American idea of multiple coordinate structures of authority, much of it beyond state control, can create space for constant, if slower change. And this model seems particularly well suited to the preservation and transmission of a charism. For if the charismatic leader burns bright, he or she can pass a thousand or a million sparks to others. And if those others have channels through which their sparks can be maintained and transmitted, if the society is open to a wide array of actors exercising diverse kinds of authority, it can experience the dynamic process of change that can come with the coordinated movement of millions of small steps instead of the few large steps of centralized change understood entirely through the hierarchical vision of either lawful bureaucratic or traditional authority.
In the realm of social theory, ideal types are a powerful device for ordering the great mess and confusion of our lived reality. And few have created ideal types as powerful, evocative and lasting as Max Weber. His tripartite conception of authority retains its power and his analysis of how mass movements can slip into oppressive irrationality was all too prescient. He foretold the main currents of the middle and very bloody years of the twentieth century. But few are as insightful as Weber and the future course of our social structures is all too opaque. In this paper I have tried to gesture toward a social world in which less monolithic structures empower smaller, more diverse communities to choose paths that integrate but do not stifle the spark of charism and change that earlier ages, with their more brittle structures, found so disruptive. I have argued that the lived reality of the American Civil Rights struggle led by Dr King offers an example of this possibility. Some will read my history as lacking and some will read my theory as inadequate but I suspect many will identify with the hopes that motivate me to look down that path.

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